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Abstract
Based on quantum physical phenomena, quantum information theory has a potential
which goes beyond the classical conditions. Equipped with the resource of complemen-
tary information as an intrinsic property it offers many new perspectives. The field
of quantum key distribution, which enables the ability to implement unconditional
security, profits directly from this resource. To measure the state of quantum systems
itself for different purposes in quantum information theory, which may be related to
the construction of a quantum computer, as well as to realize quantum key distribution
schemes, a certain set of bases is necessary. A type of set which is minimal is given by a
complete set of mutually unbiased bases. The construction of these sets is discussed in
the first part of this work. We present complete sets of mutually unbiased bases which
are equipped with the additional property to be constructed cyclically, which means,
each basis in the set is the power of a specific generating basis of the set. Whereas
complete sets of mutually unbiased bases are related to many mathematical problems,
it is shown that a new construction of cyclic sets is related to Fibonacci polynomials.
Within this context, the existence of a symmetric companion matrix over the finite
field F2 is conjectured. For all Hilbert spaces which have a finite dimension that is a
power of two (d = 2m), the cyclic sets can be generated explicitely with the discussed
methods. Results for m = {1, . . . , 600} are given. A generalization of this construction
is able to generate sets with different entanglement structures. It is shown that for di-
mensions d = 22
k
with k being a positive integer, a recursive construction of complete
sets exists at least for k ∈ {0, . . . , 11}, where for higher dimensions a direct connection
to an open conjecture in finite field theory by Wiedemann is identified. All discussed
sets can be implemented directly into a quantum circuit by an invented algorithm.
The (unitary) equivalence of the considered sets is discussed in detail.
In the second part of this work the security of a quantum public-key encryption
protocol is discussed, which was recently published by Nikolopoulos [Nik08a], where
the information of all published keys is taken into account. Lower bounds on two
different security parameters are given and an attack on single qubits is introduced
iv
which is asymptotically equivalent to the optimal attack. Finally, a generalization of
this protocol is given that permits a noisy-preprocessing step and leads to a higher
security against the presented attack for two leaked copies of the public key and to
first results for a non-optimal implementation of the original protocol.
Zyklische komplementa¨re
Basen und
Quantenkryptographie mit
o¨ffentlichen Schlu¨sseln
Kurzfassung
Quantenmechanische Pha¨nomene verleihen der Quanteninformationstheorie ein Poten-
zial, welches u¨ber die klassische Informationstheorie hinausgeht. Die hierin verankerte
Fa¨higkeit, komplementa¨re Information zu erzeugen, bietet viele neue Mo¨glichkeiten.
Die Theorie zur Quantenschlu¨sselverteilung nutzt diese Information unmittelbar aus,
um beweisbar sichere kryptografische Verfahren umzusetzen. Zur Realisierung einer
solchen Quantenschlu¨sselverteilung, aber auch zur Bestimmung eines Quantenzustan-
des, beispielsweise um einen Quantencomputer zu realisieren, werden gewisse Mengen
von Messbasen beno¨tigt. Eine kleinstmo¨gliche Menge dieser Messbasen ist eine soge-
nannte vollsta¨ndige Menge von komplementa¨ren Basen. Im ersten Teil dieser Arbeit
wird die Konstruktion solcher Mengen betrachtet. Diese haben die zusa¨tzliche Eigen-
schaft, zyklisch zu sein, d. h. jedes Element der Menge la¨sst sich als Vielfaches eines
bestimmten Generatorelementes der Menge erzeugen. Es wurde bereits gezeigt, dass
die Theorie der komplementa¨ren Basen mit einigen anderen mathematischen Gebieten
verwandt ist. Hier wird ein Zusammenhang der Konstruktion von zyklischen kom-
plementa¨ren Basen mit Fibonaccipolynomen beleuchtet. Weiterhin wird die Existenz
einer symmetrischen Begleitmatrix u¨ber dem endlichen Ko¨rper F2 vermutet. Die be-
handelten zyklischen Mengen von komplementa¨ren Basen ko¨nnen fu¨r alle endlichen
Hilbertraumdimensionen explizit erzeugt werden, deren Dimension ein Vielfaches von
zwei ist (d = 2m); Ergebnisse fu¨r m = {1, . . . , 600} werden aufgefu¨hrt. Eine Verall-
gemeinerung dieser Konstruktion ist in der Lage, Mengen zu erzeugen, welche eine
alternative Struktur der Verschra¨nkung aufweisen. Fu¨r den Fall dass die Dimension
des Hilbertraumes d = 22
k
betra¨gt, wobei k eine positive ganze Zahl ist, existiert eine
rekursive Erzeugungsmethode, solange k ∈ {0, . . . , 11} gilt. Fu¨r alle ho¨heren Wer-
te von k wird diese Konstruktion mit einer offenen Vermutung von Wiedemann aus
dem Bereich der Theorie endlicher Ko¨rper in Verbindung gebracht. Alle behandelten
Mengen lassen sich mithilfe eines vorgestellten Algorithmus unmittelbar als Quan-
tenschaltkreis realisieren. Die (unita¨re) A¨quivalenz verschiedener behandelter Mengen
wird ebenfalls im Detail betrachtet.
vi
Der zweite Teil dieser Arbeit behandelt die Sicherheit eines ku¨rzlich von Niko-
lopoulos [Nik08a] vorgestellten asymmetrischen Verschlu¨sselungsprotokolls, welches
o¨ffentliche Quantenschlu¨ssel verwendet, wobei der Informationsgewinn aus allen ver-
o¨ffentlichten Schlu¨sseln fu¨r die Betrachtung eines potenziellen Lauschers beru¨cksichtigt
wird. Es werden untere Schranken fu¨r zwei verschiedene Sicherheitsparameter angege-
ben sowie ein Angriff besprochen, welcher einfach zu realisieren ist, da er nur einzelne
Qubits misst. Es wird weiterhin gezeigt, dass dieser asymptotisch a¨quivalent zu einem
optimalen Angriff ist, welcher physikalisch schwieriger umzusetzen ist. Abschließend
wird eine Verallgemeinerung des Protokolls vorgestellt, welche durch das absichtliche
Einbauen von Sto¨rungen zu einer ho¨heren Sicherheit fu¨hrt. Exemplarisch wird dies fu¨r
den Fall gezeigt, dass ein bzw. zwei Exemplare des o¨ffentlichen Schlu¨ssels vom An-
greifer abgefangen werden. Diese Verallgemeinerung kann auch zur Betrachtung einer
nicht idealisierten Realisierung des Ausgangsprotokolls genutzt werden.
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Notation
In this document, several mathematical symbols are used. To avoid misinterpreta-
tions, we list the most important symbols in the following, starting with the definition
of different sets, operators, and matrices. The section ends by a description of the
notation of vectors.
Sets
Symbol Meaning
K A general set
R Set of real numbers
C Set of complex numbers
N Set of natural numbers starting with zero
N∗ Set of natural numbers starting with one
Z Set of integers
Zm Set of integers modulo m with m ∈ N∗
Fp Finite field with p elements, p ∈ N∗ and p prime
Fpm Finite field with pm elements, p,m ∈ N∗ and p prime
Mm(K) Set of m×m matrices with entries from K
GLm(K) Group of invertible m×m matrices with entries from K
Operations
Symbol Meaning
⊕m Addition of two values modulo m ∈ N∗
gcd(a, b) Greatest common divisor of a, b ∈ N∗
[x] Largest integer not greater than x ∈ R (Gaussian floor)
dxe Smallest integer not less than x ∈ R (Gaussian ceiling)
〈a〉 Group generated by the element a
a⊗ b Tensor product of two linear operations a, b
which act on a finite dimensional Hilbert space
xiv CONTENTS
Matrices
Symbol Meaning
1m m-dimensional identity matrix
0m m×m zero matrix
Vectors
Usually, vectors are written in the form ~a = (a1, . . . , am)
t, with numbers a1, . . . , am
from a certain set, m ∈ N and (·)t denoting the transposition of a vector or matrix. In
few cases, where it is mentioned in addition, the same vector is given by a for a better
readability.
Chapter
1
Introduction and outline
As long as humans populate our world, their addiction to analyze the incidents and
the behavior of this world is gigantic. On the one hand, this attitude may result from
the benefits this knowledge provides. On the other hand, it seems to be based on
the pure exploration urge. Already a long time ago, humans started to systematize
their knowledge; it leads to specifically adapted methods for the different fields and
allows a better overview which is helpful in order to teach younger generations. A first
approach which coined nowadays methods in the occidental culture was given by the
Platonic Academy. The idea of science was introduced and different sciences were de-
fined. Aristoteles was one of the first members of this Academy who was motivated in
discussing natural phenomena; the physical laws were summarized systematically the
first time by Isaac Newton in his famous Principia Mathematica in the 17th century.
Later on, based on the number of results and obviously the different forms of research,
natural sciences were divided amongst others into biology, chemistry, and physics.
Around the 19th century, different research topics on physics were of interest, which
are nowadays called the areas of classical physics, namely mechanics, electrodynamics,
thermodynamics, and optics. With the beginning of the 20th century, modern physics
came up with the theory of general relativity and quantum mechanics. The latter be-
came necessary in order to avoid the ultraviolet catastrophe which came up with the
Rayleigh–Jeans law which was derived to describe black-body radiation. Max Planck
finally solved this problem by introducing the so-called Planck constant h. The aim
of quantum mechanics is, roughly speaking, the description of physical phenomena at
microscopic scales, but many descriptions succeeded this idea which are contrary to
the usual expectation. There are Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (complementary
variables cannot be measured perfectly), entanglement (a system can have more infor-
mation than the sum of the information of the subsystems), no-cloning-theorem (un-
known quantum systems cannot be copied perfectly), and many more. Fundamental
legitimation problems still arise from the Copenhagen interpretation which describes
the measurement process as a wave-function collapse which is not convenient to the
normal time evolution in quantum physics. Bell introduced his famous no-go theorem
which describes a test to distinguish between system states which occur in classical
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physics and systems states which occur only in quantum physics. His goal was to
solve the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox which challenged the Copenhagen
interpretation in order to ask whether quantum mechanics is complete. Along with
these fundamental questions, the effects which originate from the theory of quantum
mechanics (and which are also observed in experiments) have the potential for several
applications.
As long as humans populate our world, their creativity in order to avoid undesired
duties is unlimited. An important benefit is to save time for more important concerns,
another is possibly the unattractiveness of tasks which can be schematized easily. A
first important innovation were water clocks, already known in Babylon which were
able to measure time automatically. Based on the steam engine, the industrial revolu-
tion started in the 18th century and helped the workers to implement larger projects.
Around the same time, Charles Babbage invented the first mechanical computer and
the concept of a programmable computer in order to automatize tedious and error-
prone calculations. Ada Lovelace worked theoretically on this computer in the 19th
century and is seen as the first programmer. The first digital computer was build in
the 20th century and was able to solve simple mathematical problems; with the minia-
turization computers became more and more powerful and helped to solve complicated
mathematical problems. Numerical methods and the idea of simulating systems with
computers took place into the scientific research. Nevertheless, many problems are too
hard to be implementable efficiently into classical computers.
As long as humans populate our world, they have secrets which they like to share
only with selected persons. Different ciphers were known already in the ancient Greece
in order to hide information or to make information unreadable to third parties. In
the 20th century, more complicated ciphers were implemented by machines, like the
Enigma during the second world war, which was able to encrypt and to decrypt mes-
sages in a complicated but logical way. As all algorithms were broken, they became
more and more complex. In 1882, a simple cipher, the one-time pad was described
by Frank Miller1. It encodes each letter of the message with an individual letter of
the key, thus the key has to be as long as the message. It can be proven by methods
of information theory, that this cipher is unbreakable, if the key is perfectly random,
only used once and not leaked by a third party. Those problems seem to be unsolvable
in the classical ways.
A combination of these three mentioned research areas, namely quantum mechan-
ics, computer sciences, and cryptography, is given by the field of quantum information
theory. Equipped with the effects of quantum mechanics, it seems that a new genera-
tion of computers, so-called quantum computers, may have the capability to expand the
efficiency of classical computers dramatically. The first example is the Deutsch–Jozsa
algorithm, which scales exponentially faster on a quantum computer, but is mostly of
scientific interest [DJ92]. The first quantum algorithm which demonstrated the practi-
cal potential of the quantum computer was invented by Peter Shor in 1994 [Sho97] and
is able to perform prime factorization in polynomial time–which does not seem to be
possible for classical computers. As many common asymmetric cryptographic ciphers
such as RSA are based on the difficulty of this problem, Shor’s algorithm would affect
1Steven Bellovin figured out in 2011 that Frank Miller invented the one-time pad 35 years before
Gilbert Vernam and Joseph Mauborgne, who were in general seen as the inventors [Bel11].
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instantly the security of nowadays secret information–which is important for the secu-
rity of credit cards, for instance.2 Already in 1984, ideas of Charles Bennett and Gilles
Brassard paved the way to recover a security scheme which may replace the classical
cryptography by quantum cryptography. After Shor’s algorithm was known, security
proofs for the quantum key distribution protocol were given. Finally, as quantum
computers seem to be efficient, they are seen as an attractive candidate to simulate
quantum systems for their analysis.
To realize a quantum computer, different methods and tools need to be explored.
For several purposes, the construction of complete sets of cyclic mutually unbiased
bases is relevant as will be seen in Section 1.1. These bases find their applications
also in the field of quantum cryptography. Regarding the development of the field
of quantum cryptography, the security of many protocols is important and should
be analyzed. A discussion on the security of a recently invented quantum public-key
encryption scheme is started in Section 1.2.
1.1 Cyclic mutually unbiased bases
The first part of this work deals with the problem of constructing complete sets of
cyclic mutually unbiased bases (MUBs).
A detailed introduction into the history, the properties and the applications of
MUBs is given in Chapter 2. Complete sets of MUBs play an important role for
quantum state tomography of finite dimensional quantum systems, as they define a
minimal set of measurement bases. This qualifies them for example to be a candidate
which measures states of quantum registers, a part of a quantum computer. Further-
more, MUBs have a large potential in quantum cryptographic protocols. In order to
increase the efficiency of these protocols it turned out that, by using higher-dimensional
information carriers, complete sets of MUBs need to be constructed for higher dimen-
sions, most suitable with a cyclicity property [Cha02, Cha05, RA06]. This cyclicity is
a special property those sets may obey, which means that a whole set is generated by
the powers of a single element. As it is not even known yet if complete sets exist in
all complex Hilbert spaces with a finite dimension, MUBs are still a field of current
research.
Whereas first ideas on complete sets of MUBs were given by Ivanovic´ [Iva81] and
Wootters and Fields [WF89], applications of cyclic sets and alternative constructions
were discussed many years later by Chau [Cha05] and Gow [Gow07]. These ideas are
retraced in Chapter 3, together with mathematical methods which are used later on.
2In 1996, another important quantum algorithm was found by Lov Grover [Gro96], which improves
the search in an unsorted list quadratically whereas the classical algorithm seems to be optimal within
a classical setup.
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In Chapter 4, a construction of complete sets of cyclic MUBs is introduced. Fol-
lowing the methods of a systematic scheme of Bandyopadhyay et al. [BBRV02], we
published a first work in 2010 in which we construct cyclic sets of MUBs in all even
prime power dimensions [KRS10]:
Complete sets of cyclic mutually unbiased bases in even prime-power di-
mensions,
by Oliver Kern, Kedar S. Ranade, and Ulrich Seyfarth,
in Journal of Physics A 43, 275305 (2010).
The introduced methods allow to reduce the problem of explicitely constructing a
complete set of MUBs for a Hilbert space of dimension d = 2m in a first step from
(2m)2 free variables of Z4 to m2 variables of Z2. With the help of a second step, an
assumed reduction of the search space, the number of free variables goes below (m/2)2.
A second work formalizes and extends these results as it shows the relation of the
construction with so-called Fibonacci polynomials [SR12]:
Cyclic mutually unbiased bases, Fibonacci polynomials and Wiedemann’s
conjecture,
by Ulrich Seyfarth and Kedar S. Ranade,
in Journal of Mathematical Physics 53, 062201 (2012).
Furthermore, we prove the existence of complete sets of cyclic MUBs for the discussed
construction. Results of both manuscripts are given in Section 4.1; numerical methods
which deal with the search of the solutions in the remaining space which is spanned by
the free variables are summarized in Section 4.1.1. An analytical approach which may
lead to a symmetric companion matrix 3 is given in Section 4.1.2. In Section 4.2 results
of the second work are presented, which show that for m = 2k with k ∈ N, a complete
set of cyclic MUBs for dimension d = 22
k
can be constructed recursively. Namely, it
can be constructed from the complete set of cyclic MUBs for dimension d = 22
k−1
at
least for k ∈ {1, . . . , 11}, which is shown in Appendix C.1.4, limited by the largest
Fermat number for which the prime factorization is known. For all k, it is proven in
that section that the problem is related to an open conjecture in finite field theory by
Wiedemann [Wie88] which is still of current interest [MS96, Vol10]; an approach for a
proof is given in Appendix B. In Section 4.3 a unique form of representing complete
sets of cyclic MUBs in order to be able to compare different sets is given.
Discussions with L. L. Sa´nchez-Soto drew the author’s attention to the problem
of constructing complete sets of cyclic MUBs with different entanglement properties.
An introduction is given in Section 4.4, a first subclass, presented in Section 4.5.1, is
a generalization of the construction which was explored in the two mentioned articles.
First approaches on two other classes are given in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.6. Results can
be found in Appendices C.1.1, C.1.2, and C.1.3.
An important representation of sets of MUBs are sets of unitary operators. There-
fore, a transformation of the different sets into a unitary operator representation is
3The conjectured construction of a symmetric companion matrix assumes, that for each polyno-
mial with coefficients in F2, a symmetric matrix can be constructed which has that polynomial as its
characteristic polynomial.
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given in Section 4.7, which is published in the first work. For those sets which can be
constructed recursively, we published another manuscript [SR11]:
Construction of mutually unbiased bases with cyclic symmetry for qubit
systems,
by Ulrich Seyfarth and Kedar S. Ranade,
in Physical Review A 84, 042327 (2011).
The first part of these results is shown in Section 4.7.2, namely that the corresponding
unitary operator can also be constructed recursively. Finally, the generators of these
complete sets of MUBs can be implemented by a quantum circuit into an experimental
setup. In the context of the Bachelor thesis of N. Dittmann, the construction of the
circuit was generalized for all discussed sets of cyclic MUBs and even more general
operators, which is presented in Section 4.8. As the implementation of a large cyclic
set may accumulate errors, a more practical implementation for such sets is drawn in
Section 4.8.4, which makes nevertheless use of the cyclic structure.
Chapter 5 deals with the equivalence of MUBs. A slight generalization of the
results of [SR12] is presented and it is proved that the introduced method constructs
complete sets of cyclic MUBs which are (unitary) equivalent to others like the non-
cyclic sets constructed by Wootters and Fields [WF89].
Finally, the results are concluded in Chapter 6 and an outlook on possible future
research topics is givens.
To keep the sections short, many results are shown in the appendices as well as
basic mathematical properties. In Appendix A, tools from algebra and quantum
information theory which are important for this work are summarized.
An approach to prove Wiedemann’s conjecture is presented in Appendix B.
Most of the computational results are given in a compressed form in
Appendix C. Section C.2 shows the appearance of similar fractal patterns in Fi-
bonacci polynomials and characteristic polynomials of certain matrices which are both
important for the construction of cyclic MUBs. Section C.1.5 lists generators for com-
plete sets of cyclic MUBs for dimensions d = 2m with m ∈ {2, . . . , 600} for the method
introduced in [KRS10], taking advantage of the improvements of [SR12]. The results
which may indicate the existence (and maybe a construction) of a symmetric compan-
ion matrix are given shortly in Section C.1.6. Then, generators of sets of cyclic MUBs
with different entanglement properties are listed for four-qubit systems in Sections
C.1.1 and C.1.2 and in Section C.1.3, respectively. Finally, the Matlab code which is
used to test Wiedemann’s conjecture for k ∈ {0, . . . , 11} is shown in Section C.1.4.
1.2 Quantum public-key encryption
The second part of this work treats the security of an asymmetric protocol of quantum
cryptography which was recently published by Nikolopoulos [Nik08a]. As quantum
cryptography wants to offer unbounded security, detailed security analyses are essen-
tial. Since no security proof exists yet for this commonly known quantum public-key
encryption (QPKE) protocol, a detailed analysis was published [SNA12]:
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Symmetries and security of a quantum-public-key encryption based on single-
qubit rotations,
by Ulrich Seyfarth, Georgios M. Nikolopoulos, and Gernot Alber,
in Physical Review A 85, 022342 (2011).
In Chapter 7, an introduction into the protocol is given.
Within Chapter 8 all new investigations on the security of the protocol are de-
picted. Namely, Section 8.2 deals with the security of the private key which is essential
for the security of the protocol. If though, the security of encrypted messages has to
be guaranteed in addition, as they can be attacked directly and in the worst case by
using all copies of the public key. This message security is analyzed in Section 8.3,
where the security against a used security parameter is shown for an attack which can
be implemented easily. Nevertheless, it is also shown that this attack has a similar
behavior as a class of very general attacks.
In the context of the Bachelor thesis of W. Mian the effect of a noisy-preprocessing
step was analyzed. With two simple attacks in Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2 it is shown in
Section 8.4.3 that the security of the message increases with the help of this method.
Nikolopoulos’ protocol, which is assumed to work in an ideal description of the world,
has to be transformed into a protocol which is used in a real description of the world, as
errors come into account. But therefore, this method can also be used in order to model
errors in the construction process of the public key. Obviously, the implementation of
error correction protocols needs to be discussed within further work.
The second part is concluded and an outlook is given in Chapter 9.
Part I
Cyclic mutually unbiased bases

Chapter
2
Introduction
A fundamental characteristic of quantum mechanical systems is the uncertainty prin-
ciple which was formulated by Heisenberg in 1927 [Hei27]. It describes the observation
that pairs of physical variables exist which cannot be measured simultaneously with
maximal precision. If this mutual influence is maximal, the variables are called comple-
mentary.1 As finite-dimensional quantum mechanical systems are described by density
matrices that are defined in the Hilbert space H = Cd, a set of operators exists that
defines a unitary operator basis (and is capable to describe properties of complemen-
tary variables). Back in 1960, Schwinger derived initially a complementary pair of
operators that is able to describe two complementary variables in an arbitrary finite
dimensional Hilbert space [Sch60]. It turned out that the absolute overlap of two
vectors from different bases is constant for a given dimension. Ivanovic´ followed this
path, motivated by the complete state estimation of an unknown quantum state, and
figured out that the minimal number of pairwise complementary operators needed to
determine the quantum state completely, equals the dimension of the Hilbert space
plus one [Iva81]. His considerations result in a construction method for a complete set
in prime Hilbert space dimensions, whereas Wootters coined the notion of mutually
unbiased bases (MUBs) for pairwise complementary operators [Woo86]. In collabo-
ration with Fields, he presented a construction method for complete sets of MUBs
in prime power Hilbert space dimensions [WF89]. Pointing back again to Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle, it was conjectured by Kraus and shown by Maassen und
Uffink that the optimal solution for a certain kind of uncertainty relations is a set of
MUBs [Kra87, MU88].
It still remains an open question that is under current research, how many bases
a maximal set of MUBs contains for composite Hilbert space dimensions.2 Even for
the smallest such dimension, which is d = 6, this problem is unsolved, where the
1A common example is the measurement outcome of the electron spin; if the spin is known to be
in an eigenstate of the Pauli-σx operator, the outcome of a measurement in the basis of the Pauli-σz
operator is completely undetermined.
2The term “composite dimension” refers to dimensions that cannot be represented as the power
of a prime number.
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largest known sets have only three elements.3 Also many different constructions to
that given by Wootters and Fields were figured out (e. g. [BBRV02, KR04]).4 In
2005, Chau proved a theorem which predicts the existence of a cyclic group generator
that can be used to generate a complete set of MUBs [Cha05];5 in other words, such a
complete set of cyclic MUBs is given by the powers of a single unitary operator. It was
shown by Gow [Gow07], that cyclic sets exist only for even-prime power dimensions.
An example of such a cyclic set was already used by Gottesman in 1998 in order to
transform the three Pauli operators cyclically [Got98]. The advantages of a cyclic
generation of a set of MUBs were used in proofs of the quantum cryptographic six-
state protocol [Lo01, GL03] and even an abstract definition of such sets was taken into
account to prove generalizations of that protocol [Cha05].
The aim of the first part of this work is to continue this path by finding explicit
constructions of cyclic MUBs in a straightforward way with suggestions for a direct im-
plementation of these sets into experimental setups. After addressing the fundamental
properties of MUBs, their usage in the fields of quantum state estimation, quantum
key distribution, and further relations in the subsequent sections, different well-known
constructions will be discussed in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3. Properties of the so-called
Fibonacci polynomials are presented and extended in Section 3.2, which are fundamen-
tal for the generation of complete sets of cyclic MUBs in Chapter 4. Three different
constructions are given in Sections 4.2, 4.5, and 4.6, that aim on sets with specific
entanglement properties which are derived in Section 4.4. It turns out that another
form, the Fermat-based sets which are discussed in Section 4.1, are related to an open
conjecture in finite field theory which was given in 1988 by Wiedemann [Wie88]. Sup-
posed this conjecture is true, an unlimited class of complete sets of cyclic MUBs can
be created by the given recursive construction. Until then, the results given in Ap-
pendix C.1.4 can be used for the construction of complete sets of cyclic MUBs for
dimensions d = 22
k
with k ∈ {0, . . . , 11}.6 By their nice form, these sets can be imple-
mented quite easily into quantum circuits as shown in Section 4.8.1. For more general
cyclic MUBs, another method is presented in Section 4.8.2. An improved practical
implementation is suggested by a promising method in Section 4.8.4. The classifica-
tion of the generated sets of MUBs is derived in Chapter 5, where the equivalence of
the sets with known constructions is discussed. The results are summarized and an
outlook is provided in Chapter 6.
2.1 Relations
From a mathematical point of view, MUBs are related to many mathematical ob-
jects of other research fields. In the context of the existence of a complete set of
MUBs with d + 1 bases, a well-known connection to orthogonal Latin squares was
established [Zau99, GHW04, PDB09], but also finite projective planes play an impor-
3There is strong evidence that these sets are maximal [Zau99, Gra04, BBE+07, RLE11].
4A recent review article on MUBs was published by Durt et al. [DEBZ10].
5The proof by Chau is based on finite field theory, whereas Gow gave a proof based on represen-
tation theory [Gow07].
6The limitation to k = 11 is limited due to the largest known prime factorization of Fermat
numbers.
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tant role [SPR04, Ben04, BE05]. In the context of equivalence of MUBs, relations to
symplectic spreads [CCKS97] and affine planes [Kan12] are of importance.
2.2 Quantum state estimation
As already mentioned, MUBs were originally introduced in the context of quantum
state estimation [Iva81, WF89] and seen as a good candidate for optimal schemes for
quantum state tomography . For a systematic approach, we may observe the general
state of a quantum system, which is defined in a d-dimensional Hilbert space H = Cd
by a density operator
ρ =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|, (2.1)
which is diagonal in its orthonormal eigenbasis {|ψi〉}i with a normalized probability
distribution, where
∑
i pi = 1 holds. More generally, we can describe the state vectors
|ψi〉 as the eigenvectors of ρ with their corresponding eigenvalues pi. An experiment
which measures the state ρ of the system in its orthonormal eigenbasis, will measure
the state |ψi〉 with probability pi. Since these probabilities have to be real, quantum
mechanics postulates ρ to be Hermitian, thus ρ = ρ†.
If we are aware of the eigenbasis of ρ and have infinitely many copies of the system
state ρ, we can measure infinitely many times within the eigenbasis to reconstruct
the probability distribution, thus we have to solve a well-known classical problem,
namely the approximation of a probability distribution by sampling. The number of
free parameters of ρ is d − 1, since ρ can be represented by a diagonal d × d matrix
with a normalized set of real eigenvalues.
Conversely, if we are not aware of the eigenbasis of the state ρ, it can still be
represented by a normalized Hermitian matrix that might not be diagonal and has
at most d2 nonzero entries. By Hermiticity, those entries can be described by d2 real
parameters. Normalization of the matrix fixes another parameter and leaves d2−1 free
parameters7 that describe an arbitrary quantum state ρ of the d-dimensional Hilbert
space H. Measuring on infinitely many copies of the system in some basis {|φi〉}i,
we learn at most d− 1 free parameters due to the normalization of the measurement
outcome. Since the total number of free parameters of the quantum state ρ is d2 − 1
and by a single measurement operator we can figure out d − 1 of those parameters,
it turns out that we need at least d + 1 different bases to completely estimate the
quantum state.
The set of unitary operators of the d-dimensional Hilbert space defines exactly
the set of possible orthonormal bases, where the row vectors of the unitary operators
are identified as the basis vectors of the corresponding orthonormal basis. Thus, in
order to completely estimate the system state ρ, one has to find a set of d + 1 bases
from the set of unitary operators.8 Given such a set, the application of a unitary
7In contrast to the d−1 free parameters in the case where the system is measured in its eigenbasis,
additional free parameters appear which encode the basis information.
8In the following, we will use this correspondency without mentioning again and declare unitary
operators as bases.
12 CHAPTER 2. INTRODUCTION
transformation to all bases will not affect the amount of information that is extracted
by the measurements. Hence, we are free to choose one of the bases to be the standard
basis. Measuring a state that is diagonal in that standard basis with one of the d
remaining bases should lead to equally probable outcomes, even if the system is in a
definite state (in the standard basis). To achieve this goal, the overlap of every vector
of this basis with every vector from the standard basis has to be constant. If we want
to find such a set of d + 1 bases to reconstruct the state ρ completely, the operators
have to fulfill those properties pairwise, which leads to the concept of MUBs.
Definition 2.2.1 (Mutually unbiased bases).
A set of orthonormal bases S = {B0, . . . ,Br−1}, r ∈ N∗, of the d-dimensional Hilbert
space H = Cd is called a set of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs), if for every pair
(Bk,Bl) with k 6= l, the absolute value of the overlap of their basis vectors is constant.
With Bk =
{|ψk1〉, . . . , |ψkd〉} and Bl = {|ψl1〉, . . . , |ψld〉}, there holds∣∣〈ψki |ψlj〉∣∣ = 1/√d, (2.2)
for k, l ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}, k 6= l, and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Such a set of MUBs is called complete if no set in the same Hilbert space exists
which has a higher number of elements, it is therefore a maximal set. For a Hilbert
space of dimension d this size is in general still unknown. Nevertheless, it was shown
by Wootters and Fields with geometric arguments that each set has at most d + 1
elements [WF89];9 another proof based on the connection of sets of MUBs with pairwise
orthogonal matrices was given by Bandyopadhyay et al. [BBRV02].
2.3 Quantum key distribution
Another area of application for sets of MUBs emerged in 1984, when Bennett and
Brassard introduced their ideas for quantum key distribution (QKD) [BB84]. The aim
of this approach is to solve the classically unsolved problem of a secure distribution of
a common secret key to two distinct parties, called Alice and Bob. The classical cipher
which is known as one-time pad guarantees a secret transmission of a message between
two parties, provided that both parties share a perfectly random bit-key, which has
at least the size of the message and is used only once. Classically, this key cannot be
distributed secretly from Alice to Bob, but a guaranteed secure key transmission may
be implemented with the help of QKD.
In a general formulation, Bennett and Brassard use in their approach a qubit10 in
order to send quantum information from Alice to Bob. At random, Alice prepares
the qubit either in an eigenstate of the Pauli-σx or Pauli-σz operator.
11 By construc-
tion, the eigenbases of these operators are mutually unbiased in the sense of Definition
9Wootters and Fields give also a construction of sets with d + 1 elements if the dimension of
the Hilbert space is a power of a prime. For none of the remaining dimensions, even for d = 6, a
construction of d+ 1 elements is known.
10A qubit denotes a two-level quantum system, which may be in any complex superposition of two
possible quantum states |0〉 and |1〉, namely α|0〉+ β|1〉, with α, β ∈ C2, |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
11More information about the Pauli operators is given in Appendix A.4.
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2.2.1. In the chosen basis, quantum state |0〉 or |1〉 is again taken randomly with equal
probability. After the qubit is sent to Bob, he measures randomly in one of the two
distinct bases. If he chooses the same basis as Alice, he will obtain the encoded bit
perfectly, if not, the property of the MUBs leads to a random output.12 Therefore,
Alice and Bob communicate after the measurement of the qubits over a classical au-
thenticated channel13 and discard those pairs of bits, where they have chosen different
bases. If the transmission would be perfect, both parties would share a common key
at this point, but as the transmitted single qubits encounter quantum noise on the
channel, a perfect correlation between the qubits of Alice and Bob cannot be guaran-
teed. By declaring some of the transmitted qubits as test qubits, they can calculate
the induced bit error rate; in principle, this error rate cannot be distinguished from
an error a possible eavesdropper Eve induced, so it is seen as information which is
leaked to her. Possible attacks can be considered within a quite general way, but for
simplicity reasons one may focus on a rather straightforward, but powerful attack,
which is called intercept-and-resend attack. In this case, Eve measures each qubit in
one of the two preparation bases randomly. Consequently, in average, in every second
case the basis is correct and in cases where Eve took a different basis than Alice and
Bob, her probability to measure the correct result is only 1/2. Therefore, she induces
an error of 25% in the case she attacks each qubit. Alice and Bob can correct this
error by using classical error correction protocols and try to rule out the information
the eavesdropper got, by so-called privacy amplification protocols. The tolerable bit
error rate (BER) by using the mentioned post-processing protocols is limited by the
corresponding proof of the protocol, which guarantees unconditional security. For the
protocol by Bennett and Brassard a first rigorous proof was given by Mayers which
allows a tolerable BER of 7.5% [May96]. Many versions of this BB84 called QKD
protocol are known (see e. g. [Eke91, Ben92]) and further rigorous proofs also in order
to raise this limit were given (e. g. [LC99, SP00, GL03]). Finally, Chau proved that
this limit can be raised asymptotically to 20% [Cha02]. A formulation of this result
which is usable in a larger context was given by Ranade and Alber [RA06].
A promising approach which uses the properties of MUBs and generalizes the
BB84 protocol was considered by Bruß in 1998 and is called six-state protocol [Bru98];
its security was again rigorously proven [Ina00, Lo01]. The six-state protocol makes
use of the third variable σy, that is complementary to σx and σz. So the protocol
uses then a complete set of three MUBs in a Hilbert space of dimension two. By
the same arguments as above, it is clear that only 1/3 of the transmitted pairs can
be used. It was again proven by Chau as well as by Ranade and Alber, that the
tolerable error rate is roughly 27.6%, which is clearly above the limit for the BB84
protocol [Cha02, RA06]. Considerations of possible generalizations of this protocol
show that this rate can be raised asymptotically up to 50% by using complete sets
12Imagine, the eigenstates of the Pauli-σz operator are denoted by |0〉 and |1〉. If the quantum
state 2−1/2(|0〉 + |1〉) (which is then an eigenstate of the Pauli-σx operator) is measured by the
operator |1〉〈1|, the respective expectation value is 1/2, thus no information about the prepared state
is measured.
13To guarantee, that the classical messages Alice and Bob receive are not sent by Eve, they have
to be authenticated with the help of a previously shared key; used schemes take then advantage of
universal hash functions as introduced by Wegman and Carter [WC81].
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of MUBs and qudits14 as information carriers, which are defined in an d-dimensional
Hilbert space [RA07]. Examinations of these protocols indicate, that a cyclic property
of the set of MUBs is advantageous [Cha05]. Those cyclic sets have the property, that
all elements within the set are given by the powers of one element of the set of bases.
14A qudit denotes the generalization of a qubit, namely a d-level quantum system with all possible
complex superpositions of d orthogonal states for which their absolute squares sum up to one.
Chapter
3
Fundamentals
The first natural step when aiming on the construction of complete sets of cyclic MUBs
is the reconstruction of existing complete sets of MUBs with the purpose of finding
steps in the construction that are suitable in order to generate cyclic sets. It may
be useful to combine different aspects and ideas from different approaches in order
to achieve this goal. Ultimately, these considerations may lead to new ideas that
require fundamental observations of more distant aspects which become relevant. The
aim of this chapter is to retrace exactly this path. Within Section 3.1, two different
approaches for the construction of complete sets of MUBs will be discussed in order to
get a notion of MUBs and to have a playground which enhances the potential for the
construction of cyclic sets. It will turn out later in this work (cf. Section 4.1), that
the properties of so-called Fibonacci polynomials are useful for that construction. The
basis properties and their relation to the usual Fibonacci series will be discussed in
Section 3.2, as well as advanced results that appeared in literature and own results.
3.1 Constructions
Many different constructions of complete sets of MUBs are known in literature. As
later discovered by Klappenecker and Ro¨tteler, Alltop gave a construction for all
prime dimensions with p ≥ 5 unknowingly in 1980 by solving a different problem
[All80]. One year later, a construction which works for all prime dimensions was
given by Ivanovic´ [Iva81] and generalized to prime power dimensions by Wootters and
Fields [WF89] many years later. This construction is based on basic observations of
the properties of complete sets of MUBs and known results from number theory and
field theory, respectively. Klappenecker and Ro¨tteler gave a precise formulation of all
these constructions more than a decade later, using finite fields and Galois rings more
explicitly [KR04]. In the meantime, a different construction was discussed by Bandy-
opadhyay et al., which is based on the partition of the set of Pauli operators [BBRV02].
As these two different approaches seem to be the most important constructions
of complete sets of MUBs that appeared in literature, they will be discussed in the
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following two sections. In Section 3.1.1, the ideas of Ivanovic´ and Wootters and Fields
are summarized, whereas Section 3.1.2 concerns with the construction suggested by
Bandyopadhyay et al..
3.1.1 Exponential sum analysis
The first general construction of complete sets of MUBs was given by Ivanovic´ for
all finite dimensional Hilbert spaces with a prime dimension d = p [Iva81]. To fol-
low his approach, let us assume that a complete set of MUBs exists. According to
Definition 2.2.1, it is clear by the usage of the scalar product, that the application of
any unitary transformation to all elements of the set causes again a complete set of
MUBs.1 Therefore, w.l.o.g., if a complete set of MUBs exists, there is always another
complete set, which includes the standard basis. To fulfill then Definition 2.2.1, all
remaining bases should have only numbers as entries with an absolute value of p−1/2.
For odd dimensions, Ivanovic´ uses a property of number theory, namely∣∣∣∣∣
p−1∑
j=0
e(2pii/p)(sj
2+tj)
∣∣∣∣∣ = √p, (3.1)
which holds for all t ∈ N, s ∈ N∗ and p being an odd prime number. This expression
is the absolute value of a generalized quadratic Gauss sum [BEW98, p. 13]. If the
component l of the vector k within the basis r is denoted as (v
(r)
k )l, the standard basis
is given by (
v
(0)
k
)
l
= δkl, (3.2)
with k, l ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}. All remaining bases, i. e. with r ∈ {1, . . . , d} within a
complete set of MUBs read in this construction as(
v
(r)
k
)
l
=
1√
p
e(2pii/p)(rl
2+kl). (3.3)
It can easily be checked that the bases given by Equation (3.3) define unitary operators
and that all of them are mutually unbiased with respect to the standard basis. To
test the mutual unbiasedness of all remaining pairs of bases in the fashion of Defini-
tion 2.2.1, the expression given by Equation (3.1) appears and guarantees the expected
result. Wootters and Fields used the fact, that a generalization of Equation (3.1) ex-
ists in finite field theory and turns out to be a good candidate in order to generalize
this construction of complete sets of MUBs to odd prime-power dimensions [WF89].
Namely, it is known that ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈Fpm
e(2pii/p) tr(sj
2+tj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = √pm, (3.4)
1As will be seen later on, this transformation is one of the transformations which leads to an
equivalent set of MUBs (cf. Chapter 5).
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holds for s 6= 0 and s, t being elements of the finite field with 2m elements [LN08].2
The trace denotes the trace defined in field theory, which maps an element of the
field Fpm to the field Fp according to Definition A.2.1 with resulting properties. The
non-standard bases read finally similar to Equation (3.3) as(
v
(r)
k
)
l
=
1√
pm
e(2pii/p) tr(rl
2+kl), (3.5)
with r, k, l ∈ F2m . Unitarity can again be checked easily. The standard basis is given
analogously to Equation (3.2), but with k, l being elements of the finite field Fpm .
As the left-hand side of Equation (3.4) turns to zero in the case that the char-
acteristic of the field equals p = 2, Wootters and Fields have reformulated the bases
defined by Equation (3.5) in a different representation in order to generate complete
sets of MUBs for even prime-power dimensions as will be discussed in a brief summary
in the following. In principle, every finite field Fpm can be seen as a vector space
over the ground field Fp, thus every element β ∈ Fpm can be written in a basis as
β =
∑m
i=1 βifi with fi being the basis vectors and βi the coefficients. The product
of two basis vectors can always be expressed within the bases by a set of coefficients
like fifj =
∑m
n=1 α
(n)
ij fn. With the help of this argumentation, the expression l
2 which
appears in the argument of the trace in Equation (3.5) can be rewritten as
l2 =
(
m∑
i=1
lifi
)2
=
m∑
n=1
ltα(n)lfn, (3.6)
with l = (l1, . . . , lm)
t on the right-hand side being a column vector and using that α(n)
is a symmetricm×mmatrix. Following this notion and that the trace in Equation (3.5)
can be rewritten as
tr(rl2 + kl) =
m∑
n=1
ltα(n)l tr(rfn) + tr(kl), (3.7)
the non-standard bases of Equation (3.5) are given by(
v
(c)
d
)
l
=
1√
pm
e(2pii/p)(l
t(c·α)l+dtl), (3.8)
where c is a vector of the coefficients which appear by a similar transformation of
that given in Equation (3.6) from r and d a vector of the coefficients which appear
analogously from k. Finally, α denotes a column vector of the matrices α(1), . . . , α(n).
The mutual unbiasedness of the bases was proven by Wootters and Fields also in
the non-field representation of Equation (3.8), but again only for odd prime-power
dimensions. For even prime-power dimensions, the construction of the set of bases has
to be adapted slightly as (
v
(c)
d
)
l
=
1√
2m
e(2pii/2)(l
t(c·α)l/2+dtl) (3.9)
=
1√
2m
il
t(c·α)l (−1)dtl, (3.10)
2It was mentioned by Klappenecker and Ro¨tteler that Equation (3.4) is related to a stronger
version of Weil’s theorem [LN08, Theorem 5.37].
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and was again proven to be a complete set of MUBs (cf. also [BEW98, p. 47]).
Identifying the rightmost term as an m-folded tensor product of the Hadamard matrix
as given in Equations (A.8) and (A.9), leads to an abbreviated form of Equation (3.10),
namely (
v(c)
)
l
= il
t(c·α)lH⊗m, (3.11)
where (v(c))l denotes the row vector with entries (v
(c)
d )l.
A more formal description of the discussed complete sets of MUBs was given by
Klappenecker and Ro¨tteler [KR04], which is based on Weil sums in the case of odd
prime-power dimensions and in even prime-power dimensions on Galois rings, which
form by their roots and the zero element the so-called Teichmu¨ller set.
3.1.2 Pauli operators partition
In 2002 a paper by Bandyopadhyay et al. appeared that follows another approach to
construct MUBs in a way that highlights the structure of these bases [BBRV02] (cf.
also [LBZ02]). In this construction, in a Hilbert space of dimension d ∈ N∗, each basis
is seen as the set of common eigenvectors belonging to a maximal set of commuting
Pauli operators within the set of all d2 generalized Pauli operators. If we exclude
the unity operator, which commutes with all operators, we can find at most d − 1
pairwise commuting operators within a single set. A partition of d+1 such sets results
in a complete set of MUBs. These partitions exist, as the previous construction (cf.
Section 3.1.1), for prime power dimensions, although, the initial approach is limited
artificially, which leads to very specific sets. In this section we will introduce the
ideas of the approach Chapter 4 is based on. Possible alternatives in the construction
process are pointed out.
We define the generators of the generalized Pauli operators Z and X, acting on a
state |i〉 of the d-dimensional Hilbert space H = Cd as
Z|i〉 = ωi|i〉 and X|i〉 = |i⊕d 1〉, (3.12)
with ω = exp (2pii/d) being the first d-th root of unity. The group which is generated by
these operators, i. e. H := 〈Z,X〉, is known as (Weyl-)Heisenberg group or sometimes
generalized Pauli group. Since phases are not relevant for unitary operators in quantum
theory, we will only refer to elements with a real and positive phase in the following,
thus we factorize the group by its center {±1,±i}1 and get the set of Pauli operators
H˜. Any element of this set is given by
ZX(k, l) :=
{
(−i)klZkX l for d = 2,
ZkX l else,
(3.13)
with k, l ∈ N, whereas Zd = Xd = 1d by construction. For prime-power dimensions
d = pm with p being a prime number and m ∈ N∗, each Pauli operator of this set can be
seen as the representation of a 2m-dimensional vector which is an element of the finite
field F2mp . Then, the generalized Pauli operators can be written in a tensor-product
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structure as
ZX(~a) =
{
(−i)az1ax1Zaz1Xax1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ (−i)azmaxmZazmXaxm for p = 2,
Za
z
1Xa
x
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ZazmXaxm else, (3.14)
with ~a = (az1, . . . , a
z
m, a
x
1 , . . . , a
x
m)
t ∈ F2mp . The commutation relation of two elements
of this set ~a,~b ∈ Fmp is given by
ZX(~a) · ZX(~b) = ω(~a,~b)spZX(~b) · ZX(~a), (3.15)
with the symplectic product (~a,~b)sp as defined in Definition A.6.2. Thus, two Pauli
operators ZX(~a) and ZX(~b) commute, if and only if the symplectic product (~a,~b)sp
equals zero, where the symplectic product is additive (cf. Corollary A.6.2).
As it is shown by Lemma A.4.1, the set of Pauli operators is an orthogonal basis of
linear operators. Thus, a possible choice is to describe every projective measurement
operator by this set. Since we aim on constructing MUBs which can be represented as
unitary operators it is natural to restrict the consideration to projective measurements
in the following. A discussion on more general measurements is given at the end of
this section. As we can parametrize any unitary measurement basis uniquely with the
elements of the set of Pauli operators, we will choose an exceptional set of MUBs, if
each basis is given directly by the common eigenspace of a subset of the generalized
Pauli operators, instead of taking a set of commuting unitary operators in general.
Therefore, we partition the set of Pauli operators into disjoint classes Cj, such that
H˜ \ {1d} =
d⋃
j=0
Cj. (3.16)
Each class Cj is a set of d+ 1 commuting Pauli operators and is created by a 2m×m
generator matrix Gj with entries in Fp, as
C ′j = Cj ∪ {1d} = {ZX(~a) : ~a = Gj · ~c : ~c ∈ Fmp }. (3.17)
By using the generator matrix in the mentioned way, the resulting set of vectors ~a
forms an m-dimensional subspace of F2mp and the class is therefore called linear.
It was shown by Bandyopadhyay et al., using Equation (3.12), that the Hilbert-
Schmidt inner product of two elements ~a,~b ∈ H˜ of the set of Pauli operators, namely
〈ZX(~a)|ZX(~b)〉HS := tr(ZX(~a)†ZX(~b)), (3.18)
vanishes for all ~a 6= ~b [BBRV02, Theorem 4.2]. Pairs of matrices with a vanishing
Hilbert-Schmidt inner product are called orthogonal. Since all operators within a
single class Cj commute, they have a common eigenbasis. But the Hilbert-Schmidt
inner product is invariant under basis transformation and reduces for diagonal matrices
to the inner product of their diagonal vectors. As at most d vectors can be found that
are mutually orthogonal in a d-dimensional space (and form therefore an orthogonal
basis), at most d (mutually orthogonal) elements of the set of Pauli operators can
be found, that commute pairwise [BBRV02, Lemma 3.1]. These elements will always
form a linear class:
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Lemma 3.1.1 (Linearity of maximal class).
A class of d commuting elements of the set of Pauli operators can always be created
by a generator matrix and is therefore always linear.
Proof. It was shown above that at most d elements of the set of Pauli operators
commute pairwise in a d-dimensional Hilbert space. By Corollary A.6.2, also those
elements ZX(~ak) and ZX(~al) commute, which can be constructed by the linear com-
binations of their generating vectors ~ak and ~al. But there is no class with more than
d elements, thus there exists always a basis of m elements which we call generator, as
in Equation (3.17).
A unitary operator basis, i. e. a basis for unitary operators, with d2 elements that
can be partitioned into d+ 1 classes with mutual orthogonal and pairwise commuting
elements, is called a maximal commuting basis and can be used to construct a max-
imal set of d + 1 MUBs [BBRV02, Theorem 3.2]. Conversely, also a complete set of
MUBs implies the existence of a maximal commuting basis [BBRV02, Theorem 3.4].
It remains an open question to figure out all (or at least all non-equivalent) maximal
commuting bases (see Chapter 5).
Therefore, in order to construct the classes Cj, we need–according to Equa-
tion (3.17)–to find d + 1 generators Gj that partition the set of Pauli operators into
disjoint classes of d−1 pairwise commuting elements each3. It will turn out later on in
this work that we are free to fix one of the classes to construct a certain set of MUBs
(cf. Chapter 5). But still, specific separability properties of the MUBs are modified
by this choice (cf. Section 4.4). A possible choice is to set the generator of the class
C0 as
G0 =
(
1m
0m
)
, (3.19)
which generates all Pauli-Z operators that obviously commute; the symbols 1m and 0m
refer to the identity matrix and a quadratic zero matrix, respectively, where 1m, 0m ∈
Mm(F2). In order to obtain classes Cj with j ∈ {1, . . . , d} that are disjoint with the
class C0, the column vectors of their generators have to be linearly independent, which
is exactly true if the block matrices (G0, Gj) are invertible for j ∈ {1, . . . , d}.4 By
Lemma A.1.2 this is true if the determinant of Gz0G
x
j − GzjGx0 is not zero for j 6= 0,
where Gj = (G
z
j , G
x
j )
t. Since Gx0 = 0m, this equation can only hold if G
x
j is invertible.
But if Gxj is invertible, we can write all generators with j 6= 0 as
Gj =
(
Gzj
1m
)
, (3.20)
which will be proven in Corollary 4.3.1 and called standard form in Section 4.3. Within
this form, the elements in a single class commute, if the symplectic product of all pairs
3As the unity element appears obviously in all classes it is excluded in order to construct disjoint
classes.
4A class with a maximal number of elements can only be created if the column vectors of a single
generator are linearly independent.
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of vectors of the generating set (thus, all column vectors of the generator) have a
vanishing symplectic product. With Gzj = (~a
z
1, . . . ,~a
z
m) follows
~azk~a
x
l − ~axk~azl = 0 for k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} , (3.21)
and with Gxj = 1m finally
azk,l − azl,k = 0 for k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} . (3.22)
Thus, the matricesGzj with j ∈ {1, . . . , d} have to be symmetric [BBRV02, Lemma 4.3].
The last point we have to achieve is that arbitrary pairs of generators Gj with j 6= 0
do not span the same vectors spaces, thus for k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the determinant of
GzkG
x
l −GzlGxk does not vanish. But with Gxk = Gxl = 1m we find
det(Gzk −Gzl ) 6= 0 for k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} . (3.23)
In summary, this leads to the following three conditions in order to construct a
maximal commuting basis if we set G0 = (1m, 0m)
t:
(1) Gj = (G
z
j ,1m) for j ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
(2) Gzj is symmetric.
(3) det(Gzk −Gzl ) 6= 0 for k, l ∈ {1, . . . , d} , k 6= l.
If the unitary operators within a class C ′j are given by
C ′j = {Uj,0, . . . , Uj,d−1} , (3.24)
with Uj,0 referring to the unity matrix 1d, there is an orthonormal basis in which all
of these operators are diagonal. This leads to a set of eigenvalues λj,k,l where k ∈
{0, . . . , d− 1} indicates the operator Uj,k and l ∈ {1, . . . , d} belongs to the eigenvector
index. Bandyopadhyay et al. have shown, that the following construction generates a
complete set of MUBs from the maximal commuting basis with Mj being the unitary
operator that is a common eigenbasis of the elements of C ′j and serves as an element
of the set of MUBs:
Mj =

λj,0,1 λj,0,2 · · · λj,0,d
λj,1,1 λj,1,2 · · · λj,1,d
...
...
. . .
...
λj,d−1,1 λj,d−1,2 · · · λj,d−1,d
 . (3.25)
Finally, we like to mention, that the set of generalized Pauli operators as it was
chosen to construct the mutually unbiased bases which may serve as a set for com-
pletely estimating the quantum state of a system, is only a subset of the most general
set of measurement operators which contains all positive operator valued measurements
(POVMs).5 Investigations on so-called symmetric informationally complete POVMs
5A POVM is a set of positive operators, {En}, which are defined by measurement operators Mn
as En = M
†
nMn with
∑
nEn = 1 for n ∈ N∗. The probability that outcome n occours is given by
p(n) = 〈ψ|En|ψ〉 if the state of the system is given by |ψ〉.
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(SIC-POVMs) may expand the state estimation techniques raised by MUBs. After this
concept was introduced in the seventies [LS73, Pru77], Zauner conjectured that a com-
plete state estimation with SIC-POVMs is possible for all Hilbert space dimensions and
showed this explicitly for dimensions d ≤ 5 [Zau99]. Whereas Renes et al. [RBKSC04]
found numerical evidences for larger dimensions, an explicit construction of a SIC-
POVM for the smallest composite dimension d = 6 was given by Grassl [Gra04]. A
formal discussion of the former results with the notion of an extended Clifford group
was done by Appleby [App05, App09].
3.2 Fibonacci polynomials
Fibonacci polynomials play an important role in the process of constructing the so-
called cyclic MUBs, which will be considered in Chapter 4. We will discuss those
properties in detail which are necessary in order to understand the features of most of
the sets of cyclic MUBs which are constructed in this work (cf. Sections 4.1 and 4.5.1).
This section starts by defining the Fibonacci polynomials and enters directly into the
area of important and generally available properties of these polynomials. We will
then examine properties which are limited to the case where these polynomials are
defined over the finite field F2. Most of these lemma with similar proofs were done
for [KRS10, SR12]. Some were already given in [WP69, Bic70, GKT97, GKW02], as
well as further properties. The existence of complete sets of cyclic MUBs, using the
constructions of Sections 4.1 and 4.5.1, can be proven with the presented results.
The well-known Fibonacci sequence can be generalized in a way to generate the
so-called Fibonacci polynomials Fn(x), which are defined recursively.
Definition 3.2.1 (Fibonacci polynomials).
The polynomial Fn(x) is called the Fibonacci polynomial of index n, and recursively
defined as
Fn+1(x) := x · Fn(x) + Fn−1(x) (3.26)
with F0 := 0 and F1 := 1.
For x = 1 we end up with the usual Fibonacci sequence given by the ordered set
{Fn}∞0 = {0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, . . .}. For further investigations it is a great advantage to have
a generalized recursion relation.
Lemma 3.2.1 (General recursion relation).
The Fibonacci polynomial Fk+l(x) with k, l ∈ N can be derived with the help of the
Fibonacci polynomials Fk(x) and Fl(x) as
Fk+l(x) = Fk(x)Fl+1(x) + Fk−1(x)Fl(x). (3.27)
Proof. We show this formula by induction. For l = 0 we find Fk(x) = Fk(x). Assuming
that (3.27) holds, we get Fk+(l+1)(x) = Fk(x)F(l+1)+1(x)+Fk−1(x)Fl+1(x) = xFk+l(x)+
Fk+(l−1)(x) by using Equation (3.26).
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We can use this relation in order to prove an important lemma on the divisibility
properties of the Fibonacci polynomials. Beforehand, we need the auxiliary lemma
which follows.
Lemma 3.2.2 (Coprime Fibonacci polynomials).
The polynomials Fn(x) and Fn+1(x) are coprime for n ∈ N∗.
Proof. It is given by construction that gcd(F1(x), F2(x)) = gcd(1, x) = 1. If we as-
sume that gcd(Fn(x), Fn+1(x)) = 1 we can step the induction forward by gcd(Fn+1(x),
Fn+2(x)) = gcd(Fn+1(x), xFn+1(x) + Fn(x)) = 1, using the assumption.
This basic divisibility property leads to a more fundamental property of the Fi-
bonacci polynomials.
Lemma 3.2.3 (Divisibility of Fibonacci polynomials).
The polynomial Fn(x) is divisible by Fm(x) if and only if m divides n, with m,n ∈ N∗.
Proof. To show the implication, let us assume that n = mm′ with m′ ∈ N∗. We note
that Fm(x) divides Fn(x) trivially for m
′ = 1. Using relation (3.27) with k := m
and l := m(m′ − 1), we proceed by induction with the assumption that Fm(m′−1)(x)
is divisible by Fm(x) and see that this implies that Fmm′(x) = Fm+m(m′−1)(x) =
FmFm(m′−1)+1(x) + Fm−1(x)Fm(m′−1)(x) is also divisible by Fm(x).
To show the converse we set n = mm′ + r with some remainder r ∈ N such
that r < m. The generalized recursion relation (3.27) gives Fn(x) = Fr+mm′(x) =
FrFmm′+1(x) + Fr−1(x)Fmm′(x). Using the normal recursion relation (3.26) we get
Fn(x) = xFr(x) ·Fmm′(x)+Fr(x)Fmm′−1(x)+Fr−1(x)Fmm′(x). By the implication, the
first and the last term are divisible by Fm(x). Since we assume that Fn(x) is divisible
by Fm(x), the term Fr(x)Fmm′−1(x) should also be divisible by Fm(x) or vanish. From
Lemma 3.2.2 we know that Fmm′(x) and Fmm′−1(x) are coprime, thus Fmm′−1(x) is
coprime to Fm(x). Since we further assume that r < m which implies that the degree
of Fm(x) is larger than the degree of Fr(x), the polynomial Fr(x) cannot be divisible
by Fm(x), thus should vanish by identifying r = 0.
Keeping these properties in mind, we can expand our investigation on the Fibonacci
polynomials by discussing their coefficients. Therefore, it is useful to read off the
coefficients a
(n)
k from Equation (3.26), meaning the coefficient belonging to x
k in the
polynomial Fn(x), and get
a
(n+1)
k = a
(n)
k−1 + a
(n−1)
k , (3.28)
with a
(0)
k = 0 for k ∈ N, a(1)0 = 1 and a(1)k = 0 for k ∈ N∗. Using this relation, we are
able to show the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2.4 (Coefficients of Fibonacci polynomials).
For Fn(x) =
∑n
k=0 a
(n)
k x
k and n ∈ N, there holds
a
(n)
k =

(
(n+ k + 1)/2
(n− k + 1)/2
)
, if n− k ≡ 1 mod 2,
0, otherwise.
(3.29)
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Proof. For F0(x) = 0 and F1(x) = 1 the statement holds. Using Equation (3.28), we
have to show that (n+k
2
+ 1
n−k
2
+ 1
)
=
(n+k
2
n−k
2
)
+
( n+k
2
n−k
2
+ 1
)
(3.30)
holds for the first case. But this is known from Pascal’s triangle. Using again Equation
(3.28), we see that the second case always stays zero.
We can restate the result of this lemma as
Fn(x) =
[n/2]∑
k=0
(
n− k
k + 1
)
xn−2k−1. (3.31)
Since the Fibonacci polynomials define a linear recurring sequence, namely an
impulse response sequence [LN08, Chapter 8], we can represent the sequence given by
Equation (3.26) by the associated companion matrix A of its characteristic polynomial
χF (Z) = Z
2 − x · Z − 1, i. e.
A =
(
0 1
1 x
)
. (3.32)
With the initial state vector 6 (F0, F1)
t = (0, 1)t, we obtain the Fibonacci polynomials
by (
Fn(x)
Fn+1(x)
)
=
(
0 1
1 x
)n
·
(
F0
F1
)
. (3.33)
If we identify the entries within the companion matrix A with their associated Fi-
bonacci polynomials, we find
An =
(
F0 F1
F1 F2(x)
)n
=
(
Fn−1(x) Fn(x)
Fn(x) Fn+1(x)
)
. (3.34)
In the case that n is decomposable into integers as n = k+l, the relation Ak+l = Ak ·Al,
namely(
Fk+l−1(x) Fk+l(x)
Fk+l(x) Fk+l+1(x)
)
=
(
Fk−1(x) Fk(x)
Fk(x) Fk+1(x)
)
·
(
Fl−1(x) Fl(x)
Fl(x) Fl+1(x)
)
(3.35)
leads directly to the generalized recursion relation (3.27).
3.2.1 Fibonacci polynomials over F2
If we limit the coefficients of the Fibonacci polynomials to be an element of the finite
field which has characteristic two and is prime, namely F2, we find further properties
which are important for the construction of cyclic MUBs. A major feature of fields
6In the theory of linear recurring sequences, an initial state vector is defined as the vector which
describes the initial state of the feedback shift register (cf. [LN08, Chapter 8]).
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with characteristic two is the fact that the minus sign can be replaced by the plus sign.
We may then create a second form of Equation (3.26), i. e.
Fn−1(x) = x · Fn(x) + Fn+1(x). (3.36)
This leads to Fibonacci polynomials with a negative index, being equal to their positive
counterparts, such that F−n(x) = Fn(x). A similar result with alternating signs can
be deduced for different prime fields. Some of the Fibonacci polynomials have special
properties if they are defined over the field F2.
Lemma 3.2.5 (Fibonacci polynomials F2n(x)).
For Fibonacci polynomials that have an even index and are defined over the finite
field F2, holds F2n(x) = xFn(x)2 for n ∈ N. More general, we can state F2m·r(x) =
F 2
m
r (x)x
2m−1 with m, r ∈ N.
Proof. Using the generalized recursion relation (3.27), we find Fn+n(x) =
Fn(x)Fn+1(x) + Fn−1(x)Fn(x). With Equation (3.26) this yields the requested result.
The second part follows by induction over m.
Despite the general recursion relation (3.27), we can deduce a symmetric gen-
eralization of the normal recursion relation (3.26), that is only valid for Fibonacci
polynomials over F2.
Lemma 3.2.6 (Symmetric recursion relation).
For Fibonacci polynomials that are defined over F2, there holds Fk+l(x) + Fk−l(x) =
xFk(x)Fl(x) with k, l ∈ N.
Proof. To show the lemma by induction, we start with the normal recursion rela-
tion (3.26). We can proceed the induction over l by using Equations (3.26) and (3.36)
as Fk+(l+1)(x) + Fk−(l+1)(x) = Fk+l(x) + Fk−l(x) + Fk+(l−1)(x) + Fk−l−1(x). With the
assumption this leads to the expected result.
Using this lemma we can formulate a subtractive type of a recursion relation.
Lemma 3.2.7 (Subtractive recursion relation).
For Fibonacci polynomials that are defined over the finite field F2, there holds
Fk+1(x)Fl(x) + Fk(x)Fl+1(x) = F|k−l|(x) with k, l ∈ N.
Proof. If we multiply the expression Fk+1(x)Fl(x) + Fk(x)Fl+1(x) by x and apply the
implication of Lemma 3.2.6, we have Fk−1+1(x)+Fk−l−1(x). Using the converse of this
lemma and ruling out the initially multiplied x we get the expected result.
With Lemma 3.2.6 in mind, we can prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3.2.8 (Completeness of Fibonacci polynomials).
All polynomials of degree m ∈ N∗ or degree m′ ∈ N∗ such that m′ divides m, which are
irreducible over the field F2, divide either F2m−1(x) or F2m+1(x), or equal x.
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Proof. If we calculate the product of x with F2m−1(x) and F2m+1(x) using Lemma 3.2.6,
we get F2m+1(x) + F2(x), which equals x
2m+1−1 + x = x(x2
m−1 + 1)2 by Lemma 3.2.5.
But the term x2
m
+ x is, as a well-known result from finite field theory (see e. g.
Lemma 2.13 of [LN08]), equal to the product of all irreducible polynomials over the
field F2, whose degree divides m.
This theorem enables us to well-define a property of irreducible polynomials which
are defined over F2 that will be important in this work later on.
Definition 3.2.2 (Fibonacci index).
Every irreducible polynomial p ∈ F[x] of degree m has a property, namely the Fibonacci
index (sometimes called depth), which is given by the minimal positive number d ∈ N,
such that p divides Fd.
Corollary 3.2.9 (Maximal Fibonacci index).
The Fibonacci index of an irreducible polynomial p ∈ F[x] of degree m is upper bounded
by 2m + 1.
Proof. The statement follows directly by applying Theorem 3.2.8.
To limit the possible Fibonacci index of a specific irreducible polynomial, we state
the following lemma which was proven by Sutner (cf. Theorem 3.1 of [Sut00]).
Lemma 3.2.10 (Irreducible factors of F2m±1).
All irreducible polynomials which divide F2m+1(x), have a linear term, whereas the
linear term of those irreducible polynomials which divide F2m−1(x) vanishes.
Finally, we like to mention that the structure of the Fibonacci polynomials is
related to the Sierpinski triangle (see Appendix C.2) and to structures that appear
with characteristic polynomials of reduced stabilizer matrices with submatrix A equal
to zero, as defined in Equation (4.13).
Chapter
4
Construction of cyclic sets
In Section 3.1 we have discussed different constructions of MUBs that refer to nice
mathematical structures which lead to direct constructions of the different unitary
matrices within a set of MUBs. Only the construction introduced by Bandyopad-
hyay et al. [BBRV02] breaks this rule by introducing a preceding step, namely the
arrangement of the set of Pauli operators into classes of commuting elements. From a
physical point of view it is useful to equip complete sets of MUBs with further features.
One of these features is important both for theoretical investigations and also for ex-
perimental implementations of MUBs. It is a cyclic structure we might only find for
complete sets of MUBs for Hilbert space dimensions which are a power of two [Gow07],
thus d = 2m with m ∈ N∗. Namely, if one of the bases within the set–which can be
represented as a unitary operator–is given by U , we get a complete set of MUBs
S = 〈U〉 = {U,U2, . . . Ud+1} with Ud+1 = 1d. Therefore, we will refer to these sets as
sets of cyclic mutually unbiased bases (cyclic MUBs) from now on. It is the main aim
of the first part of this work to investigate the properties of cyclic MUBs, to provide
constructions and to expand these ideas. Initially the existence of the chosen construc-
tion will be proven. From a theoretical point of view, cyclic MUBs are easier to handle
since they allow elegant proofs, e. g. for QKD protocols [Got98, Lo01, Cha05]. For
the experimental aspect cyclic MUBs feature their advantage of being implementable
by a single quantum circuit. As we restrict our quantum systems to be describable in
a Hilbert space of dimension d = 2m with m ∈ N∗, we can consider our systems to
be systems of interacting qubits. Formally, this provides us a simple tensor product
structure. Conceptually, the restriction refers to most of the valuable applications,
which are built on qubits. However, extensions to general prime-power dimensions
appear to be feasible by dropping some dispensable properties, but demand further
investigations. In fact, it seems that the set of MUBs can only be reduced to a set of
generators [Gow07].
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.1 a method is introduced which
is proven to be able to generate complete sets of cyclic MUBs for all dimensions 2m.
Numerical methods are discussed in subsections. Section 4.2 discusses a special kind of
solutions for m = 2k with k ∈ N which can be constructed recursively and is related to
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a mathematical conjecture of finite field theory by Wiedemann. In Section 4.3 the stan-
dard form is introduced which will be used later on in order to compare sets of cyclic
MUBs, followed by a discussion about their entanglement properties (Section 4.4).
The resulting homogeneous and inhomogeneous sets are shown in Sections 4.5 and 4.6,
respectively. As all sets are given in a special representation, the construction of the
corresponding unitary operator is given in Section 4.7. Finally, the implementation
of all discussed sets into a quantum circuit is possible with the methods specified in
Section 4.8.
4.1 Fibonacci-based sets
The first class of cyclic MUBs we create in this work is based on properties of Fibonacci
polynomials which were discussed in detail in Section 3.2. Contrary to other classes,
which will be discussed later on in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, the connection to Fibonacci
polynomials allows a straightforward construction scheme that is based on finite field
theory. The method we will use, finds solutions for the construction of Bandyopadhyay
et al. [BBRV02] that was introduced in Section 3.1.2, with an additional cyclicity
property. Therefore, we will establish a symplectic matrix C ∈M2m(F2) which will be
called stabilizer matrix in the following, that cyclically permutes the d + 1 classes Cj
of Equation (3.17). In other words, that stabilizer matrix is a matrix representation
of a generator of a finite group of order d+ 1 and generates a complete set of MUBs.
This section starts by discussing the required properties of the stabilizer matrix and
different approaches to achieve them, as published in [KRS10, SR12]. We then show
the existence of the stabilizer matrix for each dimension d = 2m with m ∈ N∗, followed
by a conjecture that predicts a symmetric companion matrix of polynomials defined
over F2, which raises the ability of calculating the stabilizer matrix from a certain
polynomial directly. A list of solutions for the symmetric stabilizer matrix is given in
Appendix C.1.6 for dimensions with m = 2, . . . , 36. Solutions for stabilizer matrices
in a certain form are listed for dimensions with m = 2, . . . , 600 in Appendix C.1.5.
Section 4.7.1 deals with a unitary representation of the stabilizer matrix C.
As the method we choose to generate complete sets of cyclic MUBs is based on the
construction of Bandyopadhyay et al., we need to partition the set of Pauli operators
into disjoint classes of commuting elements, as seen by Equation (3.16). For each of
these classes Cj with j ∈ {0, . . . , d}, by repeating Equation (3.17) with p = 2, we define
a 2m×m generator matrix Gj that generates the d−1 elements of the class Cj as well
as the identity as
C ′j = Cj ∪ {1d} = {ZX(~a) : ~a = Gj · ~c : ~c ∈ Fm2 }. (4.1)
To implement a cyclic structure into this partition, we demand that the stabilizer
matrix C ∈ M2m(F2) permutes the generators as Ck · Gl = Gk⊕l, which implies that
Cd+1 = 12m and leads to
C ′j = Cj ∪ {1d} = {ZX(~a) : ~a = Cj ·G0 · ~c : ~c ∈ Fm2 }. (4.2)
As we are free to fix one of the generators, we set G0 = (1m, 0m)
t. To guarantee
disjoint classes, the generators need to span non-overlapping vector spaces, i. e. the
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matrix (Gk, Gl) is invertible for all values k, l ∈ {0, . . . , d} with k 6= l. Since the set
of automorphisms of the Heisenberg group is the Clifford group and the commutation
relations of ZX(~a) indicate a symplectic structure (see Appendix A.6), we need C to
be symplectic. More precisely, the matrix C ∈ M2m(F2) is a 2m× 2m representation
of a Clifford unitary matrix. So the problem is boiled down from finding a 2m × 2m
unitary matrix to the task of finding this 2m× 2m stabilizer matrix C. In summary,
we have the following restrictions on the stabilizer matrix C:
(I) C is symplectic.
(II) Cd+1 = 12m.
(III) (Gk, Gl) is invertible for k, l ∈ {0, . . . , d}, k 6= l, with Gk = Ck · (1m, 0m)t,
where (Gk, Gl) defines a block matrix in the form
(Gk, Gl) =
(
Gzk G
z
l
Gxk G
x
l
)
, with Gk =
(
Gzk
Gxk
)
. (4.3)
These restrictions yield still a lot of freedom to create complete sets of cyclic MUBs.
We will refer to alternative classes of possible solutions in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. Within
this section, we limit the stabilizer matrix C to
C =
(
B 1m
1m 0m
)
, (4.4)
with B ∈Mm(F2). Symplecticity is given (see Definition A.6.1) when
Ct ·
(
0m −1m
1m 0m
)
· C ≡
(
0m −1m
1m 0m
)
mod 2, (4.5)
thus, the matrix B, which we will refer to as reduced stabilizer matrix , needs to be
symmetric to fulfill Condition (I). As we consider the powers of C, namely Cn with
n ∈ N, we get
Cn =
(
Fn+1(B) Fn(B)
Fn(B) Fn−1(B)
)
, (4.6)
with Fn(x) being the Fibonacci polynomials as defined in Section 3.2. In order to
achieve Condition (II), we can read off from Equation (4.6) that for n = d+ 1, Fn(B)
has to be equal to 0m and Fn−1(B), as well as Fn+1(B) have to equal 1m. But the
last property follows from the first two properties by the recursion relation of the
Fibonacci polynomials over F2 (see Equation (3.36)). We conclude this symmetry
with the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1.1 (Symmetry of Fibonacci polynomials with reduced stabilizer matrix).
For a reduced stabilizer matrix B ∈Mm(F2) that creates a complete set of cyclic MUBs,
there holds Fn(B) = F2m+1−n(B) for n ∈ {0, . . . , 2m + 1}; in particular, F2m−1(B) =
F2m−1+1(B).
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Proof. With F0(B) = 0m and F1(B) = 1m, the recursion relation of Equation (3.26)
defines all Fn(B) with n ∈ N. As seen above (cf. Equation (4.6)), to create a complete
set of cyclic MUBs, it holds F2m+1(B) = 0m as well as F2m(B) = 1m. The inverse
recursion relation of Equation (3.36) defines again all Fn(B) with n ∈ N. By simply
counting we find that F2m−1(B) = F2m−1+1(B).
The generator matrix Gj of the class Cj with j ∈ {0, . . . , N} is given by
Gj = C
j ·G0 =
(
Fj+1(B)
Fj(B)
)
, (4.7)
so to achieve Condition (III), we have to check that the matrices
(Ck ·G0, C l ·G0) =
(
Fk+1(B) Fl+1(B)
Fk(B) Fl(B)
)
, (4.8)
with k, l ∈ {0, . . . , d} and k 6= l are invertible. Thus, as Lemma A.1.2 indicates, the
expression Fk+1(B) ·Fl(B) +Fl+1(B) ·Fk(B) has to be invertible. But this is equal to
F|k−l|(B) as Lemma 3.2.7 shows.
Using the results of this discussion and the approach of Equation (4.4), we can
reformulate Conditions (I)-(III):
(i) B is symmetric.
(ii) Fk(B) equals 1m for k = d and 0m for k = d+ 1.
(iii) Fk(B) is invertible for k ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
By Lemma 4.1.1 we need to check Condition (iii) only for k ∈ {1, . . . , d/2}, but for the
subsequent discussion the chosen form is preferable. At this point, it is useful to call the
properties of Fibonacci polynomials (cf. Section 3.2) back into mind in order to reduce
this list of conditions. In the following, we will discuss how the structure of Fibonacci
polynomials implies that Condition (iii) follows from Condition (ii). Therefore, we
start with a lemma which shows that the characteristic polynomial of the reduced
stabilizer matrix is irreducible, if a complete set of MUBs is created by that matrix.
Lemma 4.1.2 (Characteristic polynomial of reduced stabilizer matrix).
The characteristic polynomial χB of a reduced stabilizer matrix B ∈ Mm(F2) with
m ∈ N∗ is irreducible and coincides with the minimal polynomial of B, if and only if
the Fibonacci index of χB equals either 2
m − 1 or 2m + 1.
Proof. Any irreducible polynomial p which is a factor of the characteristic polynomial
of B and has in the set of all factors the smallest Fibonacci index (as defined in
Section 3.2.2), annihilates B. Therefore, the Fibonacci polynomial where p appears
first as a factor, annihilates B. But all irreducible polynomials which have Fibonacci
index 2m±1, have minimal degree m (see Theorem 3.2.8), which is also the dimension
of B.
In the case that the characteristic polynomial of B, namely χB, has Fibonacci index
d+ 1 with d = 2m, the Fibonacci polynomial Fd+1(B) equals 0m. With the help of the
following corollary this implies that Fd(B) = 1m.
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Corollary 4.1.3 (Multiplicative order of reduced stabilizer matrix).
If the characteristic polynomial of B has Fibonacci index d+ 1 with d ∈ N∗, the order1
of χB and therefore the multiplicative order of B divides d− 1.
Proof. As shown by Lemma 4.1.2, the characteristic polynomial of B is irreducible
and has degree m. Since it is defined over the field F2, its splitting field is isomorphic
to F2m , thus all roots of χB are elements of the multiplicative group of F2m with
2m − 1 elements. Since B is a root of χB by the Hamilton-Cayley theorem, it has a
multiplicative order that divides d− 1.
If we take Lemma 3.2.5 and set r = 1, it follows with F1(x) = 1 that F2m(x) =
x2
m−1. Hence, with Corollary 4.1.3 we get Fd(B) = 1m for d = 2m. This reduces
Condition (ii) to the requirement that the characteristic polynomial of B has Fibonacci
index d + 1. To combine this new statement with Condition (iii), the following field-
theoretic proposition is essential.
Proposition 4.1.4 (Representation of fields).
Let L/K be a field extension2 of order n ∈ N∗ and let A ∈ Mn(K) be a matrix that
has an irreducible characteristic polynomial χA, which is naturally an element of the
polynomial ring K[x]. Then, the set {f(A)|f ∈ K[x]} is isomorphic to the extension
field L.
Proof. Since one of the roots of the irreducible polynomial χA is A itself (by Hamilton-
Cayley), we can simply adjoin this root A to the ground field K in order to obtain the
extension L which is isomorphic to the polynomial ring K[x] (cf. [LN08, pp. 66]).
Given that Condition (ii) is fulfilled, namely the Fibonacci index of the charac-
teristic polynomial χB of the reduced stabilizer matrix B ∈ Mm(F2) equals d + 1, no
Fibonacci polynomial with a positive index smaller than d+1 annihilates B. But since
all of those polynomials are elements of the polynomial ring F2[B] which is isomorphic
to a finite field (as Proposition 4.1.4 states), they are invertible. But this is Condition
(iii). Finally, we can rewrite Condition (ii) (which implies Condition (iii)) as:
(ii’) The characteristic polynomial of B has Fibonacci index d+ 1.
Hence, if we are interested in the construction of a complete set of mutually unbiased
bases with a cyclic generator for a Hilbert space of dimension d–how it is discussed
here–we may propose the following algorithm:
1. Find an irreducible polynomial p of degree m that divides Fd+1.
2. Check if p divides any Fibonacci polynomial with an index that divides d+ 1, if
so, go back to 1.
1 The order of a non-zero polynomial f(x) ∈ Fpm [x] is defined to be the smallest natural number
e for which the polynomial divides xe − 1 [LN08, Definition 3.2]. If the polynomial has no trivial
root, the order of the polynomial equals the order of any of its roots in the multiplicative group F∗pm
[LN08, Theorem 3.3].
2An introduction and further information about field extensions can be found in Lidl and Nieder-
reiter [LN08, Section 1.4].
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3. Find a symmetric matrix B ∈Mm(F2) that has p as its characteristic polynomial.
To ensure the reliability of this algorithm we need to prove the existence of an ap-
propriate Fibonacci polynomial as well as the corresponding reduced stabilizer matrix
B.
Theorem 4.1.5 (Existence of reduced stabilizer matrices).
For any dimension d = 2m with m ∈ N∗ there exists a reduced stabilizer matrix
B ∈ Mm(F2) that is symmetric and has an irreducible characteristic polynomial with
Fibonacci index d+ 1, hence fulfills Conditions (i) and (ii’).
Proof. We will follow the checklist given above. The number of polynomials with
Fibonacci index 2m + 1 is given by φ(d+1)
2m
, where φ denotes Euler’s totient function (cf.
Theorem 8 of [GKW02]); by Theorem 3.2.8 their degree is m. Since this expression is
non-zero, there exists at least one polynomial for any dimension d that has Fibonacci
index d+ 1.
For the last step, we take the well-known fact that all polynomials p ∈ K[x] have a
companion matrix A, i. e. a matrix which has a characteristic polynomial that equals
p.3 Finally, for every monic polynomial that is defined over a finite field K = Fq there
exists a symmetric matrix that is similar to the companion matrix and, therefore, has
the same characteristic polynomial (cf. Lemma 2 of [BT98]).
Having this theorem in mind, we are free in the way of how to construct the
stabilizer matrix. We propose three different ways:
• Testing all symmetric matrices B ∈Mm(F2).
• Testing a reduced set of matrices by defining a more specific form of B.
• Creating B directly, as a symmetric companion matrix .
The first two suggestions need numerical methods, which will be discussed in the
following paragraph, whereas the last approach aims on an analytic solution that leads
to a conjecture given in the subsequent paragraph.
4.1.1 Numerical construction of reduced stabilizer matrix
Within this paragraph we concentrate on the first two suggestions given above to
find an appropriate reduced stabilizer matrix B. We will estimate the runtime of the
proposed algorithm (Steps 1.–3.) and compare this result with an alternative approach.
This idea is not based on the construction of any polynomial, it uses the resulting
Condition (ii’) indirectly and starts with testing a chosen set of possible matrices that
fulfill Condition (i) by construction. The task of Condition (ii’) is to ensure, that
the characteristic polynomial of B appears the first time as a factor in the Fibonacci
polynomial Fd+1 with d = 2
m, such that Fd+1(B) = 0m. If so, then Corollary 4.1.3
tells us that Fd(B) = 1m, thus C
d+1 equals 12m. Furthermore, it has to be guaranteed
3Despite the fact that different constructions for a companion matrix exist, it is possible to define
such a matrix with a simple structure uniquely.
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that all Fibonacci polynomials Fj(B) with j ∈ {1, . . . , d} do not equal 0m. But by
Lemma 3.2.3, only such Fibonacci polynomials Fj(B) divide Fd+1(B), that have an
index j that is a divisor of d + 1. Thus, if none of those Fibonacci polynomial Fj(B)
is zero, where j is a non-trivial divisor of d+ 1, the Fibonacci index of B is d+ 1 and
Condition (ii’) is fulfilled. This brings us to the following alternative algorithm:
1’. Take a stabilizer matrix C from a previously defined test set.
2’. Check if the power to d+ 1 of this stabilizer matrix equals 12m.
3’. Check that for any power of C to a non-trivial divisor of d + 1 the off-diagonal
blocks do not equal 0m,
whereas we construct C in the form of Equation (4.4).4
To be able to compare the runtime of both methods, we examine this question by
calculating the computational costs. For simplicity reasons, we will take the number
of array accesses5 as an appropriate measure.
For the first method (Steps 1.–3.) we have to calculate the characteristic polynomial
of an m×m matrix. Therefore, we may derive the sums of all principal minors. One
of these is the determinant of B, which is calculated by the Leibniz formula
det(B) =
∑
σ∈Sm
sgn(σ)
m∏
i=1
bi,σ(i), (4.9)
where bi,j denotes the matrix element of B and Sm is the symmetric group of all
possible permutations of the index set {1, . . . ,m}. The calculation of the determinant
in this way yields to |Sm| ·m = m ·m! array accesses. For the next minor sum, we have
to sum up all determinants where any pair (i, i) with i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} of row and column
is deleted. This yields m principal minors with |Sm−1| · (m − 1) = (m − 1) · (m − 1)!
array accesses each, thus (m − 1) ·m! array accesses. If we follow this approach and
take the sum of all array accesses, we end up with(
(m− 1) ·m
2
)
·m! (4.10)
array accesses for the calculation of the characteristic polynomial of an m×m matrix.
For the alternative method (Steps 1’. –3’.), we need to calculate the power to
2m + 1 of a stabilizer matrix C as given in Equation (4.4). To do this efficiently, we
can multiply the matrix C with itself and write the answer to a new variable, square
this, and so on. We would end with 2m, which we multiply by C again and write this
final result. This procedure needs 3(m + 1) full read outs or writings of an 2m × 2m
matrix, thus 12m3 + 12m2 array accesses. At the end, we have to check if this matrix
4After finishing this thesis, the author realized that only those powers of C have to be tested,
which are given by d + 1 divided by one of the prime factors. This holds due to Lemma 3.2.3 and
gives an exponential advantage over the discussed method. In the calculation of the computational
costs the divisor function has to be replaced by another function with exponentially reduced values.
5The most time consuming operations are reading and writing elements of matrices, as the com-
plete matrices cannot be stored directly into the processor registers. In comparison to these opera-
tions, arithmetical operations are done instantaneously.
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equals 12m which yields in summary 12m
3 + 16m2 array accesses. Since we have to
check all possible factors to be not equal to a block-diagonal matrix with m × m
submatrices, we have to take a similar procedure d(2m + 1) times, where d(n) with
n ∈ N∗ denotes the divisor function that counts the number of divisors of an integer n.
Since any divisor of 2m+1 can be represented as an m-bit number (with leading zeros),
we can use the same number of array accesses as an upper bound for this calculation.
We have numerical evidence, that for odd integers in the form n = 2m+ 1 with m ≥ 2,
the divisor function is upper bounded by
√
n (including 1 and n), as it is true for at
least m = 200. This limits the total number of array accesses to
(
√
2m + 1− 1) · (12m3 + 16m2). (4.11)
It is clear that the second method scales much better since the factorial in Equa-
tion (4.10) grows faster than any polynomial and obviously faster than 2m. An explicit
calculation shows that for m ≥ 7 the second method is preferable. We are aware of
the fact that we left out some terms like the generation of all divisors of a number,
since they are not that much relevant in the scaling and cannot easily be taken into
account. We did also not mention the fact, that we have to find a polynomial with
an appropriate Fibonacci index in the first case, which is another reason to use the
second method.
As a next step we should decide which set of matrices we take as our test set. If we
test all possible m×m matrices which have only ones and zeros as entries, this yields
m2 free parameters, which we denote by g. Consequently, we have 2m
2
matrices to
test. But we are able to fulfill Condition (i) by construction, by shrinking the number
of free parameters, such that the resulting matrices are symmetric which leaves us
2(m
2+m)/2 matrices to test. In this case we have g = (m2 + m)/2. The number of all
m×m matrices B that are symmetric and invertible is given by6
a(m) = 2m(m+1)/2
∏
j=1..2·dm
2
e(1− (1/2)j)∏
j=1..dm
2
e(1− (1/4)j)
, (4.12)
but it would be quite challenging to implement a construction that creates only these
matrices with higher efficiency than creating all symmetric matrices.
A method that really shrinks the number of free parameters is published in [KRS10].
Therefore, the upper left half of the matrix is fixed to one, the lower right to zero,
but with the lower-right corner being a r × r matrix A with free parameters (r ∈
{0, . . . , [m/2]}). For m = 5 the possible reduced stabilizer matrices would look like
B =

1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 a11 a12
1 0 0 a12 a22
 , (4.13)
leaving 3 free parameters. For dimensions m = 2 and 3 this matrix A = (ai,j) is a
1 × 1 matrix. For m = 1 the matrix B = (1) is already a solution (A does not exist
6Refer to Sloane’s A086812 and Brent et al. [RPB88].
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by construction). For most of the dimensions with m ≤ 30, the matrix A needs only
to be a 2× 2 matrix. Starting with dimensions m = 12, 20, 21, 25, 28 it turns out, that
this matrix needs to be at least a 3 × 3 matrix, thus having six free parameters. In
higher dimensions that size has to be increased further. Comparing with the general
(m2 + m)/2 parameters to test, this approach is quite a good improvement, but we
have no rigorous proof that the set of matrices this scheme produces, contains always
a solution. Nevertheless, solutions for m = 2, . . . , 600 are given in Appendix C.1.5.
An approach that shrinks even more the number of possible matrices in the test
set is given in the following paragraph, where we set the number of free parameters to
2m− 1.
4.1.2 Reduced stabilizer matrix as symmetric companion
matrix
To calculate a certain reduced stabilizer matrix B, we like to investigate the existence
of a symmetric companion matrix, which means, given any polynomial p ∈ F2[x]
with degree m, we can directly construct a matrix that has p as its characteristic
polynomial7. Thus, we do not have to test different matrices on their suitability. This
construction aims on the first algorithm that was given above (Steps 1.–3.).
The idea is the following, based on observations on the different solutions for reduced
stabilizer matrices: The reduced stabilizer matrix B is described by a set of 2m− 1
free parameters {s1, . . . , s2m−1} as
B =

s1 s2 · · · sm−1 sm
s2 s3 sm sm+1
...
. . .
...
sm−1 sm s2m−3 s2m−2
sm sm+1 · · · s2m−2 s2m−1
 . (4.14)
In other words, the matrix elements bi,j with i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} of B are given by
bi,j = si+j−1. (4.15)
As we were not able to construct this companion matrix uniquely yet, we can only
conjecture its existence and guess a possible solution.
Conjecture 4.1.6 (Existence of symmetric companion matrix).
For any polynomial p ∈ Fm2 with m ∈ N∗ there exists a symmetric companion matrix
B ∈Mm(F2) in the form of Equation (4.14) which has characteristic polynomial χB =
p.
A table with string representation of possible solutions for s is given for m =
{1, . . . , 36} in Appendix C.1.6. Contrary to the analytical expectation, the method of
the last paragraph that finds a matrix B in the form of Equation (4.13) succeeds faster
than finding the symmetric companion matrix by testing all possibilities. The reason
for this contradiction is that, effectively, we find solutions for matrices A that have
7Ideally, this matrix would be unique.
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a dimension r which is much smaller than the limit of [m/2]. Nevertheless, from a
mathematical point of view, it is quite interesting to have a candidate for a symmetric
companion matrix that serves for all polynomials over F2.
4.2 Fermat sets
A special subclass of the Fibonacci-based sets which were discussed in Section 4.1 is
given by sets we denote as Fermat sets . These sets are only defined for dimensions
d = 22
k
with k ∈ N. Since the number of elements of a complete set of MUBs in such a
dimension is given by 22
k
+ 1, they are called Fermat sets, where the Fermat numbers
are defined as
Fk = 22k + 1. (4.16)
The outstanding feature of these sets is their recursive construction that supersedes
the search of an appropriate reduced stabilizer matrix as it is common for general
Fibonacci-based sets. The only caveat of these Fermat sets is that in general their
completeness (the fact that a complete set of d + 1 MUBs is created) can only be
conjectured. Within the subsequent discussion we will derive a connection of this
completeness to an open conjecture on iterated quadratic extensions of F2 that was
found by D. Wiedemann in 1988 [Wie88], is of current interest [MS96, Vol10], and was
tested for k = 0, . . . , 8 by Wiedemann himself. By the methods derived in Section 4.1
we are able to raise this limit to k = 11, the largest Fermat number where the complete
factorization into prime numbers is currently known. It is clear, that the problem of
testing if possible factors divide a Fermat number is easier than testing if the power
of the stabilizer matrix C to the same factors has vanishing off-diagonal blocks of size
m×m. The program code we use is given in Appendix C.1.4.
The solutions we propose to obtain complete sets of cyclic MUBs for dimensions
d = 22
k
with k ∈ N are based on Equation (4.4). We thus need to find an appropriate
reduced stabilizer matrix B. In the following we add an index to B that refers to
the integer m which defines the dimension as d = 2m. In the case of Fermat sets the
number m is defined by 2k. If we recall some already known solutions from [KRS10],
we find
B20 = (1), B21 =
(
1 1
1 0
)
, and B22 =

1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
 . (4.17)
If we iterate this construction, we end up with the recursion
B2k+1 =
(
B2k 12k
12k 02k
)
∈M2k+1(F2). (4.18)
Analogously, we define C2k as
C2k =
(
B2k 12k
12k 02k
)
∈M2k+1(F2), (4.19)
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thus C2k ≡ B2k+1 . At this point, we can already use the program code from Ap-
pendix C.1.4 to see that the recursion produces complete sets of cyclic MUBs for
k ∈ {0, . . . , 11}. But this does not help us understanding the problem and developing
ideas that may serve to prove this recursion for all k. It is clear by construction that
the reduced stabilizer matrices are symmetric, thus Condition (i) of Section 4.1 is ful-
filled. To be able to check if the construction is also conform with Condition (ii’) we
shall start with calculating the characteristic polynomial χB of the reduced stabilizer
matrix B. It will turn out that the notion of reciprocal and self-reciprocal polynomials
is of interest within this context.
Definition 4.2.1 (Reciprocal polynomial).
The reciprocal of a polynomial f ∈ K[x] is defined by f ∗(x) := xnf(x−1), where
n ∈ N∗ is the degree of f . If a polynomial coincides with its reciprocal, it is called
self-reciprocal.
We can create a self-reciprocal polynomial by applying the reciprocal operator Q
on an arbitrary polynomial f with degree n, namely
fQ(x) := xnf(x+ x−1). (4.20)
The recursion we propose in Equation (4.18) is a matrix representation of the appli-
cation of the reciprocal operator, starting with an appropriate polynomial.
Lemma 4.2.1 (Characteristic polynomials).
Let K be a finite field of characteristic 2 and χS be the characteristic polynomial of a
matrix S ∈Mn(K) with n ∈ N∗. Then χS′ = (χS)Q is the characteristic polynomial of
S ′ :=
(
S 1n
1n 0n
)
∈M2n(K). (4.21)
Proof. The characteristic polynomial χS′ is given by χS′(x) = det(x12n − S ′) =
det
(
x1n − S 1n
1n x1n
)
. If we use Lemma A.1.1, we get χS′(x) = det(x1n) det(x1n − S −
x−11n). But the first factor equals xn and the second is given by χS(x− x−1). Thus
χS′(x) = x
n · χS(x− x−1) = (χS)Q(x).
We can use Lemma 4.2.1 to show that the characteristic polynomials of the B2k
are factors of the Fibonacci polynomials F2m+1 with m = 2
k. With the help of Theo-
rem 3.2.8 and Lemma 3.2.10, it turns out that these polynomials have to be irreducible
and keep their linear term in order to be possible candidates for producing complete
sets of cyclic MUBs.
Lemma 4.2.2 (Minimal polynomial of B2k).
The characteristic polynomial of B2k as defined in Equation (4.18) is given by f
Qk(x)
with f(x) = 1 + x. It is irreducible and therefore minimal.
Proof. The first part follows by induction from Lemma 4.2.1. It was shown by Var-
shamov and Garakov [VG69] and in a more general form by Meyn [Mey90] that for
a polynomial g ∈ F2[x] and g being irreducible, gQ is also irreducible, if and only if
the linear coefficient of g does not vanish. This is true for f by construction. But for
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an arbitrary polynomial h(x) =
∑n
j=0 ajx
j it holds hQ(x) =
∑n
j=0
∑j
i=0
(
j
i
)
ajx
n+j−2i.
The only contribution to the linear coefficient from hQ(x) arises from j = i = n − 1
which is given by an−1. Since the reciprocal operator creates a self-reciprocal function
this stays true for all k.
Thus, regarding Condition (ii’) of Section 4.1, we have shown by
Lemma 4.2.2 in combination with Lemma 3.2.10 that the Fibonacci index of the re-
duced stabilizer matrices B2k in the form of Equation (4.18) equals d+1 or is a divisor
of d + 1 with d = 22
k
. We have tried to prove that the Fibonacci index is d + 1, but
without success. A promising approach can be found in Appendix B.
However, we are able to relate the question of the Fibonacci index to an open
conjecture from finite field theory, namely Wiedemann’s conjecture, which was given
already in 1988 [Wie88]. Wiedemann considered iterated quadratic extensions of the
finite field F2 using generators xj which are recursively defined as
xj+1 + x
−1
j+1 = xj, (4.22)
with j ∈ N and x0 + x−10 = 1, where x0 ∈ F2. Rewriting Equation (4.22) into
x2j+1 + xj+1xj + 1 = 0 (4.23)
shows that the roots of this equation are not in the field where xj belongs to, but in
its quadratic extension, due to the quadratic nature of this equation [Wie88, Theorem
1]. Accordingly, he defined the (extension) fields Ej as
Ej+1 := Ej(xj+1), (4.24)
with E0 := F2(x0). The extension field Ej is then isomorphic to the finite field F22j+1 .
As x−1j is the conjugate of xj with respect to the ground field, x
−1
j = x
22
j
j holds
[LN08, Lemma 2.14]. Thus, the multiplicative order of xj divides the j-th Fermat
number Fj = 22j + 1. Calculating the product of the roots as x˜n := x0x1 . . . xn ∈ En,
the order of x˜n is given by the product of the orders of the xj, since the Fermat
numbers are mutually coprime. Wiedemann finally conjectured, that the orders of xj
are given by Fj = 22j + 1, thus |x˜n| = F22n+1 − 2 would hold, meaning x˜n would be
a primitive element of En, generating its multiplicative subgroup E
∗
n. He successfully
tested his conjecture computationally for j = 0, . . . , 8. The matrices C2k defined in
Equation (4.19) can be seen as a realization of the xk.
Theorem 4.2.3 (Wiedemann analogy).
Wiedemann’s conjecture is true, if and only if the characteristic polynomial of all
reduced stabilizer matrices B2k which are defined in Equation (4.18), has Fibonacci
index 22
k
+ 1.
Proof. If the stabilizer matrix C2k is constructed due to Equation (4.19),
C20 + C
−1
20 = 12 holds obviously. Assuming that the order of C2k is given by 2
2k + 1,
the characteristic polynomial of B2k = C2k−1 has Fibonacci index 2
2k + 1 (which is in
accordance to Condition (ii’) of Section 4.1). The characteristic polynomial of C2k over
the field where B2k = C2k−1 belongs to, is then by construction given as x
2 +C2k−1x+1.
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By comparing this result with Equation (4.23), the stabilizer matrices C2k can be iden-
tified with Wiedemann’s xk; in equivalence with Wiedemann’s construction the C2k
are the roots of their characteristic polynomials.
With Theorem 4.2.3 it is shown that the construction of complete sets of cyclic
MUBs with a reduced stabilizer matrix in the form of Equation (4.19) is an instance
of Wiedemann’s conjecture. A potential approach to proof this conjecture is given in
Appendix B. We followed Wiedemann’s idea and tested his conjecture for j = 0, . . . , 11,
limited by the largest Fermat number with a known prime factorization (cf. Appendix
C.1.4).
4.3 Standard form
All cyclic sets of MUBs which are based on the ideas of Bandyopadhyay et al. [BBRV02]
need to partition the set of Pauli operators into disjoint classes of commuting ele-
ments, as discussed in Section 4.1 that deals with Fibonacci-based sets. The Proper-
ties (I)–(III) should always be fulfilled, but the form of the stabilizer matrix C can
be different to that given in Equation (4.4). Additionally, we have the freedom to
choose a different generator G0 than G0 = (1m, 0m)
t in order to prevent the appear-
ance of a set with all Pauli-Z operators (which will be identified as the standard basis
in Section 4.7). To be able to observe a complete set of cyclic MUBs within a com-
mon picture–different and more general than by relations to Fibonacci polynomials–we
introduce the so-called standard form, derived from the Fibonacci-based sets. Unfortu-
nately, this form does not preserve the cyclic structure of the generators of the classes,
but it can be seen as an instrument to identify certain properties of the analyzed set
of MUBs. It turns out that this form is also used by Bandyopadhyay et al., but not
in this very general form (cf. Equations (3.19) and (3.20) of Section 3.1.2).
We start with the generators that follow Equation (4.6) and the fact that G0 is
fixed for Fibonacci-based sets. We find
G0 :=
(
1m
0m
)
and Gj =
(
Fj+1(B)
Fj(B)
)
, (4.25)
for j ∈ {1, . . . , d}. As the class C ′j consists of all Pauli operators with argument Gj · ~c
and ~c ∈ Fm2 (cf. Equation (3.17)), we have a certain freedom in the choice of Gj.
Corollary 4.3.1 (Generator matrix).
The generator Gj with j ∈ N that creates a class in the form C ′j = {ZX(~a) : ~a = Gj ·~c :
~c ∈ Fm2 } can be multiplied from the right by any invertible matrix P ∈ GLm(F2) to
produce the same set of Pauli operators, i. e.
C ′j ≡ {ZX(~a) : ~a = Gj · P · ~c : ~c ∈ Fm2 }. (4.26)
Proof. Since the class is created by all vectors ~c with ~c ∈ Fm2 , the invertible matrix P
only permutes this set by executing the operation P · ~c.
Using Corollary 4.3.1, we can write the generators from above (Equation (4.25)) in
a different form by multiplying Gj with (Fj(B))
−1. Recalling Proposition 4.1.4, Fj(B)
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equals either 0m or its inverse exists. Therefore, we will not change G0 for this form,
which yields
G¯0 :=
(
1m
0m
)
and G¯j =
(
Fj+1(B)(Fj(B))
−1
1m
)
, (4.27)
the generators of a Fibonacci-based set written in standard form. We introduce sets
which are not based on Fibonacci polynomials within Sections 4.5 and 4.6. It will turn
out, that the following definition is capable to describe them uniquely.
Definition 4.3.1 (Standard form).
Generators Gj with j ∈ {0, . . . , d} , d ∈ N∗, which create classes that partition the set
of Pauli operators in order to produce a complete set of mutually unbiased bases are
in standard form, if there holds
G¯0 :=
(
1m
Gx0
)
and G¯j =
(
Gzj
1m
)
, (4.28)
with matrices Gzj , G
x
0 ∈Mm(F2).
The values of Gzj and G
x
0 are clear in the case of Fibonacci-based sets. We refer to
sets where Gx0 = 0m as homogeneous sets and sets where G
x
0 6= 0m as inhomogeneous
sets . For both sets, we can in principle reuse Conditions (I)–(III) of Section 4.1.
To fulfill Condition (III) for the homogeneous sets, all sums Gzk + G
z
l with k, l ∈
{1, . . . , d} , k 6= l have to be invertible due to Lemma A.1.2. For the inhomogeneous
sets, the expressions 1m +G
x
0G
z
j with j ∈ {1, . . . , d} have to be invertible in addition.
In order to generate commuting operators by the Gj, the matrices G
z
j and G
x
0 have
to be symmetric [BBRV02, Lemma 4.3]. It is reasonable to discuss the appearance
of the different sets in relation to the entanglement properties of the classes of Pauli
operators as will be seen in Section 4.4.
4.4 Entanglement properties
Within the constraints of the approach given by Bandyopadhyay et al. (cf. Section
3.1.2), different sets of cyclic MUBs exist. Some of these sets were studied in 2002 by
Lawrence et al. [LBZ02], a complete list of four different sets in d = 23 dimensions
was given by Romero et al. [RBKSS05]. Following the consideration of the latter work
we will discuss the properties of the different sets and formulate conditions on the
stabilizer matrix C in order to construct a complete set of cyclic MUBs with specific
properties. Therefore, we first introduce the idea which is behind the classification of
different sets.
Recalling Equation (3.17), a single basis within a set of MUBs (that is constructed
according to the approach of Bandyopadhyay et al.) is given by the eigenspace of the
Pauli operators which constitute a class Cj with j ∈ {0, . . . , d}. The elements of such
a class are generated by Gj and are by construction given by a tensor product of Pauli
operators of the Hilbert space H = C2 (cf. Equations (3.17) and (3.14)). Operators
which are in the same class commute [BBRV02]. With a single basis we are able to
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measure those properties of the complete quantum system, which are describable by
the Pauli operators of the corresponding class Cj.
We can categorize a basis in the following way: If the Pauli operators of each
two-dimensional subsystem, as given by the tensor product decomposition, commute
separately, this basis measures properties of a fully separable system, the separability
count is s(Cj) = m. If the Pauli operators of two subsystems within the class do not
commute separately, the basis measures properties of a system that is decomposable
into m − 2 single-qubit subsystems and a two-qubit subsystem. For a system of m
subsystems, the separability count is then s(Cj) = m − 1. The continuation of this
classification leads to a couple of different decomposition structures, which we formalize
in the following way: If a complete set of MUBs is used to determine the quantum
state of an m-qubit system, we can describe the decomposition structure of a certain
basis by arranging the set of m qubits into different subsets, where the properties are
measured on the completely entangled states of the subsets. For all different possible
set structures we define the separability count, by ordering all possible structures and
take the position in this list as the separability count. This ordering works as follows:
1. Order the different structures by their number of subsets, starting with the
largest.
2. Order the different structures which have the same number of subsets by the size
of their largest set, starting with the smallest; if they are equal, continue with
the second largest set, and so on.
Finally, we describe the decomposition structure of the whole basis set by counting
the different decomposition structures of the classes with a single column vector ~n.
The first entry of this vector, namely n1, describes the number of bases which are fully
separable, thus, which measure properties of m completely non-entangled subsystems.
Then follows n2 which counts the number of bases that describe systems that are
separable into m−1 parts. To get m−2 parts we have two possibilities. Following the
algorithm for the ordering, n3 gives the number of bases which describe systems that
can be decomposed into m− 2 subsystems, with m− 4 single-qubit systems and two
two-qubit systems; n4 counts bases that describe m− 3 single-qubit systems and one
triple-qubit system. This goes logically forth until we end up with a fully-entangled
system. This ordering is slightly different from that in [RBKSS05], in order to classify
systems with few highly-entangled subsystems as less separable than systems with
many sparsely-entangled subsystems.
Since there are only three different Pauli operators for a single-qubit system, there
exist at most three different bases in a complete set of MUBs, that measure properties
of a fully separable system. So the maximum value of n1 is three. The Fibonacci-based
sets of Section 4.1 reach this limit: the generator of the class C0 constructs all Pauli-Z
operators that can be totally decomposed into m subsystems. The same holds true for
the class Cd which is generated by
Gd = C
d ·G0 =
(
0m 1m
1m B
)
·
(
1m
0m
)
=
(
0m
1m
)
, (4.29)
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and contains all Pauli-X operators. Finally, the class Cd/2 is generated by Gd/2 =
(Fd/2(B), Fd/2+1(B))
t which equals (Fd/2(B), Fd/2(B))
t (see Lemma 4.1.1). Writing
this generator in standard form as allowed by Corollary 4.3.1, we find
G¯d/2 =
(
1m
1m
)
, (4.30)
that produces all Pauli-Y operators.
As an example, we generate a complete Fibonacci-based set of cyclic MUBs for a
three-qubit system with the reduced stabilizer matrix
B3 =

1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
 , (4.31)
that generates the classes as follows:
C0 = {11Z,1Z1,1ZZ,Z11, Z1Z,ZZ1, ZZZ} , s(C0) = 3,
C1 = {1Y X,XXZ,XZY, Y XY, Y ZZ,Z1X,ZY 1} , s(C1) = 1,
C2 = {1ZX,XXY,XY Z, Y 1X, Y Z1, ZXZ,ZY Y } , s(C2) = 1,
C3 = {1ZY,X1Y,XZ1, Y XZ, Y Y X,ZXX,ZY Z} , s(C3) = 1,
C4 = {11Y,1Y 1,1Y Y, Y 11, Y 1Y, Y Y 1, Y Y Y } , s(C4) = 3, (4.32)
C5 = {1XY,XY X,XZZ, Y Y Z, Y ZX,Z1Y, ZX1} , s(C5) = 1,
C6 = {1XZ,XY Y,XZX, Y 1Z, Y X1, ZY X,ZZY } , s(C6) = 1,
C7 = {1Y Z,X1Z,XY 1, Y XX, Y ZY, ZXY,ZZX} , s(C7) = 1,
C8 = {11X,1X1,1XX,X11, X1X,XX1, XXX} , s(C8) = 3,
where 1 abbreviates 12. The numbers of decomposable systems for the classes are
given by the separability counts. So the vector ~n in the case of this set of MUBs is
given by ~n1 = (3, 0, 6)
t.8 Other possible structures are ~n2 = (2, 3, 4)
t, ~n3 = (1, 6, 2)
t
and ~n4 = (0, 9, 0)
t [RBKSS05].
To generate these structures, which do not have three totally-decomposable classes,
we cannot use the already discussed Fibonacci-based sets of Section 4.1. Therefore, we
have to reduce the number of constraints, which are required to produce the Fibonacci-
based sets, in order to achieve a larger set of possible structures. For Fibonacci-based
sets, we find a field structure:
Lemma 4.4.1 (Field structure of Fibonacci-based sets).
The submatrices Gzj of the generators G¯j = (G
z
j ,1m)
t in standard form with j ∈
{1, . . . , d} that are used to generate a complete set of cyclic Fibonacci-based MUBs,
form a representation of the finite field Fm2 .
8This set is commonly known as the standard set [GRK10].
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Proof. Considering the standard form (cf. Section 4.3) of the Fibonacci-based sets,
we find the 2m generators Gj = (Fj+1(B)Fj(B)
−1,1m)t. As B has an irreducible
characteristic polynomial of degree m that generates a polynomial ring and 2m different
elements Fj+1(B)Fj(B)
−1 exist, the set of those elements is a representation of a
polynomial ring, in particular of the finite field Fm2 .
To create cyclic sets of MUBs it is more comfortable to use homogeneous sets, as
discussed in Section 4.3, since their first basis is used to create the standard basis (cf.
Section 4.7). In this case the generator of the first group is given by G0 = (1m, 0m)
t. To
diminish the first value of the vector ~n to two, by keeping the homogeneity property, it
is obvious that we loose the field property of Lemma 4.4.1. What we get is an additive
group of the values Gzj without the unity element 1m of the multiplication, thus, a
class of all Pauli-Y operators as given by Equation (4.30) is not included. In this case,
Condition (III) of Section 4.1 is fulfilled if the expression Gzl + G
z
k is invertible for
k, l ∈ {1, . . . , d} with k 6= l, but this element is again an element of the group. We
can thus create this group of matrices by a generating set, say w. l o. g. Hk ∈ GLm(F2)
with k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
Gzj =
m∑
k=1
hkHk, for (h1, . . . , hm) ∈ Fm2 , (4.33)
where all Gzj with j 6= 0 have to be invertible. Equation (4.33) is equivalent to the
construction of Bandyopadhyay et al. [BBRV02, Section 4.3]. Details will be discussed
in Section 4.5.
To obtain n1 = 1, we need to exclude also the element 0m which forms the class
of Pauli-X operators from the set of matrices Gzj with j ∈ {1, . . . , d}. The highest
set structure which fits is then a semigroup, which does not allow a generation as in
Equation (4.33).
Finally, we have to give up the homogeneity property to set n1 = 0. To be able
to prevent all fully-decomposable classes, we have to change the generator G0. In
Section 4.3 we discussed why G¯0 = (1m, G
x
0)
t is a good choice. It is clear, that Con-
dition (III) of Section 4.1 has to be adapted minimally. Details of the inhomogeneous
sets will be discussed in Section 4.6.
4.5 Homogeneous sets
The second class of cyclic MUBs we create in this work includes the class of Fibonacci-
based MUBs formally, but does not share completely their nice way of construction.
This generalization is based on the Conditions (I)–(III) of Section 4.1. As seen in
Section 4.4, the entanglement properties of the bases within a certain set of MUBs
are different for this class of homogeneous sets. Experimentally, complete sets with a
reduced number of bases that measure properties of a fully entangled system, are to
be preferred.
As already stated in Section 4.4, the homogeneous sets can be build either from
generators with a field structure, as done for the Fibonacci-based MUBs, with an
additive group structure or an additive semigroup structure. The number of bases
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with a fully-decomposable structure is three, two and one, respectively, in these cases.
As the construction of Fibonacci-based MUBs is already solved, we give a generalized
solution in Section 4.5.1, which generates also group-based sets. In Section 4.5.2, a
first notion on the realization of semigroup-based sets is presented.
4.5.1 Group-based sets
Considering the properties of the stabilizer matrix to generate a complete set of cyclic
MUBs, we use Conditions (1)–(3) of Section 3.1.2. We propose a generalized form
of the stabilizer matrix as in Section 4.1 in order to implement an additive group
structure of the matrices Gzj in the standard form, that has solutions which avoid the
field structure (cf. Equation (4.28)). The stabilizer matrix we propose is given by
C =
(
B R
R−1 0m
)
, (4.34)
where the reduced stabilizer matrix B ∈Mm(F2) appears, but also an invertible matrix
R ∈ GLm(F2). The powers of the stabilizer matrix, as given by Equation (4.34), are
Cn =
(
Fn+1(B) Fn(B)R
R−1Fn(B) R−1Fn−1(B)R
)
, (4.35)
with Fn(x) being the Fibonacci polynomial with index n ∈ N, as defined in Equation
(3.26). In standard form the generators Gj of the classes Cj (cf. Equation (3.17)) look
like
G¯0 =
(
1m
0m
)
and G¯j =
(
Fj+1(B)Fj(B)
−1R
1m
)
, (4.36)
thus, the field elements Gzj of Equation (4.27) are multiplied by the invertible matrix
R. The new elements Gzj of Equation (4.36) form an additive group which may be
written by a generating set as stated by Equation (4.33). We can define conditions
which are similar to Conditions (i) and (ii’) of Section 4.1. Since those conditions
emerge from Conditions (1)–(3) of Section 3.1.2, we can start our discussion there. As
seen by Equation (4.36), the generators have the required form, thus, Condition (1) is
fulfilled by construction. For Condition (2), all elements Gzj with j ∈ {1, . . . , d} and
d = 2m have to be symmetric. Those elements are given by the polynomials pn(B),
defined as pn(B) = Fn+1(B)Fn(B)
−1 with n ∈ {1, . . . , d}, multiplied by the matrix R.
By the following lemma the number of matrices to be tested on their symmetry can
be reduced dramatically to two.
Lemma 4.5.1 (Symmetry of Fibonacci polynomials multiplied with invertible ma-
trix).
For invertible matrices A,B ∈ GLm(K), all polynomials p(A) ∈ K[x] multiplied with
B from the right are symmetric, if and only if B and AB are symmetric.
Proof. Let B and AB be symmetric matrices. Then for any matrix AkB with k ∈ N
there holds
(AkB)t = BtAt(Ak−1)t = ABtAt(Ak−2)t = . . . = AkB. (4.37)
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Any polynomial in A multiplied with B is then a sum of symmetric matrices. But sums
of symmetric matrices are again symmetric. The converse is obvious, if we consider
the cases k = 0 and k = 1, thus 1mB and AB.
Using Lemma 4.5.1, Condition (2) of Section 3.1.2 is fulfilled, if and only if R
and BR are symmetric. Condition (3) is also correct, since the difference of two
group elements leads again to a group element. If all three conditions are fulfilled,
the stabilizer matrix C has to be symplectic, but as a precaution we can check this
easily by using Corollary A.6.1 of Appendix A.6. The product R(R−1)t equals 1m
as R is a symmetric matrix. BtR−1 is symmetric, since its transpose (R−1)tB is the
product of a polynomial in R (cf. Proposition 4.1.4) with the symmetric matrix B,
therefore, we can apply Lemma 4.5.1. To get a complete set of MUBs, the similarity
of Equation (4.36) with Equation (4.27) indicates, that the characteristic polynomial
of B has to have a Fibonacci index of d+ 1. Finally, we find the following conditions:
(i) R and BR are symmetric.
(ii) The characteristic polynomial of B has Fibonacci index d+ 1.
The polynomials pn(B) have field structure, but multiplied by the matrix R this struc-
ture disappears. Only an additive group structure is left, as wanted. For R = 1m or
more generally for R = pn(B) 6= 0m with n ∈ {1, . . . , d}, we find the Fibonacci-based
sets. Thus, for appropriate values of R 6= pn(B) we find complete sets of cyclic MUBs
that have exactly two bases with a totally-decomposable structure, namely C0 and Cd.
According to Equation (4.34), we find 126 different pairs (B,R) for a system of
three qubits that have a decomposition structure of the bases as given in [RBKSS05],
namely ~n = (2, 3, 4)t. One of the solutions is given by
B(2,3,4) =
0 1 10 0 1
1 0 0
 and R(2,3,4) =
0 0 10 1 0
1 0 0
 . (4.38)
It is expected that most of the 126 solutions can be transformed into each other with
transformations that originate from simple symmetry considerations. One of those
transformations corresponds only to sets which are not related to the Fibonacci-based
sets and was indirectly discussed above. If we replace the matrix R in the construction
of Equation (4.34) by the product of a polynomial pl in B, with the old matrix R, we
get
C =
(
B pl(B)R
R−1pl(B)−1 0m
)
, (4.39)
with generators in standard form as
G¯0 =
(
1m
0m
)
and G¯j =
(
Fj+1(B)Fj(B)
−1pl(B)R
1m
)
. (4.40)
Since all polynomials in B with maximal degree m − 1 appear in the groups G¯j,
the polynomial pl(B) with l ∈ {1, . . . , d} permutes the original generators G¯j. Since
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there are only 2m − 1 non-zero polynomials with degree smaller than m, we found
a symmetry to reduce the solutions by a factor of 2m − 1. In the case discussed
above, we can divide 126 by 23 − 1 and get 18. We would get cyclic MUBs with
the same entanglement properties by relabeling the different qubits, which lead to m!
permutation operators, in the case of three qubits to six possible permutations. But
it is not clear if this symmetry is uncorrelated with the symmetry that appears from
multiplying the matrix R with a polynomial in B. A complete explanation of the
appearance of 126 solutions may be an interesting issue but is above the scope of this
work.
We list seven systems with a different decomposition structure for four-qubit sys-
tems in Appendix C.1.1. Some of the sets do not appear in the list given in [RBKSS05].
This is in accordance to a statement in [Law11, Section IV D], which claims an incom-
pleteness of the list of 16 MUBs in the former article; the complete classification lists
34 sets [GRK10].
4.5.2 Semigroup-based sets
In order to obtain complete sets of cyclic MUBs which contain only one class of opera-
tors that is fully separable into qubit systems, we need to find a form of the stabilizer
matrix C which is even more general than the form of Section 4.5.1 and is given
by Equation (4.34). A hypothetical idea would be the following: To construct the
Fibonacci sets of Section 4.1, the stabilizer matrix C ∈ M2m(F2) was completely de-
termined by the reduced stabilizer matrix B ∈ Mm(F2), for the group-based sets of
Section 4.5.1, a second matrix R ∈ GLm(F2) became relevant. To construct semigroup-
based sets we can imagine that a third matrix will be relevant. Nevertheless, we have
not been able to find an appropriate generalization of Equation (4.34) so far to reach
this goal. Conversely, from a top-down point of view, we are able to construct at least
some solutions within an obtainable computation time: If we assume that the upper
left submatrix of C remains invertible, we find by the properties which are given by
Corollary A.6.1, that for any symplectic matrix C =
(
s t
u v
)
, with s, t, u, v ∈Mm(K)
and s invertible, there holds
v = (st)−1(1 + utt). (4.41)
Thus, we should be able to construct the semigroup-based sets with the three matrices
s, t, u ∈ Mm(F2). A similar observation is possible by assuming that u is invertible,
but does not lead to a logical generalization of the group-based sets, as we are not
able to require a certain value for the characteristic polynomial of s. A cyclic version
of the corresponding three-qubit system in [RBKSS05] is generated by
C(1,6,2) =

0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
 . (4.42)
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However, as a suitable form is not found yet, computational results based on these
approaches and Conditions (1)–(3) of Section 3.1.2 are given in Appendix C.1.2.
4.6 Inhomogeneous sets
The third and last class of cyclic MUBs that are discussed in this work does not contain
any class of operators that is fully separable into qubit systems in its decomposition
structure which was introduced in Section 4.4. Accordingly, these sets need to have
a more general standard form as given in Definition 4.3.1, thus, the generator G¯0
does not equal (1m, 0m)
t as for the Fibonacci-based sets and the homogeneous sets
in general. The approach we choose in order to create an inhomogeneous set is the
following: At first, a symplectic matrix C0 ∈M2m(F2) is taken which produces a more
general generator G¯0 from the matrix (1m, 0m)
t. Secondly, the ordinary symplectic
stabilizer matrix C is taken.
If we take the generator G¯
(h)
0 (1m, 0m)
t of the homogeneous sets, we can produce
any generator G¯0 as
G¯0 = C0G¯
(h)
0 =
(
1m t
Gx0 v
)(
1m
0m
)
=
(
1m
Gx0
)
, (4.43)
with t, v ∈ Mm(F2), where t and v can be chosen according to fulfill the properties
derived by Corollary A.6.1 to let C0 be symplectic. For the first of these three prop-
erties, Gx0 has to be symmetric, which has also be true in order to create a class of
commuting elements in C0, corresponding to the derived Property (2) of Section 3.1.2.
The following discussion gives a first idea of the construction of inhomogeneous
sets. The results can be seen as a proof-of-principle that legitimates the approach.
In order to generate a class which is not fully decomposable, we entangle two qubit
systems with indices i, j ∈ {1,m} , i 6= j by setting (Gx0)i,j = (Gx0)j,i = 1, which has the
expected effect, regarding the class generation which is introduced by Equation (3.17).
Following then the ideas of Section 4.5.2, we found some of the solutions for four-qubit
systems and list them in Appendix C.1.3. A cyclic generator for the three-qubit system
that equals the system which is generated in [RBKSS05] is given by
C(0,9,0) =

0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
 , (4.44)
where the corresponding generator G0 equals
(Gx0)(0,9,0) =
0 1 01 0 0
0 0 0
 , (4.45)
with G0 = (1m, G
x
0)
t.
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4.7 Unitary operator
So far, we have discussed different sets of cyclic MUBs in the view of a partition of
the set of Pauli operators, as introduced in Section 3.1.2. The corresponding stabilizer
matrices were introduced in Sections 4.1, 4.5, and 4.6 and serve as generators of the
set of classes which partition the set of Pauli operators. But, for measuring quantum
states, we need to transform those matrices into unitary operators, in the fashion
of Section 3.1.2. This section starts by deriving that transformation and leads to
a comfortable form of the unitary operators which result from Fibonacci-based sets
(Section 4.7.1). Section 4.7.2 recalls the iterative construction of the Fermat sets of
Section 4.2 in order to derive again an iterative construction of these MUBs, but this
time on the level of unitary operators as published in [SR11]. The section closes by
discussing shortly the generation of the unitary operator in cases of a more general
stabilizer matrix (Section 4.7.3).
For the derivation of the unitary operator we use the theory of the stabilizer for-
malism9, as could have already been figured out by the definition of the stabilizer
matrix C ∈ M2m(Fp). Within this theory, substitutes of the usual Pauli operators
are defined, namely the logical Pauli operators . The usual Pauli operators ZX(~a)
were defined in Equation (3.14). With ~zk ∈ F2mp being a vector that has a one at
position k and zeros else and ~xk ∈ F2mp a vector with a one at position m + k and
zeros else, we can define the physical operators , namely a unitary representation of
F2mp , as Zk = ZX(~zk) and Xk = ZX(~xk); using a stabilizer matrix A results in the
logical operators Z¯k = ZX(A~zk) and X¯k = ZX(A~xk) with k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ,m ∈ N∗
and p prime. The physical Pauli-Z operators produce a local phase factor, whereas
physical Pauli-X operators induce bit (or dit10) flips. Therefore, the logical ground
state |0〉L is naturally defined as the joint eigenstate of all logical Pauli-Z operators
with eigenvalue +1. The other logical states can be derived by applying bit (or dit)
flips as
|j〉L = X¯j11 · · · X¯jmm |0〉L, (4.46)
with {j1, . . . , jm} being the bit (or dit) decomposition of j ∈ Fmp . At first, we focus
on the construction of the unitary operator that generates a Fibonacci-based set of
MUBs.
4.7.1 Fibonacci-based sets
In order to facilitate the following consideration, we use the inverse of the stabilizer
matrix for the Fibonacci-based sets (cf. Equation (4.4)), which, in the case of qubits,
is obviously given by
C−1 =
(
0m 1m
1m B
)
. (4.47)
9The theory of the stabilizer formalism was developed by Gottesman [Got96]. See also his
Ph. D. thesis [Got97].
10A dit denotes a variable defined over Zd, generalizing a bit.
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This leads to the logical operators
Z¯k = ZX(C
−1~zk) and X¯k = ZX(C−1~xk), (4.48)
with Z¯k = Xk for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Thus, the logical ground state is (up to a global
phase) given by
|0〉L = 2−m/2
∑
j∈Fm2
|j〉. (4.49)
For the construction of a complete set of MUBs for a dimension of the Hilbert space
which is a power of two, the set of Pauli operators is partitioned into d + 1 = 2m + 1
disjoint classes of commuting operators (cf. Equation (3.16)). The common eigenbases
of those classes are mutually unbiased, as shown by Bandyopadhyay et al. [BBRV02].
In order to get a cyclic set, the transformation that brings a class Cl with l ∈ {0, . . . , d}
of operators to the class C(l+1) mod (d+1), has to be of multiplicative order d + 1. By
construction, the class C0 of the Fibonacci-based sets appears as
C0 =
{
ZX
(
~az
~0
)∣∣∣∣~az ∈ Fm2 \ {0}} . (4.50)
For a complete set of cyclic MUBs there exists a unitary operator U ∈ Md(C), such
that UClU † = C(l+1) mod (d+1) and Ud+1 = 1d. With 1d being the common eigenbasis of
the operators of the class C0, the columns of U l form the vectors of the eigenbases of
Cl. Since U maps Pauli operators onto Pauli operators, it is called a Clifford unitary
operator . Properties of these operators and their relation to symplectic matrices is
given in Appendix A.6. As mentioned above, we will calculate the inverse of the unitary
operator, thus U †. By definition, the operator U † transforms a physical state into the
corresponding logical state, namely U †|j〉 = |j〉L which yields with Equation (4.46)
U †|j〉 = e−iΨ
m∏
k=1
ZX(C−1~xk)jk |0〉L, (4.51)
and with Equation (4.49) finally
U † = 2−m/2e−iΨ
∑
i,j∈Fm2
m∏
k=1
ZX(C−1~xk)jk |i〉〈j|. (4.52)
The global phase factor e−iΨ with Ψ ∈ [0, 2pi) is fixed by assuming that (U †)d+1 = 1d,
but the phases of the elements of the set of Pauli operators within a class Cj are
arbitrary. Thus, this global phase factor does not follow from the stabilizer formal-
ism. To calculate the expression of Equation (4.52), we plug in C−1 in the form of
Equation (4.47) with B = (bij). The general k-th factor looks like
ZX(C−1~xk) =
(
k−1⊗
t=1
Xbtk
)
⊗ (−i)bkkZXbkk ⊗
(
m⊗
t=k+1
Xbtk
)
. (4.53)
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Applying the product, we find for a single tensor factor of the qubit at position k the
term
(−i)bkkjkXb1kj1+...+bk−1,kjk−1 · Zjk ·XXkkjk+...+bmkjm , (4.54)
that can, by shifting the operator Z to the left, be rewritten as
ibkkjk(−1)b1kj1jk+...+bkkjkjkZjk ·XX1kjk+...+bmkjm . (4.55)
To be able to write the tensor product in a short form, we define the abbreviations
p∗j :=i
∑m
k=1 bkkjk(−1)
∑m
k=1 b1kj1jk+...+bkkjkjk , (4.56)
X˜j :=
m⊗
k=1
Xb1kj1+...+bmkjm , (4.57)
which lead to
U † = 2−m/2e−iΨ
∑
i,j∈Fm2
p∗j ·
(
m⊗
k=1
Zjk
)
· X˜j|i〉〈j|. (4.58)
Only the factor X˜j acts on
∑
i |i〉, but it has no argument in i and keeps the sum
invariant. Therefore–summarized over i–it equals the unity operator and vanishes.
The tensor product
⊗m
k=1 Z
jk can be identified with (−1)i·j that equals Sylvester’s
Hadamard matrix (cf. Equation A.7). Thus we end up with the short form of U † as
U † = e−iΨH⊗m · P ∗, (4.59)
the m-folded tensor product of the normalized Hadamard matrix (cf. Equation (A.6))
which is defined as
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, (4.60)
and the diagonal phase system matrix which is given by P ∗ = diag((p∗j)j∈Fm2 ). With B
being symmetric and the quadratic form
〈j|B|j〉 =
m∑
k,l=1
bkljkjl, (4.61)
where 〈j|B|j〉 ∈ Z4 holds, as it is only taken as the power of a root of order four, we
finally find
p∗j = i
〈j|B|j〉(−1)
∑m
k=1 bkkjk . (4.62)
For the sake of completeness, the original unitary operator U is accordingly given by
U = eiΨP ·H⊗m, (4.63)
with P = diag((pj)j∈Fm2 ) and pj = (−i)〈j|B|j〉(−1)
∑m
k=1 bkkjk .11 The consideration of the
unitary operators U for the derived stabilizer matrices that follow from the matrices
A in Appendix C.1 leads to an unproven conjecture.
11 The additional minus sign comparing to the results of [KRS10, SR12] is due to the fact that we
to construct U here and not U†, which does not matter in principle.
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Conjecture 4.7.1 (Spectrum of generators of MUBs).
The spectrum of a unitary operator U that generates a complete set of MUBs is non-
degenerate; it consists of all roots of unity of order d+ 1 with a single exception.
It is clear, that the eigenvalues of U have to be roots of unity of order d + 1 in
order to fulfill Ud+1 = 1d. But U is a d× d matrix, thus if it is non-degenerate, it has
d different eigenvalues. Multiplying a valid U by any root of unity of order d+ 1 will
result again in a valid U . We are free to exclude the trivial root 1 from the spectrum
which results in a spectrum that is symmetric to the real axis. In this case, the trace
of U is given by trU = −1. This way, we can calculate the global phase eiΨ of U by
inserting Equation (4.63) as
eiΨ = − tr(P ∗H⊗m). (4.64)
The consideration of derived unitary operators that generate a complete set of cyclic
MUBs, where the eigenvalue −1 is excluded from the spectrum, results again in a
conjecture.
Conjecture 4.7.2 (Global phase of generators of MUBs).
The global phase of the generator U in the form of Equation (4.63) of a complete set
of cyclic MUBs, where the eigenvalue +1 is chosen to be excluded from the spectrum
of U , provided Conjecture 4.7.1 is true, reads
eiΨ =
{
−1−i√
2
, for m odd,
−i, for m even. (4.65)
It is surprising that the global phase eiΨ seems to depend not on the stabilizer
matrix C at all, but only on the number of qubits, thus, on the dimension d = 2m.
Since by construction of the phase factors pj (cf. Equation (4.62)), the product P ·H⊗m
leads to a matrix with entries that are roots of unity of order four (and a global real
normalization factor), for even m the unitary matrix U has only roots of unity of
order four as entries, whereas for odd m it has only entries that are principal roots
of order eight (so not of order four). The complex conjugation of the phase factor
in relation to the results of [KRS10] comes from the fact that here are operators ZX
used, in [KRS10] operators XZ, but C looks the same. As an advantage, the approach
used here results in a symmetric arrangement of the classes Cj, for example C0 consists
only of Pauli-Z operators and Cd of Pauli-X operators.
4.7.2 Fermat sets
In Section 4.2 it was shown that for dimensions d = 22
k
with k ∈ N, a complete set
of cyclic MUBs can be build recursively, thus, using the complete set of cyclic MUBs
from the next smaller dimension. This procedure in terms of the stabilizer matrix C
was shown in Equation (4.19). Considering the unitary matrix U which results from
C for Fibonacci-based sets as given by Equation (4.63), we find an analogous recursive
construction, but this time in terms of U . And, comparably to the definition of C2k of
Equation (4.19), we will refer to the unitary operator U of dimension 2m with m = 2k
in the following as U2k .
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To simplify matters, we define the matrix V by
V = P · H¯⊗m, (4.66)
which has, compared to the unitary operator U of Equation (4.63), a factor of one for
the global phase and with the Hadamard matrix as given in Equation A.5, namely
H¯ =
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, (4.67)
no normalization factor. Thus, V is not a unitary matrix, but U can be derived from
V simply as U = V/(− trV ). To calculate a matrix Vm with a Bm as discussed in
Section 4.2, we have
Vm = diag(((−i)〈i|Bm|i〉(−1)
∑m
k=1 bkkik)i∈Fm2 ) · H¯⊗m, (4.68)
using Equation (4.62). By Equation (4.18), the only value on the diagonal of B2k that
does not vanish, is b11. We can therefore abbreviate Equation (4.68) as
Vm = diag(((−i)〈i|Bm|i〉(−1)i1)i∈Fm2 ) · H¯⊗m. (4.69)
The same construction holds for V2m; we may consider the new vector
i′ = (i′1, . . . i
′
2m)
t ∈ F2m2 as i′ = (i, j)t = (i1, . . . , im, j1, . . . , jm)t ∈ F2m2 , which leads
to
V2m = diag(((−i)〈i,j|B2m|i,j〉(−1)i1)i,j∈Fm2 ) · H¯⊗2m. (4.70)
The matrix element 〈i, j|B2m|i, j〉 with B2m =
(
Bm 1m
1m 0m
)
equals 〈i|Bm|i〉+ 2(i · j),12
thus, we find for Equation (4.70):
V2m = diag(((−i)〈i|Bm|i〉(−1)i1(−1)i·j)i,j∈Fm2 ) · H¯⊗2m. (4.71)
The factor (−1)i·j defines the 2m× 2m dimensional Hadamard matrix H¯⊗m, the same,
that is used to describe Vm. By definition, i represents the lower bit half and j the
higher bit half of i′ as i′ = (i, j)t. We identify i as the row index and j as the column
index of H⊗m, the factors, namely (−i)〈i|Bm|i〉(−1)i1 are invariant of j, thus repeat
for each j. The phase vector of V2m arises, by calculating Vm and concatenating its
column vectors such that 
p1
p2
. . .
p22m
 =

(~v1)m
(~v2)m
. . .
(~v2m)m
 , (4.72)
where (~vk)m is the k-th column vector of Vm. We will refer to the mapping of Vm to
the phase vector P2m of V2m as the chop map M, i. e. M(Vm) = P2m. This defines
the recursion relation
V2m = diag(M(Vm)) · H¯⊗2m. (4.73)
12It has to be taken care, that 2(i · j) ∈ Z4 holds and does therefore not vanish, as it is part of the
exponent of −i in Equation (4.70).
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For k = 0, thus m = 2k = 1, we have with B1 = (1):
V1 = diag((−i)0·1·0(−1)0, (−i)1·1·1(−1)1) ·
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(4.74)
=
(
1 1
i −i
)
. (4.75)
This implies with M(V1) = (1, i, 1,−i)t:
V2 =

1 1 1 1
i −i i −i
1 1 −1 −1
−i i i −i
 , (4.76)
and can be continued at least to V2048 as checked in Appendix C.1.4, and if Wiede-
mann’s conjecture is true, for all V2k with k ∈ N.
To calculate the unitary operator Um as Um = Vm/(− trVm), we need to analyze
the matrix Vm in detail. If i ∈ F2 represents the rows and j ∈ F2 the columns of V1,
we find with Equation (4.75),
(V1)i,j =
{
1 · (−1)i·j, for i ≡ 0 mod 2,
i · (−1)i·j, for i ≡ 1 mod 2. (4.77)
Taking Equation (4.73) into account, V2 reads as
(V2)i,j =
{
1 · (−1)i1·i2+i·j, for i ≡ 0 mod 2,
i · (−1)i1·i2+i·j, for i ≡ 1 mod 2, (4.78)
with i = {i1, . . . , im} in general. As seen above, the lengths of the vectors i and j are
one for V1. For V2 the vectors are two bit long, for V4 four bit and so forth. Using
Equation (4.71) in order to recognize Hadamard matrices in the construction of Vm
recursively, we find
(Vm)i,j =
{
1 · (−1)x, for i ≡ 0 mod 2,
i · (−1)x, for i ≡ 1 mod 2, (4.79)
with
x = i1 · i2 + (i1, i2) · (i3, i4)t + . . .+ (i1, . . . , im/2) · (im/2+1, . . . , im)t + i · j. (4.80)
The trace of Vm is given by the sum of the diagonal values, where j = i holds. We will
calculate the real and the imaginary part separately.
For the real part of the trace of Vm, the first bit value of i has to be zero, thus we
find
R{trVm} =
∑
i∈Fm2 ,i1=0
(Vm)i,i =
∑
i∈Fm2 ,i1=0
(−1)x, (4.81)
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with x = 0 · i2 + (0, i2) · (i3, i4)t + . . . + (0, i2, . . . , im/2) · (im/2+1, . . . , im)t + i · i. We
arrange the sum in pairs, where for one element of the pair im/2+1 = 0 holds and for
the other element im/2+1 = 1. Since i1 = 0 holds for all terms in the sum, x differs
only in the last term for the two elements of a pair, where i · i gives the Hamming
weight of i, that differs by one for the different cases. So for one element of each pair,
x is an even number, for the other element it is odd and as exponents of −1 can be
taken modulo two, the expression (−1)0 + (−1)1 = 0 is the sum of both elements and
equals zero. Since all elements can be paired this way, the real part of the trace of Vm
vanishes.
For the imaginary part of the trace of Vm the value of i1 equals one, we find
I {trVm} =
∑
i∈Fm2 ,i1=1
(Vm)i,i =
∑
i∈Fm2 ,i1=1
(−1)x, (4.82)
with x = 1 · i2 + (1, i2) · (i3, i4)t + . . . + (1, i2, . . . , im/2) · (im/2+1, . . . , im)t + i · i. We
will consider two cases: For those elements i, where at least one of the bit values of{
i2, . . . , im/2
}
equals zero, we can arrange the elements analogously in pairs as done
for the real part. The second case treats all remaining elements, namely those where
all bit values of
{
i2, . . . , im/2
}
equal one, which produces terms with
x = 1 · 1 + (1, 1) · (1, 1)t + . . .+ (1, . . . , 1) · (im/2+1, . . . , im)t + i · i. (4.83)
For m = 1, we have only one term and this adds −1 to the imaginary part. For
m = 2, the imaginary part equals
∑1
i2=0
(−1)1·i2+(1,i2)·(1,i2)t which leads to −2. For
all m > 2 we can use the following observation: For each of the 2m/2 elements with
i = (1, . . . , 1, im/2+1, . . . , im) the two rightmost terms of Equation (4.83) give the same
result modulo two, since the number of ones in the left part is even. As m is a power
of two, all remaining terms without the first one result in powers of two and the first
one equals one. Therefore, the sum of all those elements provides a contribution of
−2m/2 to the imaginary part of the trace of Vm. Thus, we have
trVm = −i2m/2. (4.84)
Taking all results together, we finally find for the unitary operator Um which results
for the Fermat-based sets,
U2m = −i2−mdiag(M(Vm)) · H¯⊗2m. (4.85)
The difference of the operators to those given in [SR11] is due to the replacement of
XZ operators by ZX operators which was motivated in Section 4.7.1. Using the results
of this section may lead to a proof of Wiedemann’s conjecture by the analogy that was
proven in Theorem 4.2.3. An idea is given in Appendix B.
4.7.3 More general sets
The construction of a unitary operator that generates a complete set of cyclic MUBs
which is based on a more general stabilizer matrix, like those discussed in Sections
4.5 and 4.6 is possible in a similar way as was done for the Fibonacci-based sets in
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Section 4.7.1 by using the same steps. But, presumably, the resulting form will not be
decomposable as simple as in Equation (4.63). The search for a nice construction form
is beyond the scope of this work; nevertheless, a physical implementation of general
stabilizer matrices will be discussed in Section 4.8 that is more applicable than the
representation as a unitary matrix with a simple construction.
4.8 Gate decomposition
We have seen so far, that the construction of complete sets of cyclic MUBs for a Hilbert
space of dimension d = 2m with m ∈ N∗ is based on the construction of a stabilizer
matrix (cf. Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.5, and 4.6), which can be represented as a unitary
matrix (cf. Section 4.7). What still lacks is the implementation of the individual bases
into an experimental setup (e. g. a quantum computer). A common general description
of an implementation is the idea of a quantum circuit . This is a scheme, similar to a
classical circuit, that gives a description of the behavior of a unitary operation that
can be seen as a recipe on how to implement the operation in quantum gates. The
challenge in deriving this circuit from the operation is to get a minimal number of
those gates where each gate acts on a minimal number of qubits.13 It was shown that
single-qubit gates and two-qubit gates produce a universal set , which can be used to
implement any unitary operation [DiV95, DBE95, Llo95, BMP+00]. It is important to
mention that the application of gates in quantum circuits have to be read from left to
right, rather than the application of quantum operations on quantum states. Within
this section, we provide a simple generation of a quantum circuit for the Fibonacci-
based sets of Section 4.1 and show the minimal form of this circuit in the case of the
Fermat sets of Section 4.2. Finally, an approach for constructing a quantum circuit
from a more general stabilizer matrix is given. A short discussion on performance and
error optimizations closes this section.
4.8.1 Fibonacci-based sets
In the case of Fibonacci-based sets, it turns out that the construction of an appropriate
quantum circuit that implements the generator of a complete set of cyclic MUBs can
be read out from the reduced stabilizer matrix B ∈ Mm(F2) as it was introduced in
Equation (4.4). But, honestly speaking, this fact results from the direct construction
of the unitary operator, as given by Equation (4.63). Since the global phase cannot
be measured and is therefore irrelevant in the physical implementation, we have to
generate a quantum circuit for the operator
U ′ = P ·H⊗m. (4.86)
Obviously, the application of the Hadamard matrix H⊗m can be done by applying H
to each of the m qubits individually. The phase system is given by P = diag((pj)j∈Fm2 ),
where the binary representation of j refers to a specific quantum state. The bit jk
13An advantage of cyclic MUBs is that a single circuit can be used to implement a complete set of
MUBs, where for a non-cyclic set, d + 1 different circuits have to be implemented, as was done e. g.
by Klimov et al. [KMFS08].
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addresses then with k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the qubit at position k. This phase system depicts
directly the implementation into a quantum circuit. More precisely, we can rewrite
the phase factor as it was given in Equation (4.56), where we find
pj =(−i)
∑m
k,l=1 bkljkjl(−1)
∑m
k=1 bkkjk
=
m∏
k>l=1
(
(−1)jkjl)bkl · m∏
k=1
(
ijk
)bkk . (4.87)
The second term of Equation (4.87) tells us, that a phase of i is applied to the qubit
with index k, if it is in state |1〉k〈1| and bkk = 1; in the case |0〉k〈0| nothing happens.
The first term is only relevant in the case that the qubits with index k and l are in
the state |1〉k〈1| ⊗ |1〉l〈1| (which means that jk = jl = 1) and if bkl = 1. The described
actions can be performed by the following elementary gates:
– The single-qubit Phase gate acting on qubit k which is defined as
Phasek(e
iφ) = |0〉k〈0|+ eiφ|1〉k〈1|, (4.88)
and visualized as
|Ψ〉 eiφ |Ψ′〉
with phase φ ∈ [0, 2pi).
– The two-qubit controlled-Phase gate
CPhases→t(eiφ) = |0〉s〈0| ⊗ |0〉t〈0|+ |0〉s〈0| ⊗ |1〉t〈1|
+ |1〉s〈1| ⊗ |0〉t〈0|+ eiφ|1〉s〈1| ⊗ |1〉t〈1|, (4.89)
with control qubit s, target qubit t and phase φ ∈ [0, 2pi). For a two-qubit state
|Ψs,Ψt〉, the CPhase gate induces in general a transformation |Ψs,Ψt〉 → |Ψs,Ψ′t〉
and is visualized by the following circuit:
|Ψs〉
|Ψt〉 eiφ
|Ψs〉
|Ψ′t〉
We can use these two gates to implement the phase factor of Equation (4.87), namely
by identifying the gates from the reduced stabilizer matrix B as:
– For bkk = 1, apply Phasek(i).
– For bkl = 1 and k > l, apply CPhasek→l(−1).
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Figure 4.1: Quantum circuit for the generator U ′22 of a complete set of cyclic MUBs
for a four qubit system.
As an example, a possible reduced stabilizer matrix that can be used to generate a
complete system of cyclic MUBs for a quantum system of four qubits, is given by the
recursive construction of Equation (4.18) with
B22 =

1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
 . (4.90)
Following the results given above, this solution results in one Phase gate, three
CPhase gates and four Hadamard gates, as depicted in Figure 4.1. Accordingly, in
the case of the recursive construction of Fermat sets given by Equation (4.18), the
implementation of the generator of a complete set of cyclic MUBs for m qubits needs
one Phase gate, m − 1 CPhase gates and m Hadamard gates, which is optimal in the
number of two-qubit gates.14 In the case of the Fibonacci-based sets in the Form of
Equation (4.13), an implementation would need not more than dm/2e+5 Phase gates,
(dm/2e2 − dm/2e)/2 + 10 CPhase gates and m Hadamard gates for m ∈ {1, . . . , 600}
as can be seen in Appendix C.1.5. This does not seem to be optimal at all. Also the
proposed method to find a symmetric companion matrix (cf. Conjecture 4.1.6) does not
seem to be capable to solve this problem optimally. Therefore, further investigations
on how to reduce the number of non-vanishing entries of the reduced stabilizer matrices
are essential in order to reduce the number of gates needed.
4.8.2 Homogeneous sets
To implement homogeneous sets into quantum circuits we cannot use similar methods
as for the Fibonacci-based sets as long as no construction of the unitary matrix is
given in an analogous form to that of Equations (4.63) and (4.87). Therefore, we
will introduce a method that is capable to generate the quantum circuit of nearly
any matrix C ∈ M2m(F2) that is symplectic. At first, symplectic representations of
different quantum gates will be discussed; thereafter, it will be shown how a large set of
symplectic matrices with entries in F2 can be decomposed into a product of symplectic
14As the bases of a complete set of cyclic MUBs for an m qubit system measure the complete
state of this system, a possible quantum circuit should link all qubits together, which can be done by
controlled gates. If not all qubits were linked together, then only information on subsystems could be
measured. Consequently, if for controlled gates only two qubit gates are used, the minimum number
of these gates is m− 1.
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matrices in order to become directly implementable by corresponding quantum gates.
Quantum circuits derived by this method for the homogeneous sets which are discussed,
are shown in Appendices C.1.1 and C.1.2.
Let us define an arbitrary symplectic matrix C ∈M2m(F2) in block-matrix form as
C =
(
s t
u v
)
, (4.91)
with submatrices s, t, u, v ∈ Mm(F2). As stated in Appendix A.6, elements of the
Clifford group are automorphisms of the set of Pauli operators. By their group prop-
erty, these elements are invertible, so also their representation as symplectic matri-
ces. Therefore, any symplectic matrix has full rank, thus, the row vectors within the
submatrix (u, v)t are linearly independent. For the group-based sets defined by Equa-
tion (4.34) this fact can be seen also in the stabilizer matrix directly, since v := 0m and
u := R−1 is invertible. The same holds for the submatrix (s, u), but is not that obvi-
ous. According to this observation, it is in general possible to obtain by elementary
row and column operations a transformed matrix where the submatrix u is invertible.
Within this section, we limit the consideration only to those cases where u is invertible.
To apply these necessary operations and to implement the resulting matrix, different
quantum gates have to be considered.
By the construction of the classes Cj with j ∈ {0, . . . , d} as given in Equation (4.2),
each class consists of Pauli operators. The matrix C then realizes by its symplecticity
property that the set of a certain class of Pauli operators is transformed to another
set of operators, i. e. the next class. Therefore, a circuit of quantum gates which
represents the matrix C has to implement transformations of a set of Pauli operators
to another set. As we can see the whole circuit as the product of basic transformations
(i. e. the quantum gates), the implication of each quantum gate can be analyzed by
the consideration of its truth table of Pauli operators. To explain the idea, we analyze
the Hadamard gate as an example:
The Hadamard operator is defined by Equation (A.6) as
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
; with H† = H, (4.92)
it acts on the Pauli operators X, Y and Z, which are listed in Appendix A.4, as
HXH† = Z, HYH† = −Y and HZH† = X. To construct a complete set of cyclic
MUBs, the eigenbases of the classes Cj are relevant, but the phases of the elements are
not relevant. A quantum gate, represented as a symplectic matrix CH, that implements
the Hadamard operator, should then act on the Pauli operators for a single qubit,
represented as elements of the finite field F22, as
CH
(
1
0
)
=
(
0
1
)
, CH
(
0
1
)
=
(
1
0
)
, and CH
(
1
1
)
=
(
1
1
)
. (4.93)
Obviously, any symplectic matrix will set the zero vector to the zero vector, which is
in accordance to the unitary representation given above. The representation of the
Hadamard operator as a symplectic matrix is finally given by
CH =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, (4.94)
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with the corresponding visual representation as the Hadamard gate.
H
This gate acts only on a single qubit, so the unitary operator on a multi-qubit system
with m qubits that applies a Hadamard gate on the i-th qubit, is given by
U
(i)
H =
(
i−1⊗
l=1
12
)
⊗H ⊗
(
m⊗
l=i+1
12
)
, (4.95)
its representation as a symplectic matrix C
(i)
H =
(
c
(i)
H
)
kl
has entries
(
c
(i)
H
)
kl
=
{
δkl for k, l /∈ {i,m+ i} ,
1− δkl for k, l ∈ {i,m+ i} .
(4.96)
Another single-qubit gate is the Phase gate, that was already mentioned in Section
4.8.1, but we will again concentrate on the Phase-i gate, with a phase of ±i.15 The
unitary matrix of the Phase-i gate is given by
UP±i =
(
1 0
0 ±i
)
, (4.97)
and can be represented by the symplectic matrix
CP±i =
(
1 1
0 1
)
, (4.98)
with the following visual representation.
i
The multi-qubit operators can be built in a similar fashion as for the Hadamard gate
which are given by Equations (4.95) and (4.96) and yield in the representation as a
symplectic matrix, acting on the i-th qubit,(
c
(i)
P±i
)
kl
= δkl + δkiδl(m+i). (4.99)
As a next step, we consider controlled two-qubit gates like the CPhase gate that was
already introduced in Section 4.8.1. For these gates, an operation is applied to the
target qubit if and only if the state of the control qubit equals |1〉. Here, we concentrate
on the CNot gate and the controlled-Z gate. The unitary operator of the CNot gate,
which is equivalent to a controlled-X gate, is given by
U
(1,2)
CNot =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 . (4.100)
15It turns out, that a phase of +i leads to the same result as a phase of −i, if we do only concentrate
on equivalence classes of Pauli operators, thus ignoring additional phases.
60 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCTION OF CYCLIC SETS
The symplectic representation derived from the truth table of Pauli operators of this
operation is given by
C
(1,2)
CNot =

1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
 , (4.101)
and has also a visual representation.
The multi-qubit operator for a CNot gate with control qubit c and target qubit t,
represented as a symplectic matrix, is given by(
c
(c,t)
CNot
)
kl
= δkl + δkcδlt + δk(t+m)δl(c+m). (4.102)
The last gate we want to consider is the controlled-Z gate, which is a special
version of the controlled-Phase gate, with a fixed phase factor of −1. We will
denote this gate by CZ in the following. Its unitary representation is given by
U
(1,2)
CZ =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1
 , (4.103)
and its symplectic representation by
C
(1,2)
CZ =

1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 . (4.104)
The visualization of the CZ gate is the following circuit.
Z
Within a multi-qubit environment, the symplectic representation of the CZ gate with
control qubit named c and target qubit t is accordingly given by(
c
(c,t)
CZ
)
kl
= δkl + δkcδl(t+m) + δktδl(c+m). (4.105)
Armed with all those gates we can implement any stabilizer matrix C ∈ M2m(F2)
in the form of Equation (4.91) with u invertible by a quantum circuit. The process we
suggest is realized in two parts. In the first part, the stabilizer matrix is transformed
into a special form by symplectic operations such that u is mapped to 1m, in the
second part, this form can be written as a product of symplectic matrices that can be
implemented directly.
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Lemma 4.8.1 (Gaussian elimination).
Any symplectic matrix C ∈M2m(F2) in the form of Equation (4.91) with u invertible,
can be transformed by applying CNot operations in the form of Equation (4.102) from
the left in order to obtain a symplectic matrix in the form
C ′ =
(
s′ t′
1m v
′
)
. (4.106)
Proof. If u is an invertible matrix, it can be diagonalized by the Gaussian elimination,
that uses elementary row or column operations. By multiplying a CNot operation in
the manner of Equation (4.102) from the left to the symplectic matrix C, within the
block of the submatrix u, the row which has the index of the control qubit is added
and stored to the row which has the index of the target qubit. Two rows i, j of u can
be swapped by applying C
(i,j)
CNotC
(j,i)
CNotC
(i,j)
CNot, as the elements of u have characteristic two.
Therefore, all elementary row operations can be realized with CNot operations.16
The transformation may also be realized by multiplying CNot operations from the
right which induces elementary column operations, respectively.
Lemma 4.8.1 leads implicitly to the following corollary:
Corollary 4.8.2 (Gate commutation).
Two quantum gates which have representations as symplectic matrices in the form
C1 =
(
1m a1
0m 1m
)
and C2 =
(
1m a2
0m 1m
)
, (4.107)
with a1, a2 ∈Mm(F2), commute.
Proof. The application of C1 to C2 (or vice versa) gives
C1C2 =
(
1m a1 + a2
0m 1m
)
. (4.108)
Therefore, the Phase-i gates and the CZ gates commute.
The resulting matrix of Lemma 4.8.1 can be decomposed into a product of matrices
that can be used to read off the required CZ gates, Phase gates and Hadamard gates
directly.
Lemma 4.8.3 (Stabilizer matrix decomposition).
Any symplectic matrix C ∈M2m(F2) in the form of Equation (4.106), can be factorized
in matrices that describe the product of CZ gates, Phase gates, and an m-folded tensor
product of the Hadamard matrix as
C ′ =
(
s′ t′
1m v
′
)
=
(
1m s
′
0m 1m
)(
0m 1m
1m 0m
)(
1m v
′
0m 1m
)
, (4.109)
which implies t′ = 1m + s′v′.
16The third operation, namely the multiplication of any row with a non-zero scalar, is given by
the identity operation in F2, as no non-zero element exists besides 1.
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i
i −1
H
H
H
= C(2,3,4)
Figure 4.2: Quantum circuit for the generator C(2,3,4) of Equation (4.38) of a complete,
homogeneous set of group-based cyclic MUBs for a three qubit system.
i
i −1
H
H
H
i
i
= C(1,6,2)
Figure 4.3: Quantum circuit for the generator C(1,6,2) of Equation (4.42) of a complete,
homogeneous set of semigroup-based cyclic MUBs for a three qubit system.
Proof. Corollary A.6.1 of Appendix A.6 states the conditions on C ′ to be a symplectic
matrix. From the first condition follows, that s′ has to be symmetric. From the last
condition follows then with u′ = 1m that t′ = 1m + s′v′. Inserting t′ into the second
condition shows finally, that also v′ has to be symmetric.
The given equation appears naturally, where the middle term corresponds to Hada-
mard operations given by Equation (4.96). The remaining two terms can be created
using Corollary 4.8.2 the following way: Each non-zero element on the diagonal of s′
and v′, respectively, refers to a Phase-i gate, as can be seen from Equation (4.99).
As s′ and v′ are symmetric matrices, their off-diagonal, non-zero elements refer to CZ
gates, according to Equation (4.105).
To implement s′ and v′, at most 2m Phase-i gates and at most m2 −m CZ gates
are needed. The form derived by Equation (4.8.3) requires exactly m Hadamard gates.
An upper bound to realize the Gaussian elimination as discussed in Lemma 4.8.1 is
the implementation of m2 different CNot gates, as any m-bit vector can be build by
maximally m XOR operations within the set of m linearly independent vectors. For
v′ = 0m follows t′ = 1m, thus a Fibonacci-based set. The quantum circuit which
appears then by applying Lemma 4.8.3 is the same as the one given by Figure 4.1.
Results of the semigroup sets (cf. Appendix C.1.2) indicate, that the sets of MUBs
can be limited to sets which have an invertible m ×m submatrix in the upper right
corner (i. e. the matrix t of Equation (4.91) is invertible). If this is not the case, one
may find a set of quantum gates that realizes an appropriate transformation. Imple-
mentations of complete sets of MUBs for three qubit systems are shown by Figure 4.2
and Figure 4.3; quantum circuits for four qubit systems are listed in Appendices C.1.1
and C.1.2.
4.8.3 Inhomogeneous sets
Quantum circuits for inhomogeneous sets can in principle be built in the same way
as discussed for the homogeneous sets in the former section. But these sets do not
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i H
H
H
H
H −1
H
H= C(0,9,0) = G
(x)
(0,9,0)
Figure 4.4: Quantum circuit for the generator C(0,9,0) of Equation (4.44) and the
lower submatrix of the corresponding generator of the class C0, namely G(0,9,0) of
Equation (4.45), of a complete, inhomogeneous set of cyclic MUBs for a three qubit
system.
include the standard basis as shown in Section 4.6, i. e. the generator G0 of the first
class C0 is not given by G′0 = (1m, 0m)t; in standard form it reads G¯0 = (1m, Gx0)t (cf.
Equation (4.28)). Any symplectic matrix C0 that transforms the generator G
′
0 to the
generator G¯0 can be taken to implement the quantum circuit which produces the class
C0. In order to generate a class with commuting elements, Gx0 has to be a symmetric
matrix (cf. [BBRV02, Lemma 4.3]). The symplectic transformation C0G
′
0 = G¯0 equals
C0 =
(
1m 0m
Gx0 1m
)
, (4.110)
and can be rewritten using Hadamard gates similarly to Lemma 4.8.3 as
C0 =
(
0m 1m
1m 0m
)(
1m G
x
0
0m 1m
)(
0m 1m
1m 0m
)
. (4.111)
The quantum circuit is then given by a Hadamard gate on each individual qubit (to
implement the rightmost matrix), followed by Phase-i gates on each diagonal non-zero
value of Gx0 and CZ gates on each off-diagonal, upper triangular value of G
x
0 , as done
for Lemma 4.8.3 (to implement the matrix in the middle) and again Hadamard gates
on each individual qubit (to implement the leftmost matrix). Since the application of
two consecutively applied Hadamard operations is the unity operation, we can omit
Hadamard gates on those qubits, that are involved neither in any Phase-i nor in any
CZ gate.
Resulting quantum circuits for complete sets of MUBs on systems with four qubits
are given in Appendix C.1.3, the quantum circuit for the three-qubit system which is
generated by C(0,9,0) of Equation (4.44) is shown in Figure 4.4.
4.8.4 Practical implementation
For a practical implementation of a complete set of cyclic MUBs, a quantum circuit
like the example of Figure 4.1 would be able to transform a quantum state by an
operation that shifts one of the d+ 1 mutually unbiased bases to the next. Thus, after
this process, variables that are complementary to the former ones, could be measured
in the computational basis. To be able to measure in a specific basis of these d + 1
different bases, the quantum circuit has to be used several times, in order to achieve the
desired set of variables. In average, this would cause d/2 applications of the quantum
circuit. Consequently, for a large number of bases, namely a high dimension d of the
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Hilbert space, we propose to decompose the index of the bases binary and create for
each power of two an individual circuit. This raises the size of the experimental setup,
but reduces the number of gates which are used in average to create a specific basis.
To give an example, for a dimension d = 210, a complete set of MUBs has 1025
different bases. Following the suggestion, there would be ten different quantum cir-
cuits, thus any basis can be reached by using five of them in average. This is a huge
improvement over using 512 times the same circuit in average if only the generator of
the cyclic set of MUBs is implemented.
Depending on the dimension, it could also be favored to decompose the index to
any other number system; fortunately, all those approaches can be realized by using
the powers of the stabilizer matrix.
Chapter
5
Equivalence of mutually
unbiased bases
A set of mutually unbiased bases defines a set of bases, where the absolute value of the
overlap of all pairs of vectors that are taken from two different bases within the set is
constant and equals d−1/2, where d is the dimension of the corresponding Hilbert space
H = Cd, as was seen in Definition 2.2.1. From this definition it does not make any
sense to take the ordering of the bases into account, as well as the ordering of the basis
vectors of any basis. Also the multiplication of any basis vector with a phase factor
preserves the mutual unbiasedness which is finally even invariant under any unitary
transformation which is applied to the whole set of bases. By choosing a unitary
transformation which is the inverse of any unitary operator Bj of the set, this basis
becomes the standard basis, thus, each set of MUBs we find, can be transformed into a
set that includes the standard basis. We sum up these naturally appearing arguments
to define the equivalence of different sets of MUBs.
Definition 5.0.1 (Equivalence of mutually unbiased bases).
Two sets of mutually unbiased bases, namely S = {B0, . . . ,Br−1} and
S′ =
{B′0, . . . ,B′r−1} with r ∈ N∗, are said to be equivalent, if there holds
B′j = UBpi(j)Wj, (5.1)
with a unitary matrix U ∈ Md(C), a permutation pi on {0, . . . , r − 1} and monomial
matrices1 Wj that are given by the product of a permutation matrix and a diagonal
phase matrix, for j ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}.
It has to be kept in mind that this definition of equivalence does not distinguish
between the different sets of cyclic MUBs, that were discussed in Sections 4.1, 4.5
and 4.6. Their equivalence in a Hilbert space of dimension d = 23 was shown al-
ready in [RBKSS05]. To distinguish those sets, the consideration of the entanglement
properties is essential, as discussed in Section 4.4.
1A monomial matrix is defined to be a square matrix which has in every row and every column
exactly one entry that differs from zero.
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Nevertheless, on this mathematical level of equivalence, different sets were discussed
in the literature [CCKS97, GR09, Kan12]. It is still an open problem how many
inequivalent sets exist and how they are related. Within the following section, we
will discuss the equivalence of sets of MUBs which are based on the construction of
Bandyopadhyay et al. [BBRV02] and compare them with other constructions. The
construction of the Fibonacci-based sets of MUBs allows us to construct a set of
operators that realize permutations of the bases which is shown in the subsequent
section.
5.1 Heisenberg group partition sets
To analyze the equivalence of sets of MUBs which are based on the construction of
Bandyopadhyay et al., we can use their construction principles in order to simplify the
comparison of two different sets. Following the explanation given in Section 3.1.2, each
element Uj of the set of MUBs S which is generated by the powers of a unitary matrix
U as S = 〈U〉, is given by the set of common eigenvectors of a corresponding class of
Pauli operators Cj (cf. Equation (3.25)) with j ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} and r ∈ N∗. For a
complete set of MUBs we have r = d + 1. By the construction of Equation (3.17), a
class Cj is a set of elements ZX(~a) of the set of Pauli operators. Analogously to the set
of unitary matrices, we can define the set C = {C0, . . . , Cr−1} of classes Cj, that defines
a complete set of MUBs, but without determining the order of the basis vectors or
their phase within a single class. To define equivalence on this level, there is no need
for matrices Wj as introduced by Definition 5.0.1. We can formulate the following
lemma:
Lemma 5.1.1 (Equivalence of mutually unbiased bases).
Two sets of MUBs which are characterized by C = {C0, . . . , Cr−1} and
C′ =
{C ′0, . . . , C ′r−1} are equivalent, if there holds
C ′j = UCpi(j)U †, (5.2)
with a unitary matrix U ∈ Cd, a permutation pi on {0, . . . , r − 1}, and r ∈ N∗.
Proof. Starting with the Definition 5.0.1 on the equivalence of MUBs, the matrices Wj
do not play any role if we observe sets of Pauli operators Cj and C ′pi(j) that do neither
have any ordering nor keep any phase. The equivalence has to be formulated the given
way, since in the definition, we transform an eigenvector v as Uv; so, considering v is
an eigenvector of a matrix A, then Uv is an eigenvector of UAU †.
As the classes of both sets C and C′ contain only Pauli operators, the unitary
transformation U has to be an element of the Clifford group (cf. Appendix A.6),
that maps by definition Pauli operators onto Pauli operators. A certain class Cj can
be written in terms of a 2m × (d − 1)-matrix, where each column represents a Pauli
operator, namely one of the vectors ~a given in Equation (3.17). It can be seen within
that formula, that the d− 1 elements can be generated by the (non-unique) so-called
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2m×m generator matrix Gj, thus Cj = 〈Gj〉.2 Consequently, equivalence of two sets
C and C′ is given, if and only if
〈G′j〉 = f〈Gpi(j)〉Qj, (5.3)
with a symplectic matrix f (that maps Pauli operators onto Pauli operators), a per-
mutation Qj and a permutation pi on {0, . . . , d}. In the case, we write the generators
in standard form as discussed in Section 4.3, the generators Gj and G
′
j become unique.
Then the permutation matrix Qj can be set to unity, thus neglected. For the trans-
formation matrix f we are free to assume the block-matrix form
f =
(
s t
u v
)
. (5.4)
As it is shown by Corollary A.6.1, this matrix is symplectic if and only if stu and ttv
are symmetric and vts − ttu = 1m. With the methods introduced so far, we are able
to prove the equivalence of all Fibonacci-based complete sets of MUBs for a specific
dimension d = 2m with m ∈ N∗.
5.1.1 Fibonacci-based sets
To construct a Fibonacci-based set, we have to follow simply the Steps 1.–3. that were
given in Section 4.1. It turns out, that neither the choice of the reduced stabilizer
matrix B is unique, nor the polynomial with Fibonacci index d+1. Within this section
we will show, that all Fibonacci-based sets which are based on the same polynomial,
are equivalent, independent of the choice of B. In a second step it is shown, that also
a different choice of the polynomial will create an equivalent set of cyclic MUBs.
Applying the generator of a set to all elements rotates this set, so we can choose
pi(0) = 0 for Equation (5.3), which implies 〈G0〉 = 〈G′0〉 and in standard form G¯0 = G¯′0.
According to the construction of the Fibonacci-based sets, this generator is given by
G0 =
(
1m
0m
)
, (5.5)
which can also be seen in the derivation of the standard form in Equation (4.27). Thus,
the choice for the permutation pi maps the class of Pauli-Z operators of the set C to
the class of Pauli-Z operators of the set C′. Using Equation (5.3), we have to demand
that u = 0m; to keep f symplectic, we need to set v = (s
t)−1. If both sets represent
complete sets of MUBs, we can represent their generators in standard form, where the
elements Gzj as given in Equation (4.28) form a matrix representation of the finite field
Fm2 ; the same holds true for the elements G′zj . We can formulate a lemma on equivalent
MUBs:
Lemma 5.1.2 (Equivalence of certain Fibonacci-based sets).
The choice of different reduced stabilizer matrices B ∈Mm(F2) with the same charac-
teristic polynomial that has Fibonacci index 2m + 1 in the construction of Fibonacci-
based MUBs leads to equivalent sets.
2Normally, the symbol 〈A〉 refers to the set, which is generated by the powers of A. Adopting
the abstract meaning of this symbol, the expression 〈Gj〉 refers to a generation which is specified by
Equation (3.17).
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Proof. Two reduced stabilizer matrices B,B′ ∈Mm(F2), which have to be symmetric
according to Condition (i), formulated in Section 4.1, are related as B′ = sBst with
an orthogonal matrix s ∈ Mm(F2), i. e. s−1 = st. If we set the transformation matrix
as
f =
(
s 0m
0m s
)
, (5.6)
this matrix is symplectic. Applied to the generators of the classes Cj of C in standard
form, we get fG¯j = (spj(B), s)
t, where pj(B) is the polynomial Fj+1(B)(Fj(B))
−1.
As seen by Corollary 4.3.1, the transformed generators can be multiplied from the
right by any invertible, block-diagonal matrix, in particular also by f−1. This leads to
fG¯jf
−1 = (spj(B)st,1m)t ≡ G¯′j, the generators of the classes of the set C′, in standard
form. The case of j = 0 can be shown the same way.
We can use this lemma to give a general theorem on the equivalence of Fibonacci-
based sets.
Theorem 5.1.3 (Equivalence of Fibonacci-based sets).
All Fibonacci-based complete sets of MUBs are equivalent.
Proof. It was shown by Lemma 5.1.2, that all reduced stabilizer matrices with the same
characteristic polynomial with Fibonacci index d+1 result in equivalent sets of MUBs.
In the case that the two stabilizer matrices B and B′ have different characteristic poly-
nomials p and p′, respectively, with Fibonacci index d + 1, we can use the following
consideration: In general, the two different irreducible polynomials have degree m and
are defined over the ground field F2. We pick a pair of their roots, namely β and β′,
respectively. The adjunction of β to F2 results in the field F2(β) ∼= F2[x]/pF2[x] ∼= F2m ,
a similar consideration holds for β′. But as both extensions are Galois extensions, the
elements in F2(β) and in F2(β′) are equivalent up to a permutation [Bos06, Chap-
ter 4.1]. The elements of those fields appear in the Pauli-Z part of the generators in
standard form (cf. Equation (4.27)), thus both roots result in the same set of gener-
ators. If we chose a symmetric matrix B ∈ Mm(F2) to represent the root β, we have
the freedom shown in Lemma 5.1.2, where the minimal polynomial of B equals the
minimal polynomial of β.
In other words, Theorem 5.1.3 shows, that the minimal polynomials of different
elements of the finite field F2m are possible minimal polynomials of a polynomial ring
F2[x] which is congruent to the field itself; the chosen element only needs to have a
minimal polynomial with degree m (which is irreducible by definition).
5.1.2 (In-)Homogeneous sets
To show the equivalence of all sets which are based on the construction of Bandyopad-
hyay et al. in a similar fashion as for the Fibonacci-based sets, further investigations
are essential and exceed the scope of this work. As already stated above, it was shown
in [RBKSS05] that all discussed sets in Hilbert space dimension d = 23 are equivalent
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and the equivalence of different sets in higher dimensions was indicated. Consider-
ations in the fashion of Section 5.1.1 would also lead to explicit transformations be-
tween the different sets. In a first step, one may prove the equivalence of homogeneous
sets with an additive group structure in the Z component of the class generators to
Fibonacci-based sets and in a second step their equivalence with sets that possess only
an additive semi-group structure (cf. Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2). As inhomogeneous
sets do not contain the standard basis, they are by Definition 5.0.1 always equivalent
to sets with a standard basis, where a unitary operation for an arbitrary basis of this
set exists, that transforms this set into a homogeneous set.
5.1.3 Different constructions
We can relate the Fibonacci-based sets to different constructions by following the
discussion given in [BBRV02]: Theorem 4.4 introduces a construction that is equivalent
to the standard form of homogeneous sets (cf. Equation (4.28)). In Section 4.3 the
construction is limited to sets with an additive group structure (cf. Equation (4.33)).
Finally, at the end of this section, the group structure is fixed in a way to obtain a
field structure. Bandyopadhyay et al. took this construction from the Wootters and
Fields construction [WF89], indicating their equivalence.3 Godsil and Roy [GR09]
relate these sets also with the sets constructed by Klappenecker and Ro¨tteler [KR04]
and again to those of Bandyopadhyay et al..
5.2 Class-permutation operators
Starting with the definition of equivalence given by Definition 5.0.1, the question arises
whether the permutation pi on the indexing of the different bases can be realized by
a symplectic transformation. In the case of Fibonacci-based sets we discovered a set
of operators that seems to be capable to implement the set of permutations by a set
of symplectic transformations. We call this set the set of class-permutation operators .
The construction is quite intuitive, to follow the ideas, we start with the definition of
the first class-permutation operator A1, that can be deduced from the generator of a
Fibonacci-based set in the form of Equation (4.4) as
A1 =
(
1m B
0m 1m
)
, (5.7)
with the same reduced stabilizer matrix B ∈ Mm(F2). Since the generator Gj with
j ∈ {0, . . . , d} of any class is given by Equation (4.7), the application of A1 to this
class generator leads to
A1Gj =
(
1m B
0m 1m
)(
Fj+1(B)
Fj(B)
)
=
(
Fj+1(B) +BFj(B)
Fj(B)
)
=
(
Fj−1(B)
Fj(B)
)
. (5.8)
3In fact, the similarity of the phase factor in Equation (3.11) and Equation (4.62) is a strong
evidence of this equivalence.
70 CHAPTER 5. EQUIVALENCE OF MUTUALLY UNBIASED BASES
Using Lemma 4.1.1, we finally find
A1Gj =
(
Fd+1−j+1(B)
Fd+1−j(B)
)
≡ Gd+1−j, (5.9)
with d = 2m. The first class-permutation operator A1 inverts therefore the ordering
of the classes Cj, where G0 → Gd+1 ≡ G0 keeps its position. The symplecticity of the
operator A1 is obvious and can easily be checked with the help of Corollary A.6.1. In
this fashion, we may construct further class-permutation operators as
A′l =
(
Fl(B) Fl+1(B)
0m Fl(B)
)
, (5.10)
with l ∈ {1, . . . , d}, where in this case the properties of Corollary A.6.1 are not fulfilled.
To obtain a set of symplectic operators we multiply this set from the right by a block-
diagonal matrix A×l and get
Al := A
′
l · A×l =
(
Fl(B) Fl+1(B)
0m Fl(B)
)(
(Fl(B))
−1 0m
0m (Fl(B))
−1
)
(5.11)
=
(
1m Fl+1(B)(Fl(B))
−1
0m 1m
)
. (5.12)
By Proposition 4.1.4 the mentioned polynomials in B exist; we also like to point out
the striking similarity of these operators with the generator matrices in standard form
given by Equation (4.27). If we apply these class-permutation operators to an arbitrary
generator in standard form, we get for Al · G¯0 = G¯0 and for j 6= 0,
Al · G¯j =
(
Fj+1(B)(Fj(B))
−1 + Fl+1(B)(Fl(B))−1
1m
)
. (5.13)
Thus, the operator Al adds a fixed polynomial of B to the Pauli-Z operator part of
the generator Gj in standard form. As the set of all generator matrices contains all
polynomials in B, the operator Al permutes these generators according to fundamental
finite field theory. Since we have d different such class-permutation operators Al, we
realize all basic permutations which are possible this way. Finally, the set of elements
of a field is invariant under the addition of any of its elements, so we can change the
position of an arbitrary generator to any new position with this set of transformations.
But it is not clear if all permutations pi on {1, . . . , d} can be realized. If so, the
permutations can be expanded on the set {0, . . . , d} by adding the MUB generator C
to the set of permutation operators, since it permutes the classes cyclically, namely
C ·Gj = G(j+1) mod (d+1). (5.14)
For general homogeneous sets of MUBs, an appropriate set of class-permutation
operators can be constructed by naturally expanding Equation (5.13) for homogeneous
sets, which results in the set of operators
Ahoml :=
(
1m Fl+1(B)(Fl(B))
−1R
0m 1m
)
, (5.15)
and leads to the same effective permutations as for the Fibonacci-based sets.
Chapter
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Conclusions and further work
Mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) find their applications in the fields of quantum state
estimation and quantum key distribution. By their relation to mathematical objects
like orthogonal Latin squares, symplectic spreads and many more, considerations result
in immediate effects in these neighboring fields. Many (even fundamental) questions
on MUBs are still unsolved. The most famous are the question of the existence of a set
with more than three MUBs in dimension six (and how large sets may be in all other
non-prime power dimensions), as well as the number of inequivalent sets in general.
What we treat in this work is the problem of explicitly constructing cyclic mutually
unbiased bases in a straightforward way. Those bases have advantages in theoretical
tasks as well as in experimental implementations. They provide also a reduced for-
mulation of a concrete set of MUBs. It turns out that the introduced Fibonacci-based
sets have nice properties and are related to well-known algebraic questions and may
solve some of them if a construction for the symmetric companion matrix is found.
Generalizations indicate the potential of this approach and produce sets with different
entanglement properties which can be observed in the standard form. A relation to
an open conjecture given by Wiedemann 1988 in finite field theory is discovered and
serves a realization of this conjecture which may lead to a proof, as well as a recursive
construction of cyclic MUBs in an infinite subset of the dimensions. Most fortunately,
such a construction is not only found in terms of finite field theory, which can be used
immediately for a discussed implementation in quantum circuits, but also in terms of
unitary matrices. The algorithmical formulation of an implementation strategy that
may be suitable for all MUBs based on the investigations of this work generalizes these
observations and leads to feasible implementations. Approaches to prove the conjec-
ture of Wiedemann, a positive test of this conjecture for k ∈ {1, . . . , 11} in dimensions
d = 22
k
(which is limited by the largest known prime-number factorization of Fer-
mat numbers) and resulting cyclic MUBs for the Fibonacci-based sets for dimensions
d = 2m with m = {1, . . . , 600} complete the considerations. The examination of the
construction schemes relates the discussed MUBs to known constructions on the level
of equivalence of the measurement behavior.
Obviously, several questions remain open, but lead with possible generalizations
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of the derived results to promising future investigations. At first, it seems to be
possible to construct a symmetric companion matrix in order to generate the cyclic
MUBs directly from the algebraic results. For more general sets, the derivation of a
relation between the entanglement properties and the form of the stabilizer matrix
would be valuable. The equivalence transformations between all sets would show their
equivalence and be useful in order to observe the transformations of their properties.
Indications on generalizations of the Fermat-based sets and the use of the doubling
scheme for MUBs over the field of real numbers, should be followed. Considerations
for odd-prime power dimensions will probably lead to somehow different constructions
as they refer to finite fields with an odd characteristic (that behave entirely different
comparing with an even characteristic), but would again expand the dimensions where
sets of MUBs with a reduced set of generators can be created. Finally, it would be nice
to know if the derived methods can be used in a similar way to construct inequivalent
sets of MUBs by replacing the set of Pauli operators with different sets.
Part II
Quantum public-key encryption

Chapter
7
Introduction
The foundation for the field of quantum cryptography was laid in the early seventies of
the last century, when Wiesner had his prospective ideas on quantum money that can-
not be counterfeited, based on a physical uncertainty principle (and the fact, that an
unknown quantum state cannot be cloned perfectly [WZ82]). Shortly after this work
appeared in 19831, the field emerged with the quantum key distribution (QKD) proto-
col of Bennett and Brassard [BB84] which is used for symmetric encryption schemes.
Different modifications of this protocol were discussed [Eke91, Ben92] and different
security proofs were given later [May96, LC99, SP00, GL03].2 With the new millen-
nium, the potential benefit of the properties of quantum physics was also discussed
for further cryptographic primitives. Examples are quantum digital signatures [GC01],
quantum fingerprinting [BCWdW01] and quantum direct communication [BF02]. An-
other primitive is referred to as quantum public-key encryption (QPKE) (see [OTU00]),
which will be of interest here.3
In contrast to the QKD, the aim of this scheme is to reduce the number of keys
needed in a network with a large number of parties which want to exchange secret
information pairwise. To implement a QKD protocol in a network where all parties
should be able to communicate securely, the total number of keys scales quadratically
with the number of parties, where in the QPKE scheme this number scales linearly.4
The discussion in this Part of the work is based on a scheme given by Nikolopou-
los [Nik08a] which achieves its security from so-called quantum one-way functions
(qOWF). At first, we will redraw within this chapter the protocol itself. In Chap-
ter 8, a detailed analysis of the security of this protocol against a powerful individual
attack is given as well as an idea to enhance the security against attacks by a noisy
1The manuscript by Wiesner on quantum money was rejected by different journals and finally
presented at a conference [Wie83].
2A more detailed discussion on the development of symmetric QKD protocols is given in Part I
in Section 2.3.
3 Many propositions for such a scheme were given [KKNY05, HKK08, Kak06, Nik08a].
4A different approach, where QKD protocols are used, implements a key-distribution center
(KDC), which is a trusted third party, but obviously also an attractive target.
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preprocessing method. The investigations will be summarized finally in Chapter 9.
7.1 Single-qubit-rotation protocol
A proposition for a QPKE protocol was given by Nikolopoulos in 2008 [Nik08a] which
can be described in a nice way and therefore used to calculate the robustness against
different attacks and easily expanded with preprocessing steps, error performance and
so on. The security of the protocol is based on a quantum one-way function. Alice
chooses a classical private key randomly and uses the mentioned function in order to
create as much public keys–which are given as qubit strings–as wanted (and proved
to be secure against certain classes of attacks). A party Bob, which wants to send a
message to Alice, can apply for such a key and perform a determined transformation on
each qubit depending on the corresponding bit value of the message and send it back.
As Alice knows by the public key the initial states of the qubits, she is able to extract
the information Bob encrypted. We will sketch in this section the basic properties of
this protocol; a more substantial security analysis will be given in Sections 8.2 and 8.3.
The protocol starts by creating a classical private key which is the integer string
k = (k1, . . . , kN) with N ∈ N∗ and uses a security parameter n ∈ N∗, n 1. The key
generation part of the protocol is the following:
1. Take a (public) random positive integer n 1.
2. Generate a (private) random integer string k = (k1, . . . , kN) with N ∈ N∗, where
each integer is individually chosen randomly and independently from Z2n .
3. Prepare T ′ ∈ N∗ copies of the (public) N -qubit public-key state from the private
key k as
|Ψk(θn)〉 =
N⊗
j=1
|ψkj(θn)〉, (7.1)
with
|ψkj(θn)〉 = cos
(
kjθn
2
)
|0z〉+ sin
(
kjθn
2
)
|1z〉, (7.2)
where |0z〉 and |1z〉 refer to the eigenstates of the Pauli operator σz.
An appropriate lower limit on the value of n depends on the number of provided public
keys; it will be derived in Section 8.2. A copy of the public key |Ψk(θn)〉 is simply
given by the tensor product of N individual public key qubits |ψkj(θn)〉. Any such
qubit can be represented as a Bloch vector (cf. Appendix A.17)
Rj(θn) = cos(kjθn)σz + sin(kjθn)σx, (7.3)
with the Pauli operators σz and σx. Therefore, each chosen bit of the private key kj
results in a qubit that is in the state |ψkj(θn)〉, where the protocol defines the angles
to be equidistant and determined by
θn := pi/2
n−1. (7.4)
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|0x〉
|1x〉
|0z〉|1z〉 θn
Figure 7.1: For n = 4, a single private key bit has one of 16 different values, which
is transformed into one of these 16 equidistant states of the corresponding public-key
qubit within the z-x-plane of the Bloch sphere.
In other words, the public key is a representation of the private key, where each integer
kj is represented by the angle pi/2
n−1 and implemented as a rotation of a qubit within
the z-x-plane of the Bloch sphere as can be seen in Figure 7.1. This mapping is
also called a quantum one-way function, where the probability is large to generate
the quantum state from the private key and the probability is low to reconstruct the
private key perfectly from a single copy of the quantum state of the public key, if the
initial transformation is unknown.
Alice sends the copies of the public key directly to parties like Bob that want to
send encrypted messages back to Alice. Alice does not delegate the distribution to
a so-called key distribution center (KDC).5 Bob may use one of those keys in order
to encrypt a message m which has a length of at most N bits. For simplicity and
w. l. o. g. we consider a message which is exactly N bit long, thus m = (m1, . . . ,mN).
The encryption of the protocol is defined as follows: For each bit mj of the message
with j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, apply the operator Emj to the qubit |ψkj(θn)〉 of the public key,
where this operator is given by
Emj = Ry(mjpi), (7.5)
with Ry(α) = e−iα/2σy being a rotation around the σy-axis of the Bloch sphere. A
rotation is therefore applied to the original public key state, if the corresponding bit
value of the message is one and the original state is left untouched if the value equals
zero, resulting in the (quantum) cipher state
|Xk,m(θn)〉 =
N⊗
j=1
Emj |ψkj(θn)〉 =
N⊗
j=1
|χkj ,mj(θn)〉. (7.6)
In the last step, this cipher state is sent by Bob back to Alice who is able to undo the
initial rotations and measure in the Pauli-σz basis. This part of the protocol reads as:
5Such a KDC which distributes public keys has to be unconditionally trusted.
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1. Undo the initial rotations on the cipher state of Equation (7.6):
|Mm〉 =
N⊗
j=1
R−1y (kjθn)|Xkj(θn)〉 =
N⊗
j=1
|Mmj〉. (7.7)
2. Measure each qubit of the resulting state in the eigenbasis of the Pauli-σz oper-
ator to extract the sent message.
Finally, Alice has received the classical message from Bob.
But conversely, if the cipher state is leaked to the eavesdropper Eve, she may
measure each qubit in a random basis and obtain already by this simple attack the
correct bit value of each message bit with a probability of 3/4. To avoid similar attacks,
Nikolopoulos introduced a second security parameter
s ∈ N∗. (7.8)
In this generalization, each message bit mj is encoded first into an s-bit codeword wj
and subsequently encrypted into s qubits of the public key. Therefore, the public
key needs to have at least s times the length of the message, again we concentrate
for simplicity on the case that this ratio is given exactly. The codeword is chosen as
follows: If the message bit mj is zero, take a codeword wj of length s randomly from
the set of codewords with even parity. Appropriately, if the message bit mj equals
zero, the codeword is randomly chosen from the set of codewords with odd parity. In
principle, the message is only extended by this procedure, so we can use the already
defined steps of the protocol by applying the replacement
mj → wj. (7.9)
Nikolopoulos derived an upper bound [Nik08a], that limits the number of public keys
Alice can distribute by keeping the security of the private key against a powerful
individual attack which is of interest in Section 8.3. Discussions on a chosen-plaintext
attack, a forward-search attack (cf. also [NI09]) and a chosen-ciphertext were given
by Nikolopoulos [Nik08a]. A very general attack on the private key as well as a
powerful and more direct attack on the encoded message by using the information of
all distributed keys will be discussed in Chapter 8, and leads to a limit for the number
of public keys which may be distributed in order to achieve a certain security.
Chapter
8
Security analysis
For the QPKE protocol presented in Section 7.1, different attacks were already dis-
cussed by Nikolopolous and Ioannou [Nik08a, NI09], but do not always benefit from
the complete set of available public keys. The aim of this chapter is to take advantage
of the complete set and to derive the strength of practical attacks. In Section 8.1, pre-
liminary considerations will be discussed. For an asymmetric protocol, it is clear that
the security of the private key is the most important goal in order to guarantee the
secrecy of the communicated messages, as if it is broken, all messages which use that
key will be leaked. In Section 8.2, this security will be discussed. Direct attacks on the
message will be investigated subsequently in Section 8.3, where it will be shown that
a certain individual attack1 possesses an almost equal strength as collective attacks.2
Finally, in Section 8.4, a potential extension of the protocol will be considered which
uses a noisy-preprocessing step in order to reduce the information an eavesdropper
may leak. Obviously, this step influences considerably the setup of the scheme, but it
is in principle a generalization which takes partly the effect of noise into account.
8.1 Preliminary considerations
All values which refer to security issues of the protocol will be considered in the
following in the case of a single run of the protocol, meaning the information of a
single bit which is transmitted. For reasons of simplicity, we will omit the index j
which refers to the specific bit, in the following. In some cases, averages of quantities
will be taken into account, but in principle a message has a finite length and ensuring
the security of a single bit is a stronger constraint.
1Individual attacks denote attacks where the transmitted quantum systems are measured individ-
ually. Collective attacks denote attacks where information about the quantum systems is collected,
e. g. by entangling them to ancilla systems and measuring them after the protocol is finished and
information of post-processing protocols can be taken into account.
2The ideas discussed in those sections were published in 2012 [SNA12].
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To visualize this difference, let us compare the conditional probability of success of
an eavesdropping strategy in both cases. Within a single run of the protocol, values for
the key k and the codeword w as defined in Equations (7.1) and (7.9) are fixed, which
lead to a mean probability of success3 by averaging over all possible keys, namely
P¯ (suc|w) =
∑
k
P (k)P (suc|k,w) = 1
2nN
∑
k
P (suc|k,w), (8.1)
where the keys are uniformly distributed over the set {0, 1}nN . Additionally, an opti-
mal eavesdropping strategy has to be symmetric with respect to the codewords, as the
value for a one-bit message is given by m ∈ {0, 1} with equal probability and the con-
ditional probability of obtaining the codeword w is P (w|m) = 2−(s−1) (cf. Equation
(7.8)). Thus the probability of any codeword to occur is given by
P (w) =
∑
m
P (w|m)/2 = 2−s. (8.2)
8.2 Security of the private key
As given by the third step of the key generation part of the protocol which is introduced
in Section 7.1, T ′ copies of the public key exist. According to Eve’s chosen strategy,
she may use for practical reasons τ < T ′ copies of the public key.4 Obviously, she
can obtain those keys directly from Alice, as they are publicly available. Without
measuring the state of these copies, she holds a priori a mixed quantum state, given
by
ρ
(τ)
prior =
1
2n
2n−1∑
k′=0
(|ψk′(θn)〉〈ψk′(θn)|)⊗τ (8.3)
=
1
2n
2n−1∑
k′=0
(
|φ(τ)k′ (θn)〉〈φ(τ)k′ (θn)|
)
, (8.4)
where we have abbreviated the τ -qubit state as |φ(τ)k′ (θn)〉 := |ψk′(θn)〉⊗τ . To bring
Equation (8.4) into a nice form, we can take advantage of the following consideration:
A possible basis for a single qubit is given by the set {|0z〉, |1z〉} of states, which are
eigenstates of the Pauli-σz operator. If we treat a tensor product of τ single qubits,
the basis vectors are consequently given by the set
{|i〉 : i ∈ Z2τ} , (8.5)
where |i〉 represents an eigenstate of the τ -folded tensor product of Pauli-σz operators
σ⊗τz . Eve knows from the construction of the protocol, that these τ copies of the
3Probabilities which are denoted in the following in general by P (suc|X), refer to the probability
for an attacker to eavesdrop successfully, given the event X. The abbreviation “suc“, meaning
“success“, is chosen for a better readability.
4If Eve wants to attack a message, already one key is consumed for the encryption; if her aim is
to attack the key, she may in principle use all T ′ copies of the public key, but this knowledge does
not help her to gain any profitably information.
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qubit (which individually represent the public key) are equal. The state |φ(τ)k′ (θn)〉 is
therefore invariant under a permutation of the copies. Thus, a decomposition of that
state in the basis defined by Equation (8.5) will have equal parameters in those terms,
where the number of ones in the string i coincides. The state |φ(τ)k′ (θn)〉 can then be
represented by the basis
|l〉 =
(
2τ∑
i=1
δl,H(i)|i〉
)
/
√(
τ
l
)
, (8.6)
where the Hamming weight H(i) is the number of ones in the string i. These τ + 1
different states |l〉 (with l ∈ {0, . . . , τ}) refer to subspaces of the 2τ dimensional Hilbert
space.
We can use this basis in order to reformulate the state of Equation (8.4) with
|φ(τ)k′ (θn)〉 =
τ∑
l=0
√(
τ
l
)
fτ,l(k
′θn)|l〉, (8.7)
where
fτ,l(k
′θn) =
(
cos
(
k′θn
2
))τ−l(
sin
(
k′θn
2
))l
. (8.8)
Introducing the coefficients Cl,l′ with
Cl,l′ =
1
2n
√(
τ
l
)(
τ
l′
) 2n−1∑
k′=0
fτ,l(k
′θn)f ∗τ,l′(k
′θn), (8.9)
leads finally to
ρ
(τ)
prior =
τ∑
l,l′=0
Cl,l′|l〉〈l′|. (8.10)
We can use this form of the a priori state Eve may hold, in order to obtain an upper
bound on the amount of information about the private key, Eve may extract from the
state ρ
(τ)
prior. Therefore, we need the Holevo quantity χ which limits the average amount
of information Iav that can be extracted from an unknown state ρ. It is given by
χ = S(ρ)−
∑
k
pkS(ρk) ≥ Iav, (8.11)
where S(ρ) denotes the usual von-Neumann entropy of a state ρ, where the system
is in a mixed state with states ρk and corresponding probabilities pk.
5 As seen in
5Discussions, derivations, and proofs on quantities of quantum information theory can be found
in the book of Nielsen and Chuang [NC00].
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Equation (8.10), the τ -qubit state ρ
(τ)
prior can be expressed in terms of a τ+1 dimensional
Hilbert space, therefore, its von-Neumann entropy is again upper bounded as6
Iav ≤ χ ≤ S(ρ(τ)prior) ≤ log2(τ + 1). (8.12)
By the construction of the private key and the resulting public key as given in Sec-
tion 7.1, the state of the public key is in one of 2n different states, which means that
this key is secure, as long as the information Eve may gain from her measurements is
much smaller than the number of bits which describe the information, namely, as long
as
n log2(τ + 1) (8.13)
holds. As in principle T ′ copies of the public key exist and at least one is consumed
to encrypt a message, this limit reads in terms of T ′ = τ + 1 as
n log2(T ′). (8.14)
With the help of this limitation, the security of the private key can be guaranteed.
Nevertheless, direct attacks on the message are possible and will be discussed in Sec-
tion 8.3.
8.3 Security of a message
The security of the sent message in the protocol of Nikolopoulos relies essentially on
the security of the private key that can be guaranteed according to the limitations
given in Equation (8.14). Thus, if the private key can be reconstructed perfectly,
a potential eavesdropper Eve may use this information in order to obtain messages
which are sent with this key. But as the mentioned limitation should be achieved by
construction, the optimal strategy for Eve may be different. Instead of recovering the
private key perfectly, she may recover the key approximately. As the private key is in
one-to-one correspondence to the public key, we can easily discuss this issue in terms
of the public key. Let us assume first that Eve manages to receive T ′− 1 copies of the
public key as well as an encrypted message which uses the same key. Since the integers
of the corresponding private key are chosen individually and uniformly distributed, we
are free to consider a single-bit message.
The strategy of Eve is then to estimate the state of the public-key qubits, by taking
into account that each qubit is prepared in a state which lies on the z-x plane of the
Bloch sphere (cf. Appendix A.5). The security parameter s, which was introduced in
Equation (7.8), requires an s-bit codeword, which encodes a bit of the message and is
subsequently encrypted into s qubits of the public key. At first, we will consider Eve’s
attack on a single qubit, which encodes only a single bit of the codeword w and finally
6Simulations suggest that the eigenvalues of Equation (8.10) are given by λi = 2
−τ(τ
i
)
. Then
ρ
(τ)
prior would be the entropy of a binomial distribution with mean τ/2 and variance τ/4 and upper
bounded by the Gaussian distribution; this would lead to a lower upper bound of Iav, namely, Iav ≤
S(ρ
(τ)
prior) ≤ 12 log2 τ + 12 log2(pie/2).
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generalize this approach on the complete ciphertext of the codeword. As already seen
in Part I of this work, an optimal choice to estimate an unknown state with a minimal
number of single-qubit measurements is realized by using mutually unbiased bases.
Taking the limitation to the z-x plane of the Bloch sphere into account, Eve’s best
measurement strategy is to use the eigenbases of the Pauli-σz and Pauli-σx operators
equally often. To simplify matters, we assume that the number of distributed keys is
given by
T ′ = 2T + 1. (8.15)
This results in an estimation of the public key and defines an estimation of the basis
that was used to encrypt the message. If Eve uses this basis estimation to measure
the ciphertext, the fidelity of the basis which results from the private key and the
estimation of the bases gives the success probability of Eve’s attack.
Eve can apply the two different experiments (measuring in the eigenbasis of the
Pauli-σz or the Pauli-σx operator, respectively) and will receive either the measurement
outcome zero or one. This outcome depends in average on the expectation value
which is given by testing |0z〉 on the single-qubit state |ψk(θn)〉, that is introduced in
Equation (7.2), namely
〈ψk(θn)|0z〉〈0z|ψk(θn)〉, (8.16)
which yields the probability
p
(z)
0 (k) = cos
2
(
kθn
2
)
, (8.17)
to measure a zero in the eigenbasis of the σz operator. To measure a zero in the
eigenbasis of the σx operator, we find accordingly
p
(x)
0 (k) = cos
2
(
pi
4
− kθn
2
)
. (8.18)
In both cases, the probabilities to measure a one are obviously given by p
(z)
1 (k) =
1−p(z)0 (k) and p(x)1 (k) = 1−p(x)0 (k), respectively. If we denote the number of outcomes
of a zero in the eigenbasis of the σz operator, by T
(z)
0 and the number of outcomes of
a zero in the eigenbasis of the σx operator, by T
(x)
0 , Eve’s attack leads to one out of
(T + 1)2 ordered pairs
(
T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0
)
.
8.3.1 Information about the public key
In a first step, this special attack yields information about the public key (and therefore
about the private key). The a posteriori probability for Eve to guess a certain bit value
k′ with the help of the ordered pair
(
T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0
)
is given by Bayes law as
p(k′|T (z)0 , T (x)0 ) =
p(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 |k′)
2np(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 )
. (8.19)
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To calculate the a priori probability of the right hand side of this expression, we can
use the quantities defined in Equation (8.17) and (8.18), keeping in mind all possible
permutations of the measurement outcomes, which leads to
p(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 |k′) =
∏
b∈{z,x}
(
T
T
(b)
0
)(
p
(b)
0 (k
′)
)T (b)0 (
p
(b)
1 (k
′)
)T−T (b)0
. (8.20)
The probability for Eve to obtain a certain ordered pair
(
T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0
)
independently of
the private-key state is given by the sum of the a priory probability over all possible
values of k′, namely
p(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) =
1
2n
2n−1∑
k′=0
p(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 |k′). (8.21)
The information which Eve can accumulate in average by evaluating the discussed
measurement outcome is given by the difference of the Shannon entropies before and
after the measurements, thus,
Iav =Hprior − 〈Hpost〉 (8.22)
=n+
∑
T
(z)
0 ,T
(x)
0
p(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 )
2n−1∑
k′=0
p(k′|T (z)0 , T (x)0 ) log2 p(k′|T (z)0 , T (x)0 ). (8.23)
As the a priori state is uniformly distributed and can be described by n bits, the
corresponding a priori entropy is given by n.
8.3.2 Information about the message
Alternatively, the measurement outcome
(
T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0
)
can be used by Alice to estimate
the public-key state. With the help of the a posteriori probability, that a certain
value k may have been the private key, as it was introduced in Equation (8.19), we
can formulate the a posteriori state which Eve has after the measurement, taking all
possible values for k into account. This τ -qubit state is given by
ρ
(τ)
post(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) =
2n−1∑
k′=0
p(k′|T (z)0 , T (x)0 )|φ(τ)k′ (θn)〉〈φ(τ)k′ (θn)|. (8.24)
Although Eve intercepted τ raw copies of the public key, she is only interested in a
single-qubit state, which can be obtained by tracing out τ − 1 states and results in
ρ
(1)
post(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 ) =
2n−1∑
k′=0
p(k′|T (z)0 , T (x)0 )|ψk′(θn)〉〈ψk′(θn)|. (8.25)
Analogously to Equation (7.3) we can represent the single-qubit a posteriori state by
the Bloch vector (cf. Equation A.17)
R˜ =
2n−1∑
k′=0
p(k′|T (z)0 , T (x)0 )(cos(k′θn)σz + sin(k′θn)σx), (8.26)
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Figure 8.1: Conditional probability P (suc|wj, k) that Eve successfully attacks the
public key for n = 10 and different values of T .
where this vector represents in general a mixed state and has therefore a length which
is given by |R˜| ≤ 1.
In principle, we may compare this estimated Bloch vector now with the original
Bloch vector and calculate the probability that both coincide. However, we have to
call back into mind, that a single bit is encoded by an s-bit codeword w and subse-
quently encrypted into s qubits defining the security parameter that was formulated
in Equation (7.8). Following this construction, the first step is to calculate the prob-
ability that Eve correctly estimates the bit wj of the codeword w = {1, . . . , s}, which
is given by
P (suc|wj, k, T (z)0 , T (x)0 ) = cos2(Ωj/2), (8.27)
where Ωj denotes the angle between the two Bloch vectors R˜j and Rj and the index
j refers to the qubit that encrypts the bit wj. Solving this approach leads to the
expression
P (suc|wj, k, T (z)0 , T (x)0 ) =
1
2
+
R˜j ·Rj
2|R˜j|
, (8.28)
with the scalar product
R˜j ·Rj =
2n−1∑
k′=0
p(k′|T (z)0 , T (x)0 ) cos((k′ − k)θn). (8.29)
The ordered pair
(
T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0
)
is an output of the measurements by Eve which is not
observed by Alice. A more meaningful quantity is therefore given by
P (suc|wj, k) =
∑
T
(z)
0 ,T
(x)
0
P (suc, wj, k, T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 )p(T
(z)
0 , T
(x)
0 |k) (8.30)
and visualized in Figure 8.1 for different values of T . Plotted against the key value k,
the probability shows an oscillatory behavior around its mean value, with decreasing
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Figure 8.2: Conditional probability P¯ (suc|wj) that Eve successfully attacks the mes-
sage for n = 10 for the discussed attack, the asymptotic behavior of this attack and
the optimal collective attack [DBE98], plotted against T .
amplitude for a larger number of available copies. The mean value can be calculated
as
P¯ (suc|wj) = 1
2n
2n−1∑
k=0
P (suc|wj, k) (8.31)
and scales for T > 1 like
P¯ (suc|wj) . 1− 1
6T
, (8.32)
which is given together with the optimal probability that is discussed below, in Fig-
ure 8.2. The comparison with the optimal probability of successfully estimating the
prepared state which takes advantage of a collective measurement method (and is
therefore harder to get implemented) shows the good performance of this approach,
where this optimal probability is given by [DBE98]
P¯opt(suc|wj) = 1
2
+
1
22T+1
2T−1∑
i=0
√(
2T
i
)(
2T
i+ 1
)
, (8.33)
and scales as
P¯opt(suc|wj) ∼ 1− 1
8T
. (8.34)
Even this scaling can be reached by measurements on individual qubits, as it was
shown by Bagan et al. [BBMT02] with an attack which is similar to the discussed one.
Contrary to the attack given in [NI09], the probability of success does not depend on
the value wj and can be implemented using only measurement devices instead of the
more complicated quantum operations which are used in the mentioned approach.
Hence, we are well prepared to discuss the final step of this attack, namely consid-
ering the probability of correctly guessing the message bit m. As seen in Section 7.1,
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Figure 8.3: Conditional probability P¯s(suc|m,w) that Eve successfully attacks the
message for n = 10 and different values of T , plotted against the security parameter
s. The solid lines refer to the exact results of Equation (8.35) and the dashed lines to
the upper bound given by Equation (8.43).
the bit m is encoded into the parity of an s-bit codeword w, where all appropriate
codewords are equally probable. As seen in Equation (8.31), Eve has a certain prob-
ability for each bit of the codeword to succeed. But even though, namely in cases
where Eve fails an even number of times to predict the correct value of a bit wj of the
codeword, the parity she gets results in the same and therefore correct message bit m.
Additionally, as we have already seen in Figure 8.1, the amplitude of the oscillation of
the success probability becomes negligible for large values of T , at least it is an order
of magnitude smaller than the mean. Therefore, we will not gain a much better notion
by observing the mean value of the success probability, as it should be comparable to
the results within a single-run experiment. Following the structure of the codeword,
Eve has a mean probability of success, given a certain codeword and a certain message
bit,
P¯s(suc|m,w) =
s∑
α=0,
even
(
s
α
)
(1− P¯ (suc|wj))α(P¯ (suc|wj))s−α, (8.35)
where α denotes the number of incorrectly estimated bits of the codeword. Since this
value does not depend on the message bit and all codewords have the same probability,
we finally find
P¯s(suc) = P¯s(suc|m,w). (8.36)
Within Figure 8.3 we show the behavior of this probability for different values of T
against the security parameter s. As expected, this parameter produces a monotonic
decrease in the success probability of Eve and can be tightly upper bounded with the
help of the following lemma that can be used in order to generalize Equation (8.32).
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Lemma 8.3.1 (Success probabilities with increasing security parameter).
If the probability (or an upper bound) of successfully eavesdropping a single-bit message
encoded by a codeword of length s = 1 is given by
Q(1) =
1
2
+
λ
2
, (8.37)
with λ ∈ C, the corresponding quantity for a single-bit message, encoded by an s-bit
codeword, such that the parity of the codeword equals the message bit and all possible
codewords are equally probable, is given by
Q(s) =
1
2
+
λs
2
. (8.38)
Proof. As an even number of wrong results in the attack leads to a correct estimate
of the parity of the codeword which represents the sent message, a generalization of
Equation (8.37) to a codeword of length s is given by
Q(s) =
s∑
α=0,
even
(
s
α
)
(1−Q(1))α(Q(1))s−α. (8.39)
Alternatively, this generalization can also be written iteratively as
Q(s) = Q(1)Q(s−1) + (1−Q(1))(1−Q(s−1)). (8.40)
If for Q(1) Equation (8.37) holds and we assume that also Equation (8.38) is given, we
find for Q(s+1), using the iterative construction,
Q(s+1) =
(
1
2
+
1
2
)(
1
2
+
λs
2
)
+
(
1
2
− 1
2
)(
1
2
− λ
s
2
)
(8.41)
=
(
1
2
+
λs+1
2
)
, (8.42)
which completes the induction and provides the expected result.
If we set Q(1) to the value of Equation (8.32), we can use Lemma 8.3.1 with λ =
1 − 1/(3T ) and get finally a generalized upper bound for the correct guessing of the
message7 by
Q(s) := P˜s(suc) =
1
2
+
1
2
(
1− 1
3T
)s
. (8.43)
Finally, to achieve a security against the introduced attack, we have to show that for
any small positive value ε ∈ (0, 1/2], we find a finite value of the security parameter
s, such that the probability of successfully estimating goes below the sum of the
probability of randomly guessing with that value. This notion of security is also known
7The message is encoded to the parity of an s-bit codeword as introduced in Section 7.1.
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as asymptotic security . Thus, to find a security parameter which fulfills P¯s(suc) <
1/2 + ε, we find, using Equation (8.43),
s >
1 + log2 ε
log2
(
1− 1
3T
) , (8.44)
which is also fulfilled if there holds
s > 3T (1 + log2 ε). (8.45)
This easily implementable attack is stronger than the forward-search attack which
was already discussed in the original work of the protocol [Nik08a, NI09] and uses
complicated quantum operations as Fourier transformations and permutations on large
sets of qubits. Similarly to Equation (8.43), an upper bound for its probability of
successfully eavesdropping (which does not vary from run to run) is given by [NI09]
P˜FSs (suc) =
1
2
+
1
2
(
1− 1
2T
)s
. (8.46)
The success probability of that attack leads to a lower bound for the security parameter
in the notion of Equation (8.45) as
sFS > 2T (1 + log2 ε), (8.47)
and differs only by a factor of 2/3 with the new investigated attack.8
8.4 Noisy preprocessing
In order to increase the robustness of the protocol discussed in Section 7.1 against
various attacks like those investigated in Sections 8.2 and 8.3 and potentially others,
we show in the following exemplarily the behavior of a modified protocol against two
simple attacks. Conversely to the original key-generation Step 3 of the protocol, we
assume that the states are not taken from the z-x-plane of the Bloch sphere. One may
think of an affine plane which would imply states on a certain degree of latitude, areas
on the surface which are limited by two degrees of latitude, or even the complete surface
of the sphere. Obviously, as we like to leave the measurement process untouched,
post-processing (namely error correction) steps will be obligatory. Even within the
original protocol they have to be added in order to get a practical implementation, as
errors in quantum states will always occur. Possibly, the introduced steps may help
in order to model the influence of errors in the original protocol. Nevertheless, as this
consideration is based on two simple attacks, the results can only be seen as limited,
but indicate the positive behavior and motivate a subsequent analysis.
8The differences of Equations (8.46) and (8.47) with their counterparts in [NI09] are due to the
fact that within the attack discussed here, T is defined to refer to the half of the number of keys which
are used in order to attack the encrypted message. The missing factor of two in [SNA12, Equation
(30)], comparing to Equation (8.47), is based on a misprint.
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8.4.1 Single-key test attack
The first attack we use in order to compare a notion of the security of the original pro-
tocol with the security of the modified protocol is in principle a single-copy version of
the attack, which was discussed in Section 8.3 and published in the same work [SNA12].
If Eve intercepts a ciphertext and a corresponding copy of the public key, she can at-
tack the message bitwise by a simple experiment. For each bit of the codeword w as
introduced in Section 7.1, she measures both corresponding qubits in the same, but
in principle arbitrary basis within the z-x-plane, which leads to a success probability
similar to that of Equation (8.17). As rotations of the measurement axis around the
σy axis lead only to a constant term in the argument of the cos
2 and the possible
states are arranged symmetrically with even probabilities, the success probability is
independent of the chosen axis for a random chosen public key bit, so we will take the
σz axis and have
p0(k) = cos
2
(
kθn
2
)
, (8.48)
to measure a value of zero on a qubit. As a codeword bit of one generates a flip on
the Pauli-σy axis, we have to calculate the probability of measuring this flip–without
knowing the correct basis–which is given by
P (1)(suc|k, wj)
=
{
p
(key)
1 (k)p
(ct)
0 (k + 2
n−1) + p(key)0 (k)p
(ct)
1 (k + 2
n−1) for wj = 1,
p
(key)
0 (k)p
(ct)
0 (k) + p
(key)
1 (k)p
(ct)
1 (k) for wj = 0,
(8.49)
where p(key) belongs to the measurement on the key and p(ct) to the measurement on
the ciphertext. Using Equation (8.48), we find
P (1)(suc|k) = sin4
(
kθn
2
)
+ cos4
(
kθn
2
)
. (8.50)
With the help of Lemma 8.3.1 we can generalize this expression to the parity of the
codeword w and finally get
P (1)s (suc|k) =
1
2
+
(1 + cos(2kθn))
s
2s+1
(8.51)
=
1 + cos2s(kθn)
2
. (8.52)
For a mean probability by averaging over all possible private key states, we find with
Equation (8.50) a probability of
P¯ (1)(suc) =
1
2n
2n∑
k=1
P (suc|k) = 3
4
, (8.53)
for Eve to measure the correct value of a single bit of the codeword w and with
Equation (8.51) a probability of
P¯ (1)s (suc) =
1
2
+
(1/2)s
2
, (8.54)
to measure correctly the parity of the codeword.
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Figure 8.4: The four bases which are defined in order to implement the double-key
test attack.
8.4.2 Double-key test attack
The second attack we discuss takes measurement results on two public keys and the
corresponding ciphertext into account, so we assume Eve holds those three qubit-
strings. For each qubit triple that belongs to the bit of a codeword, she measures the
first key in the σz basis as for the single-key test attack, but measures the second key
in the orthogonal σx basis. This defines one out of two bases which is taken as the
measurement basis for the ciphertext qubit.
In detail: If the measurements of σz and σx give the same output, that basis is
chosen, which bisects the inner angle; in the converse situation, a basis is chosen which
bisects the outer angle. This attack is another formulation of the attack discussed in
Section 8.3 for T = 1. For the probabilities of measuring the value zero or one from
a copy of the key, we can take the expressions of Equations (8.17) and (8.18). The
probability of getting the correct value of the codeword bit by measuring the message
within the resulting basis is given by the expectation value of this basis with the
corresponding state of the ciphertext. Following these ideas we find
P (2)(suc|k, θn) = p(z)0 (k)p(x)0 (k)|〈0+|ψk(θn)〉|2 + p(z)1 (k)p(x)1 (k)|〈1+|ψk(θn)〉|2
+p
(z)
0 (k)p
(x)
1 (k)|〈0−|ψk(θn)〉|2 + p(z)1 (k)p(x)0 (k)|〈1−|ψk(θn)〉|2, (8.55)
where |0+〉 and |1+〉 refer to outcomes 0 and 1 for the basis which bisects the inner
angle between |0x〉 and |0z〉 and |0−〉 and |1−〉 to outcomes 0 and 1 for the basis which
bisects the inner angle between |0z〉 and |1x〉. Figure 8.4 illustrates this structure.
With |〈0+|ψk(θn)〉|2 = cos2(pi/8−kθn/2) and |〈0−|ψk(θn)〉|2 = cos2(−pi/8−kθn/2), we
find
P (2)(suc) = p(suc|k, θn) = 1
4
(2 +
√
2) ≈ 0.85, (8.56)
which does neither depend on n, nor on k, as the plot of Figure 8.1 already indicated.
For correctly estimating the message bit, Eve needs to guess correctly the parity of
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the codeword w, therefore we can take again advantage of Lemma 8.3.1 and find for
this attack
P (2)s (suc) =
1
2
+
(
√
2/2)s
2
. (8.57)
8.4.3 Protocol and security analysis
We extend the protocol which was discussed in Section 7.1 by a (private) displacement
parameter a ∈ [−1, 1] which moves the plane that is shown in Figure 7.1 into the
positive or negative σy direction. The parameter is defined to be one if the plane
touches the surface only at |1y〉 and equals minus one if it touches the opposite pole.
It is linear on the σz axis in the representation of the Bloch sphere. Obviously, there is
another representation of that parameter as an angle α ∈ [−pi/2, pi/2] with a = sin(α),
which is used in the following. The implementation into the protocol is achieved by
generalizing the state |ψk(θn)〉 which is defined in the key generation part in Step 3 as
|ψk(θn, α)〉 =Ry(kθn)Rx(α)|0z〉 (8.58)
=
(
cos
(
kθn
2
)
cos
α
2
+ i sin
(
kθn
2
)
sin
α
2
)
|0z〉
+
(
sin
(
kθn
2
)
cos
α
2
− i cos
(
kθn
2
)
sin
α
2
)
|1z〉. (8.59)
The probability of Eve to correctly estimate the transmitted bit using the single-key
test attack (which was discussed in Section 8.4.1) is given by
P¯
(1)
E (suc|α) =
2n−1∑
k=0
(|〈ξ|ψk(θn, α)〉|2)2 + (1− |〈ξ|ψk(θn, α)〉|2)2 = 1
8
(5 + cos(2α))
(8.60)
for an arbitrary measurement basis in the z-x-plane, averaged over all 2n possible
states. For α = 0 this result coincides as expected with the value derived in Equa-
tion (8.53). As Alice does not know the transmitted message bit and the possible
states are not within a single plane, we assume for simplicity that she measures on
an axis which is in the plane, where the states are defined for α = 0. This leads to a
probability for Alice to get the correct bit value, given by
P¯A(suc|α) = |〈0z|Rx(α)|0z〉|2 = cos2
(α
2
)
. (8.61)
If we further assume, that an error correction protocol exists which corrects as many
bits as are distributed correctly in average, the probability for Eve to find the correct
bit value in the relevant cases is given by the relative success probability
P¯ (1)(suc|α) = P¯
(1)
E (suc|α)
P¯A(suc|α) =
5 + cos(2α)
8 cos2(α/2)
. (8.62)
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Thus, to minimize the information Eve may gain by the single-key test attack for this
modified protocol, we find
α
(1)
min = ±2 arccos
4
√
3
4
, (8.63)
which leads to
P¯ (1)(suc|α(1)min) =
√
3− 1 ≈ 0.732, (8.64)
and is below the value P¯ (1)(suc) = 3/4 for α = 0.
Alternatively, we can use the double-key test attack (which was discussed in Sec-
tion 8.4.2) to check if the discussed tendency becomes stronger or weaker in the case
that Eve is able to catch more copies of the key. The probability for Eve to estimate
the correct bit value can be calculated using Equation (8.55), but replacing |ψk(θn)〉
by |ψk(θn, α)〉 and deriving p(b)v as
p(b)v (k) = |〈vb|ψk(θn, α)〉|2, (8.65)
with v ∈ {0, 1} and b ∈ {z, x}, which leads to
P¯
(2)
E (suc|α) =
1
2
+
√
2
4
cos2 α. (8.66)
As the probability for Alice to get the correct bit value does not depend on Eve’s
attack and therefore not the number of keys she uses for the attack, the probability
for Eve to get the correct bit value in the relevant cases is given by
P¯ (2)(suc|α) = P¯
(2)
E (suc|α)
P¯A(suc|α) =
1 + (cos2 α)/
√
2
2 cos2 α
2
. (8.67)
Analogously to Equation (8.63) we can find the minimum of this probability in order
to minimize the information gain for Alice by
α
(2)
min = ±2 arccos
(
(
√
2− 1)3/4 + (
√
2− 1)3/4/
√
2
)
, (8.68)
which leads to
P¯ (2)(suc|α(2)min) =
√
2
(√
1 +
√
2− 1
)
≈ 0.783, (8.69)
and is considerably below Eve’s success probability for α = 0 which is given by
P¯ (2)(suc|α = 0) ≈ 0.854. (8.70)
For a security parameter s > 1, we can again use Lemma 8.3.1 in order to derive the
success probability for Eve and find
P¯ (2)s (suc|α(2)min) =
1
2
+
1
2
(
5− 4 cos2 α
2
+ cos2 α
4 cos2 α
2
)s
, (8.71)
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Figure 8.5: Conditional probability P¯
(2)
s (suc|α) against the security parameter s that
Eve successfully attacks the public key for α = 0 and α = αmin, using the double-key
test attack.9
which decreases faster than for α = 0 as can be seen in Figure 8.5. Finally, we may
imagine cases where α is not fixed, for example to test the robustness of the protocol
against certain kinds of errors or simply to adapt the protocol. We shortly calculate
two situations: At first, α is a random parameter in the interval [−pi/2, pi/2]. In the
second case, we average over those values of α where Eve has a success probability that
is not larger than for α = 0. In the first case, we find for the single-key test attack,
using Equation (8.62),
P¯ (1)(suc) =
1
pi
pi/2∫
−pi/2
5 + cos(2α)
8 cos2(α/2)
dα ≈ 0.773, (8.72)
which is above the value of 3/4 for α = 0, but for the double-key test attack, using
Equation (8.67), we have
P¯ (2)(suc) =
1
pi
pi/2∫
−pi/2
1 + (cos2 α)/
√
2
2 cos2 α
2
dα ≈ 0.830, (8.73)
which is slightly below the value for α = 0 which was given in Equation (8.70). If this
tendency is monotonic, the protocol can in principle be enhanced by robustness and
security, if α is taken to be arbitrary. 10
For the second case we find
P¯ (1)(suc|α¯(1)min) =
3
2pi
pi/3∫
−pi/3
5 + cos(2α)
8 cos2(α/2)
dα ≈ 0.740, (8.74)
9Please keep in mind that s is a discrete parameter, the presentation is taken to get a better
notion of the behavior of the probabilities.
10This statement holds as long as the number of public key copies is larger than two.
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which is below 3/4 and
P¯ (2)(suc|α¯(2)min) =
1
2α
(2)
lim
α
(2)
lim∫
−α(2)lim
1 + (cos2 α)/
√
2
2 cos2 α
2
dα ≈ 0.816, (8.75)
which is below the value for α = 0 for the double-key test attack, with
α
(2)
lim = 2 arccos
(√
1+
√
2
2
)
.
Concluding, we have seen in these two simple test attack scenarios, that a noisy-
preprocessing in the introduced way is able to enhance the security of the original
protocol. Even if this additional parameter α is taken in a larger interval, the security
against these test attacks increases.11 Finally, the new parameter can be used as a
first approach in order to model a protocol with errors in the preparation process of
Alice, as Alice does not need the parameter α for the considered measurement of the
message.
11For the case of two copies of the public key, the test attack coincides by construction with the
quite general attack discussed in Section 8.3.

Chapter
9
Conclusions and outlook
Quantum cryptographic primitives expand the field of classical cryptography and pro-
vide perspectives which have the potential to influence existing schemes fundamentally.
Whereas in classical cryptography the security is based on computational complexity,
quantum cryptographic statements are based on physically unsolvable problems. This
leads to complete provably secure cryptographic schemes. The emerging field of quan-
tum public-key encryption offers new ways in order to benefit from the fundamental
characteristics of quantum physics for cryptographic schemes.
Within the second part of this work, the recently invented single-qubit-rotation
protocol is introduced and the security of the private key as well as the security of a
message which is transmitted with the help of the protocol are discussed. A powerful
and practical attack is used to consider the security of messages. Even though it at-
tacks individual qubits, its asymptotic behavior is comparable with collective attacks.
Finally, a possible extension of the protocol that implements a kind of noisy prepro-
cessing is discussed and its advantage against simple test attacks is considered. The
results indicate a positive effect of this method also for more general attacks and its
ability to model noise.
As a next step, a practical version of the protocol could be considered which con-
tains error correction methods, an exact formulation of noise effects as well as prepro-
cessing steps. Further analytical expressions of important quantities would be useful
to generalize Eve’s success probabilities.

Appendix
A
Algebra and quantum
information
A.1 Fundamentals
Within this section we arrange some known results from algebra that are relevant for
this work and were done for [KRS10] and [SR12].
Lemma A.1.1 (Determinant decomposition).
Let R be a ring. Then there holds
det
(
A B
C D
)
= det(D) det(A−BD−1C) (A.1)
if D is invertible, for A,B,C,D ∈Mn(R).
Proof. If D is invertible, we are free to decompose the matrix as(
A B
C D
)
=
(
1n B
0n D
)(
A−BD−1C 0n
D−1C 1n
)
. (A.2)
Since the determinant of block-triangular matrices is the product of the determinants
of the blocks on the diagonal, the statement follows.
Lemma A.1.2 (Block matrix invertibility).
Let R be a commutative ring and A,B,C,D ∈ R be commuting elements. Then the
block matrix
(
A B
C D
)
is invertible, if and only if AD −BC is invertible.
A proof is given by Silvester [Sil00].
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A.2 Finite fields
A field with a finite number of elements is called a finite field or Galois field. It turns
out that a finite field exists only if the number of elements equals the power of a prime,
which is called the order of the field. As for a given order, the corresponding finite
field is unique up to isomorphisms, it can be denoted as
Fq = Fpm , (A.3)
where Fpm is a field with pm elements, thus with order pm. The prime number p is
called the characteristic of the field and m is a natural number. For m = 1, the field is
called prime field. An important linear transformation from Fqn to its corresponding
prime field, namely Fq, with q = pm and n,m ∈ N∗, is the field trace trL/K(α) which
maps an element of a field L to a field K, where K has not to be a prime field, but
the order of K has to be a divisor of L.
Definition A.2.1 (Field trace).
The trace of an element α ∈ L := Fqn to a certain ground field K := Fq with q = pm,
p prime and m,n ∈ N∗, is given by
trL/K(α) = α + α
q + αq
2
+ . . .+ αq
n−1
. (A.4)
A.3 Hadamard matrix
Hadamard matrices appear often in considerations of the quantum information theory.
They also have applications in coding theory.
Definition A.3.1 (Hadamard matrix).
Matrices with entries ±1 and whose rows are pairwise orthogonal, are called Hadamard
matrices .
It then follows obviously by this definition, that the product of a Hadamard matrix
with its transpose yields n times the unity matrix, where n is the dimension. In
quantum information theory, the most often used Hadamard matrix is defined for
two-level systems and given by
H¯ :=
(
1 1
1 −1
)
. (A.5)
In many cases, a normalized version, which is then also the representation of a unitary
operator, reads as
H :=
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, (A.6)
thus, it is an orthogonal matrix. Whereas different construction schemes for Hadamard
matrices are known and their existence is only conjectured for dimensions which are
multiples of four1, we will only use the Sylvester construction which is given as follows.
1The existence of Hadamard matrices for the dimension one and two seems to be an exception.
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Starting with H¯1 = (1) and H¯2 = H¯, any matrix H¯2m with m > 1 and m ∈ N∗ is given
by
H¯2m =
(
H¯2m−1 H¯2m−1
H¯2m−1 −H¯2m−1
)
, (A.7)
and equals the tensor product H¯2m = H¯2⊗H¯2m−1 . The matrix H¯2m can then be derived
directly with the help of the m-folded tensor product of H¯ as
H¯2m = H¯
⊗m. (A.8)
Another representation of this matrix considers its entries and it holds
(H¯2m)i,j = (−1)i·j, (A.9)
with i, j ∈ F2m , which can be read off directly from the construction of Sylvester given
in Equation (A.7). The same arguments hold analogously for the normalized version,
where an additional factor of 2−m/2 appears for the matrix H2m .
A.4 Pauli operators
For a complex Hilbert space of dimension two, the three Pauli operators σx, σy, and
σz (or X, Y , and Z) are defined as
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, and σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (A.10)
For x→ 1, y → 2, and z → 3 it holds
σiσj = δij12 + i
3∑
k=1
ijkσk, (A.11)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and with ijk denoting the fully antisymmetric operator, also known
as Levi-Civita symbol. It can be checked easily, that the eigenbases of the Pauli
operators are mutually unbiased.
For a d-dimensional complex Hilbert space with d ∈ N∗, the generators of the
generalized Pauli operators are defined by
Z|i〉 = ωi|i〉 and X|i〉 = |i⊕d 1〉, (A.12)
with ω = exp (2pii/d) being the first d-th root of unity. The set of Pauli operators
which is generated by Z and X can be used as a basis in order to represent a linear
operator of the complex Hilbert space H = Cd.
Lemma A.4.1 (Orthogonality of generalized Pauli operators).
The set of generalized Pauli operators is an orthogonal operator basis in the sense of
Hilbert-Schmidt.
Proof. Using the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product,
〈ZαXβ|ZγXδ〉HS = tr(Zα−γXβ−δ) =
{
1 for α− γ = β − δ = 0,
0 else,
(A.13)
holds for α, β, γ, δ ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Thus, the d2 operators ZαXβ form an orthogonal
operator basis.
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Figure A.1: Illustration of a Bloch sphere, where a vector, the Bloch vector, starting
at the origin of the sphere and pointing inside or on the surface, is capable to represent
any state of a two-dimensional quantum system (qubit). The axes refer to the three
Pauli operators, where their points on the surface are given by the corresponding
eigenstates.
A.5 Bloch sphere representation
Each state of a two-dimensional quantum system can be represented as a Bloch vector
by three real parameters in the Bloch sphere, where the axes are defined by the three
Pauli matrices of Equation (A.10). A pure quantum state which is written in the
eigenbasis of the Pauli-σz operator, e. g.
|Ψ〉 = cos
(α
2
)
|0z〉+ eiϕ sin
(α
2
)
|1z〉 (A.14)
leads to a density operator
ρ =|Ψ〉〈Ψ| = 1
2
(
1 + cosα cosϕ sinα− i sinϕ sinα
cosϕ sinα + i sinϕ sinα 1− cosα
)
(A.15)
=
1
2
(12 + (cosϕ sinα)σx + (sinϕ sinα)σy + (cosα)σz) , (A.16)
where basic trigonometric identities were used. The Bloch vector is given by
R = (cosϕ sinα)σx + (sinϕ sinα)σy + (cosα)σz, (A.17)
where the length of this vector equals one. Thus, all pure states are placed on the
surface of the sphere. As mixed states are given by
∑
i piρi with
∑
i pi = 1, classical
probabilities pi ∈ R and pure states ρi with i ∈ N, they lead to a sum of vectors
in the Bloch sphere. Obviously, the resulting vector will have a length smaller than
one, therefore being placed inside the sphere. The zero-vector represents then the
completely mixed state. Figure A.1 illustrates the Bloch sphere, where the extremal
points on the axes are usually labeled by the eigenstates of the corresponding basis
vectors. A similar representation in higher dimensions is in principle not possible.
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A.6 Clifford group
Unitary matrices which map the set of Pauli operators onto the set of Pauli operators
are called Clifford unitary operators and can be represented as a symplectic matrix
A ∈ M2m(Fp) with m ∈ N∗ describing the number of qudits, where the dimension of
the Hilbert space is given by d = pm with p prime; the positive integer p defines the
Hilbert space dimension of a single qudit. Within this section we give some properties
of the symplectic vector space.
Definition A.6.1 (Symplectic matrix).
A matrix A ∈M2m(Fp) is called symplectic if there holds
AtSA = S for S =
(
0m 1m
−1m 0m
)
. (A.18)
Corollary A.6.1 (Symplectic matrix properties).
The matrix A ∈M2m(Fp) is symplectic, if and only if there holds
stu = uts, ttv = vtt, and stv − utt =1m for A =
(
s t
u v
)
, (A.19)
for s, t, u, v ∈Mm(Fp).
Proof. The three properties follow by simply applying Definition A.6.1 to the matrix
A.
Definition A.6.2 (Symplectic product).
For two vectors ~a,~b ∈ F2mp , the symplectic product is defined as
(~a,~b)sp :=
m∑
k=1
azkb
x
k − axkbzk mod p, (A.20)
where az refers to the first half of the vector entries and ax to the second half.
Corollary A.6.2 (Bilinearity of symplectic product).
For the symplectic product holds
(~a+~b,~c+ ~d)sp = (~a,~c)sp + (~a, ~d)sp + (~b,~c)sp + (~b, ~d)sp (A.21)
with ~a,~b,~c and ~d ∈ K.
Proof. The proof follows simply by using the definition of the symplectic product that
is given by Equation (A.20).
Definition A.6.3 (Symplectic standard basis).
The vectors ~zk, ~xk ∈ F2mp with k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} form a symplectic basis of F2mp , if there
holds (~zk, ~zl)sp = (~xk, ~xl)sp = 0 and (~zk, ~xl)sp = δkl for k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For the
standard basis the vectors ~zk are defined to have a one at position k and zeros else,
the vectors ~xk have accordingly a one at position m+ k and zeros else.
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Lemma A.6.3 (Symplectic basis).
The images ~z′k = C~zk and ~x
′
k = C~xk of the symplectic standard basis with k ∈
{1, . . . ,m} and the matrix C ∈ M2m(Fp) form again a symplectic basis, if and only if
C is a symplectic matrix in the sense of Definition A.6.1.
Proof. For a symplectic standard basis there holds (~zk, ~zl)sp = 0 for all
k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The transformation of these properties with a matrix
C =
(
s t
u v
)
(A.22)
may cause a new symplectic basis, if there holds (C~zk, C~zl)sp = 0. With ~νk being the
k-th row vector of ν ∈ {s, t, u, v} and ~zz being the z-part of the vector ~z and ~xx being
the x-part of the vector ~x, we find
(C~zk, C~zl)sp =
m∑
i=1
(~si · ~zzk)(~ui · ~zzl )− (~ui · ~zzk)(~si · ~zzl ) (A.23)
=(~zzk)
t · st · u · ~zzl − (~zzk)t · ut · s · ~zzl . (A.24)
Since this equation has to be zero for all k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the expression stu = uts has
to be fulfilled. Similarly, from (~xk, ~xl)sp = 0 follows that t
tv = vtt. From (~zk, ~xl)sp = δkl
we get
(C~zk, C~xl)sp =
m∑
i=1
(~si · ~zzk)(~vi · ~xxl )− (~ui · ~zzk)(~ti · ~xxl ) (A.25)
=(~zzk)
t · st · v · ~xxl − (~zzk)t · ut · t · ~xxl . (A.26)
In order to set this equation equal to δij, the expression s
tv − utt = 1m needs to be
true. But by Corollary A.6.1 these three conditions hold if and only if C is a symplectic
matrix.
Appendix
B
Wiedemann’s conjecture proof
approach
Within this chapter, an approach is given that seems to be a promising candidate
for proving Wiedemann’s conjecture of [Wie88], where the proven analogy of Theo-
rem 4.2.3 is the origin of. The idea is based on the construction of the unitary operator
U as it was given in Section 4.7.
B.1 Unitary operator approach
By Theorem 4.2.3 it was proven, that Wiedemann’s conjecture is true, if and only if the
recursive construction of Equation (4.18) leads to a complete set of cyclic MUBs, which
is given when the multiplicative order of the stabilizer matrix C2k of Equation (4.19)
equals 22
k
+1 for all k ∈ N. As the recursive construction of the unitary generator U2k =
V2k/(− trV2k) that is given by Equation (4.73), is a representation of the stabilizer
matrix (cf. Equation (4.68)), Wiedemann’s conjecture is analogously proven if it is
shown that the multiplicative order of U2k equals 2
2k + 1. We start with the following
corollary that follows from Conjecture 4.7.1:
Corollary B.1.1 (Characteristic polynomial of Fermat sets).
If the characteristic polynomial of the unitary operator U2k = V2k/(− trV2k) with Vm
as given in Equation (4.79), equals
∑d
l=0 x
l with d = 22
k
for all k ∈ N, U2k generates
a complete set of cyclic MUBs and Wiedemann’s conjecture is true. This would also
prove Conjecture 4.7.1 in the case of Fermat sets.
Proof. If the multiplicative order of U2k is d + 1, its eigenvalues have to be roots of
unity of order d + 1, at least one of the eigenvalues has to be a principal root. The
converse of Conjecture 4.7.1 is always true, namely if U2k has d different eigenvalues, it
has order d+1. Thus, if we can show that U2k has d different eigenvalues of order d+1,
it generates a complete set of cyclic MUBs. If we regard the characteristic polynomial
χU
2k
of the unitary generator matrix with d different eigenvalues of order d + 1 and
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exclude, as allowed, the eigenvalue 1 from the set, we get
χU
2k
(x) =
d∏
l=1
(x− e2piil/(d+1)). (B.1)
If we multiply Equation (B.1) by x− 1, the result is equal to xd+1− 1, which, divided
again by x− 1, equals ∑dl=0 xl as expected.
So we can prove Wiedemann’s conjecture by calculating the characteristic polyno-
mial of U2k , which is given by
χU
2k
(x) := det(x1d − U2k) (B.2)
=xd − a1xd−1 + . . .+ (−1)d−1x1x1 + (−1)dx0ad; (B.3)
see e. g. Jacobson [Jac96, p. 196]. The value a1 is defined as the sum of all diagonal
elements, thus the trace of U2k . The value a2 is the sum of the two-rowed diagonal
minors and so on; ad is then the determinant. With U2k = V2k/(− trV2k) and trV2k =
−i2m/2 as shown in Equation (4.84), we find
χU
2k
(x) = det(x1d − αV2k) (B.4)
=xd − a′1αxd−1 + . . .+ (−1)d−1αd−1x1a′d−1 + (−1)dαdx0a′d, (B.5)
with α := −i2−m/2. In order to fulfill the requirements of Corollary B.1.1, all the
coefficients cl of the characteristic polynomial χU
2k
of U2k have to be one with χU2k (x) =∑d
l=0 clx
d−l. Therefore, we should find for the minor sums a′l of V2k , that a
′
l = (−i2m/2)l
holds for l ∈ {1, . . . , d}. For the trace a′1 this was already shown in Equation (4.84).
We will refer to a′l, which is the sum of the l-rowed diagonal minors, as trl in the
following. Since the proof is not finished, we can only discuss the calculation of the
two-rowed diagonal minors, but we expect that the higher orders may be derived in a
similar manner.
B.1.1 Two-rowed diagonal minors
The sum of the two-rowed diagonal minors of the matrix V2k is given by
tr2(V2k) :=
d∑
j=2
j−1∑
i=1
((V2k)i,i · (V2k)j,j − (V2k)i,j · (V2k)j,i) . (B.6)
To calculate this sum, we will separate the sum into the diagonal and the anti-diagonal
term. We like to recall that the elements of V2k are by construction limited as (V2k)i,j ∈
{±1,±i}.
In those cases, where we pick a real and an imaginary element from the diagonal,
their product would be imaginary. But we have seen in the calculation of the trace in
Equation (4.84), that the sum of all real elements on the diagonal is zero. So the sum
of these cases adds a zero to tr2(V2k).
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Whenever we take two real elements from the diagonal, they equal either −1 or
+1, but we know their sum is zero and d/2 elements are real. All their products give
d2 − 4d
32
· 1 · 1 + d
2 − 4d
32
· (−1) · (−1) + d
2
16
· (−1) · 1 = −d
4
. (B.7)
The last case holds when two imaginary elements from the diagonal axis are multiplied.
Since the sum of the 2m−1 imaginary elements gives −i2m/2 (cf. Equation (4.84)), there
occur 2m−2−2m/2−1 elements on the diagonal which are given by +i and 2m−2 +2m/2−1
elements on the diagonal which are given by −i. In analogy, we can calculate the sum
of the pairwise products of all imaginary elements on the diagonal as
(c−)2 − c−
2
· i2 + (c
+)2 − c+
2
· (−i)2 + (c− · c+) · i · (−i) = −d
4
, (B.8)
with abbreviations c− := (2m−2 − 2m/2−1) and c+ := (2m−2 + 2m/2−1).
In order to calculate the contributions of the anti-diagonal term of Equation (B.6),
some preliminary considerations are needed. Both factors of the term, namely (V2k)i,j
and (V2k)j,i have a factor of (−1)i·j or (−1)j·i, respectively, according to Equation (4.79).
Since their product is zero, also the product of (−1)i·0 and (−1)j·0 is zero. Thus, we
have
−(V2k)i,j · (V2k)j,i = −(V2k)i,0 · (V2k)j,0. (B.9)
By the recursion relation given in Equation (4.73) it is clear, that the set of elements
of the first column of V2k equals the set of elements of V2k−1 . By construction, for any
V2k , every second column has imaginary elements and in each column, except for the
first, the number of positive and negative elements is equal.1
The product of two elements from the first column, with one real and one imaginary
element then vanishes, as the sum of imaginary elements in the first column is zero.
If we take two imaginary elements from the first column of V2k , we have an equiv-
alent calculation as for the real elements on the diagonal to sum up the products of
all pairs. With the same number of positive and negative imaginary elements the sum
gives, involving the minus sign of Equation (B.9) and analogously to Equation (B.7),
−
(
d2 − 4d
32
· i · i + d
2 − 4d
32
· (−i) · (−i) + d
2
16
· (−i) · i
)
= −d
4
. (B.10)
For the negative sum of the products of two real elements of the first column of
V2k we remember, that the set of elements of this column equals the set of all elements
of V2k−1 . This matrix is given by the multiplication of a phase vector with Sylvester’s
Hadamard matrix. The rows with even index (starting with 0), all have only real
entries. Therefore, the number of +1 and −1 is equal in all columns, but not in the
first, where only +1 appears. Thus, there are 2m−2 + 2m/2−1 entries with value +1
and 2m−2−2m/2−1 entries with value −1. The sum of their products can be calculated
analogously to Equation (B.8) as
−
(
(c−)2 − c−
2
· 12 + (c
+)2 − c+
2
(−1)2 + (c− · c+) · 1 · (−1)
)
= −d
4
. (B.11)
1The Hadamard matrix H¯ has an equal number of +1 and −1 in each column, except for the
first, where only +1 appears (cf. Appendix A.3).
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Summing up four times −d/4 in the above discussion leads to
tr2(V2k) = −d = −2m, (B.12)
which equals tr(V2k)
2 and is the expected result (cf. Equation (4.84)).
Continuing this process, maybe by using a complete induction which shows that
trl+1(V2k) is given by tr1(V2k) · trl(V2k), could lead to a proof of Wiedemann’s conjec-
ture.
Appendix
C
Results
C.1 Solutions for cyclic MUBs
C.1.1 Homogeneous sets with group structure
Homogeneous sets with an additive group structure in the Gzj components of the class
generators for j ∈ {1, . . . , d} were introduced in Section 4.5.1. Results for dimension
d = 23 of the Hilbert space were given. Here we list sets which appear by testing all
stabilizer matrices C in the form of Equation (4.34) for d = 24. For each set we give
the reduced stabilizer matrix B as well as the matrix R, both with the vector ~n as
their index which indicates the entanglement properties of the bases of the specific
set, as defined in Section 4.4. Additionally, the corresponding quantum circuits are
derived by the methods of Section 4.8.2 and listed below the matrices.
B(2,0,0,4,11) =

1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0
 and R(2,0,0,4,11) =

1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 . (C.1)
i
i −1
−1
H
H
H
H
= C(2,0,0,4,11)
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B(2,0,1,4,10) =

1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0
 and R(2,0,1,4,10) =

1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 . (C.2)
i
i −1
−1 −1
H
H
H
H
= C(2,0,1,4,10)
B(2,0,2,4,9) =

1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
 and R(2,0,2,4,9) =

1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 . (C.3)
i
i
i −1 −1
H
H
H
H
= C(2,0,2,4,9)
B(2,1,0,2,12) =

1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
 and R(2,1,0,2,12) =

1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 . (C.4)
i
i
i
−1
H
H
H
H
= C(2,1,0,2,12)
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B(2,1,1,2,11) =

1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 and R(2,1,1,2,11) =

1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 . (C.5)
i
i
i
−1
H
H
H
H
= C(2,1,1,2,11)
B(2,1,2,2,10) =

1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
 and R(2,1,2,2,10) =

1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 . (C.6)
i
i
−1
−1
H
H
H
H
= C(2,1,2,2,10)
B(2,2,2,0,11) =

1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
 and R(2,2,2,0,11) =

1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 . (C.7)
i
i
i
−1
H
H
H
H
= C(2,2,2,0,11)
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The listed sets are not unique. For each system we found the following number of
different solutions (which may give rise to possible symmetries):
~n = (3, 0, 2, 0, 12)⇒ 1 · 4 · 15 · 4! solutions,
~n = (2, 0, 0, 4, 11)⇒ 4 · 4 · 15 · 4! solutions,
~n = (2, 0, 1, 4, 10)⇒ 6 · 4 · 15 · 4! solutions,
~n = (2, 0, 2, 4, 09)⇒ 1 · 4 · 15 · 4! solutions,
~n = (2, 1, 0, 2, 12)⇒ 6 · 4 · 15 · 4! solutions,
~n = (2, 1, 1, 2, 11)⇒ 6 · 4 · 15 · 4! solutions,
~n = (2, 1, 2, 2, 10)⇒ 2 · 4 · 15 · 4! solutions,
~n = (2, 2, 2, 0, 11)⇒ 2 · 4 · 15 · 4! solutions.
As discussed in Section 4.5, the factor of 15 = 24 − 1 can be explained by a freedom
in the choice of R (cf. Equation (4.39)). It is not clear, if this is uncorrelated to all
permutations of the indexing of the four qubits, which would explain the occurrence
of the factor 4!.
C.1.2 Homogeneous sets with semigroup structure
Homogeneous sets with an additive semigroup structure in the Gzj components of the
class generators for j ∈ {1, . . . , d} were introduced in Section 4.5.2. Here we give an
incomplete list of stabilizer matrices for the existing systems, having the vector ~n as
their index which indicates the entanglement properties of the bases of the specific
set, as defined in Section 4.4 for the dimension d = 24. A representation of the solely
existing stabilizer matrix that creates the semigroup structure for d = 23 was given
already in Section 4.5.2. For each stabilizer matrix, the corresponding quantum circuit
is derived by the methods of Section 4.8.2 and shown beneath.
C(1,0,0,8,8) =

0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1

. (C.8)
i
i
−1
−1
−1 −1
−1
H
H
H
H
i
i −1
−1 −1
= C(1,0,0,8,8)
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C(1,1,0,6,9) =

0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0

. (C.9)
i
i
i
−1
−1
H
H
H
H
i
i −1
= C(1,1,0,6,9)
C(1,1,1,6,8) =

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0

. (C.10)
i
i
i
−1
H
H
H
H
i
−1
−1 −1
= C(1,1,1,6,8)
C(1,2,0,4,10) =

0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0

. (C.11)
−1
−1
−1
−1
H
H
H
H
i
i
−1
−1
−1
= C(1,2,0,4,10)
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C(1,2,1,4,9) =

1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0

. (C.12)
i
i
i
i −1
−1
H
H
H
H
−1
= C(1,2,1,4,9)
C(1,2,2,4,8) =

1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0

. (C.13)
i
i
i
i
−1
−1
H
H
H
H
i
i
= C(1,2,2,4,8)
C(1,3,0,2,11) =

1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0

. (C.14)
i
i
i
−1
−1
H
H
H
H
i
i −1
= C(1,3,0,2,11)
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C(1,3,1,2,10) =

1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0

. (C.15)
i
i
i
−1
−1
−1
H
H
H
H
i
i −1
= C(1,3,1,2,10)
C(1,4,1,0,11) =

0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0

. (C.16)
i
−1
−1
−1
−1
−1
H
H
H
H
i
i −1
= C(1,4,1,0,11)
Again, the listed sets are not unique as in Section C.1.1. But as there is not a
reduced form of the stabilizer matrix C similar to Equation (4.34), it is useless to
discuss the number of solutions for each set.
C.1.3 Inhomogeneous sets
Inhomogeneous sets were introduced in Section 4.6. Here we list stabilizer matrices
and the corresponding generators G0 of the first class of operators C0 for selected sets
of MUBs with specific entanglement properties of their bases which are indicated by
the vector ~n as their index. By construction, the generators G0 have a specific form,
thus, in order to keep this section short, we abbreviate these generators as
G
(i)
0 =
(
1m
0m +
∑i
k=2(|1〉〈k|+ |k〉〈1|)
)
, (C.17)
with i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. Their implementations as a quantum circuit are shown in the
following.
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H
H −1
H
H
= G
(2)
0
H
H
H
−1
−1
H
H
H
= G
(3)
0
H
H
H
H
−1
−1
−1
H
H
H
H
= G
(4)
0
The stabilizer matrices and generators found for four-qubit systems, as well as the
corresponding quantum circuits (cf. Section 4.8.3) are given as follows:
C(0,2,0,8,7) =

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1

and G
(3)
0 . (C.18)
H
H
H
H
i
i
i
−1
−1
−1
= C(0,2,0,8,7)
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C(0,3,1,6,7) =

0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

and G
(2)
0 . (C.19)
i
i −1 −1
H
H
H
H
= C(0,3,1,6,7)
C(0,3,2,6,6) =

0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0

and G
(2)
0 . (C.20)
i
i
i
−1
−1
−1
−1
H
H
H
H
i
i
−1
−1
−1
−1
= C(0,3,2,6,6)
C(0,4,0,4,9) =

0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1

and G
(4)
0 . (C.21)
−1
−1
−1
−1
−1
H
H
H
H
i
−1
−1
−1
= C(0,4,0,4,9)
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C(0,4,1,4,8) =

0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0

and G
(3)
0 . (C.22)
i
−1 −1
H
H
H
H
−1 −1
= C(0,4,1,4,8)
C(0,4,2,4,7) =

0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

and G
(2)
0 . (C.23)
i
−1
−1 −1
H
H
H
H
= C(0,4,2,4,7)
C(0,5,2,2,8) =

1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0

and G
(2)
0 . (C.24)
i
−1
H
H
H
H
i
= C(0,5,2,2,8)
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C.1.4 Testing Wiedemann’s conjecture
Wiedemann tested his conjecture with dimensions d = 22
k
for k ∈ {0, . . . , 8} in [Wie88].
As claimed in Section 4.2, we are able to raise this test up to k = 11. Since the testing
procedure is too complicated to be done by hand, we offer the used Matlab code to
provide maximal insight into the calculation. It should be mentioned that the method
divisor list is generated by a Mathematica code, since Matlab cannot handle very long
integers that easily. This code takes the factors of a Fermat number, calculates all
divisors, writes them in a binary representation and reverses that string to have the
least significant bit on the left hand side. Finally, these divisors are provided within a
list that can be used for the Matlab code. The following code uses the parameter ksize
that equals the variable k.
function [ ] = TestWiedemann ( k s i z e )
% t e s t i n g genera tor f o r 2ˆ k s i z e q u b i t s
s ize=2ˆ k s i z e ;
% i n i t i a l i z e matr ices
Zero=zeros ( [ size , s ize ] ) ;
C=zeros ( [ 2∗ size , 2∗ s ize ] ) ;
% crea t e un i t y matr ices One=1 { s i z e } and One2=1 {2∗ s i z e }
One = eye ( s ize ) ;
One2 = eye (2∗ s ize ) ;
% crea t e matrix C
maxrow=0;
row=1;
for i =1:2∗ s ize
C( i , row)=1;
C( row , i )=1;
row=row+1;
i f ( row>maxrow)
row=1;
i f (maxrow==0)
maxrow=1;
else
maxrow=maxrow∗2 ;
end
end
end
% t e s t i f Cˆ{2ˆm+1}=One2
CC=C;
for l =1: s ize
CC=mod(CC∗CC, 2 ) ;
end
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% i f yes . . .
i f ( mod( CC∗C, 2 ) == One2)
% load d i v i s o r s o f 2ˆm+1 in b inary
% rep r e s en t a t i on whearas the
% l e a s t s i g n i f i c a n t b i t i s on the l e f t
d i v i s o r l i s t=d i v i s o r s b i n ( s ize ) ;
wrong=0;
for i =1: length ( d iv s )
% i n i t i a l i z e t e s tma t r i x
t e s t=One2 ;
% load f a c t o r
f a c t o r=d i v i s o r l i s t { i } ;
% ca l c u l a t e the power o f C g iven by the loaded
% f a c t o r and wr i t e the r e s u l t to the t e s tma t r i x
CC=C;
for j =1: length ( f a c t o r )
i f ( f a c t o r ( j)== ’ 1 ’ )
t e s t=mod( t e s t ∗CC, 2 ) ;
end
CC=mod(CC∗CC, 2 ) ;
end
% check i f o f f−d iagona l b l o c k s equa l zero
i f ( t e s t ( 1 : size , s ize+1:2∗ s ize ) == Zero )
i f ( t e s t ( s ize+1:2∗ size , 1 : s ize ) == Zero )
% i f yes , Wiedemanns con j e c tu r e would be wrong
wrong=1;
break
end
end
end
% i f Wiedemanns con j e c tu re has never been t e s t e t wrong , i t
% f i t s f o r the t e s t e t dimension
i f ( wrong == 0)
fpr intf ( ’ Wiedemanns c on j e c t u r e t e s t e d c o r r e c t ’ ) ;
fpr intf ( ’ f o r 2ˆ%d qub i t s !\n\n ’ , k s i z e ) ;
else
fprintf ( ’ Wiedemanns c on j e c t u r e i s wrong !\n\n ’ ) ;
end
end
end
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C.1.5 Triangle solutions
For the method we introduced in Chapter 4.1.1 we are able to find reduced stabilizer
matrices B in the form of Equation (4.13). Here we list solutions for the submatrix A
for dimensions d = 2m with m = {2, . . . , 600}.1 The runtime of that algorithm is much
shorter than expected in Section 4.1.1, since the number of divisors of an integer 2m+1
with m ∈ N∗ seems in most times to be far away from the supposed limit of √2m + 1,
which is the leading factor in Equation (4.11) for large values of m. Table C.1 gives
solutions for the matrices A, where the number in the leftmost column indicates the
number of qubits m for the solution of A in the subsequent column. Moving a column
to the right increments the number of qubits by one.
2 0 0 1 0 0 1
8 0 11 1 0
1 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
1
14 0 0 11 1 1 1 0 1
20
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1
1 0 0
1 0
0 1
0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
26 0 1 00 0
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
0 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
32 0 11 0
1 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
0
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
0 1 0
1 1 0
0 0 1
38 0 11 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
1 0
0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
44
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1
50 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
56
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1
1 0
62 0 11 1
1 0
0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
68
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
0 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
74
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 11 0
1 0
0 0 1
80 0 11 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
1 0
0 1
1 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
86 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
92
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1
1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1The used algorithm keeps the matrix A as small as possible and is able to generate solutions for
even higher dimensions.
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98
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
104
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
1
110
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
0
0 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
116
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
122
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
128
0 1 0
1 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 0
0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
134 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 0
140
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1
1 1
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
146
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
152
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
0
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
158 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
164
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
170
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
176 0 11 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
182
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1
1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
188
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0
0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
194 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
200
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
206
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
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212
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 0
218
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
224
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
230
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 1 00 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
236
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
242
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
248
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
254
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
260
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0
0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
266 0 11 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
272
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 0
278 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0
0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
284
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
290
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 0
0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0
296
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
302
0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
308
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
314
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 0
0 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
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320
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
326 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
332
1 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0
0 1
1 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
338 0
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
1
344
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
350 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
356 0 11 0
1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1
0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
362
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
368
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
374
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
380
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0
386
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0
1 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
392
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 0
398 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0
0 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1
404
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
410 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
0
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
416
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1
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422
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
428
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1
434
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0
440
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0
446
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
452
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
1 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
1
458
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
464
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
470
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1
476
1 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
482
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0
1 1 0
0 0 1
488
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1
494
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
500
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
506
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
512
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
518
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
0 1 00 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
126 APPENDIX C. RESULTS
524
1 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
530 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
536
1 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
542
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0
0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
548
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0
554
0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
0
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
560
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0
566
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0
572
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1
578 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1
584
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
590
1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
0
0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0
596
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
Table C.1: This table lists the matrices A which correspond to the lower right corner
of the matrices B ∈ Mm(F2) for m = {2, . . . , 600} in the form of Equation (4.13)
satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii’) as discussed in Chapter 4.1 and can be used to
construct complete sets of Fibonacci-based cyclic MUBs for dimensions 2m.
C.1.6 Companion matrix solutions
In Chapter 4.1.2 we conjecture the existence of a symmetric companion matrix over
F2. As long as we do not have the specific form, we propose found solutions for
dimensions d = 2m with m = {2, . . . , 36}. Contrary to the solutions of Appendix
C.1.5, the number of matrices we have to test before getting a correct solution seems
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to scale worse. According to the representation of the solutions, as in Equation (4.15),
we write the solutions in Table C.2 as a binary string, starting from left with s1 and
ending with the last entry that equals one.
m s
2 11
4 1101
5 01101
6 001101
7 1101001
8 11010001
9 011001001
10 0001100001
11 01100100001
12 001101000001
13 1100101000001
14 10100110000001
15 110100010000001
16 1101000100000001
17 10011000100000001
18 000000011000000001
19 1110100001000000001
20 00011000010000000001
21 111101000010000000001
22 0001111000100000000001
23 01100100000100000000001
24 001101000001000000000001
25 1000011000001000000000001
26 01100000100010000000000001
27 110010100000010000000000001
28 1010011000000100000000000001
29 01010001000000100000000000001
30 110110111000001000000000000001
31 0000110100000001000000000000001
32 11010001000000010000000000000001
33 010110001000000010000000000000001
34 0100100011000000100000000000000001
35 10110100100000000100000000000000001
36 100111001000000001000000000000000001
Table C.2: Solutions for the symmetric companion matrix which is discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1.2 and represents a reduced stabilizer matrix B in order to construct a com-
plete set of Fibonacci-based cyclic MUBs (cf. Section 4.1) for dimensions d = 2m with
m = 2, . . . , 36. The solutions are represented as a binary string, starting from left with
s1 and ending with the last entry that equals one, corresponding to Equation (4.15).
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C.2 Fractal patterns
In Section 3.2, properties of the Fibonacci polynomials over F2 are discussed. The
structure of these polynomials is shown in Table C.3 and related to the Sierpinski
triangle. Also the characteristic polynomials of matrices over F2, that have only ones
in the upper left half and zeros otherwise (thus, setting A to zero in Equation (4.13)),
show an equivalent pattern (see Table C.4). Removing from Table C.3 every second line
and every second column leads to (an obviously smaller version of) Table C.4. Both
are related to Pascal’s triangle over F2 (see Table C.5). To have a good impression,
we encode ones by “#” and zeros by a space.
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#
#
# #
#
# # #
# #
# # #
#
# # # #
# # #
# # # # #
# #
# # # # #
# # #
# # # #
#
# # # # #
# # # #
# # # # # # #
# # #
# # # # # # # #
# # # # #
# # # # # # #
# #
# # # # # # #
# # # # #
# # # # # # # #
# # #
# # # # # # #
# # # #
# # # # #
#
# # # # # #
# # # # #
# # # # # # # # #
# # # #
# # # # # # # # # # #
# # # # # # #
# # # # # # # # # #
# # #
# # # # # # # # # # #
# # # # # # # #
# # # # # # # # # # # # #
# # # # #
# # # # # # # # # # # #
# # # # # # #
# # # # # # # # #
# #
# # # # # # # # #
# # # # # # #
# # # # # # # # # # # #
# # # # #
# # # # # # # # # # # # #
# # # # # # # #
# # # # # # # # # # #
# # #
# # # # # # # # # #
# # # # # # #
# # # # # # # # # # #
# # # #
# # # # # # # # #
# # # # #
# # # # # #
#
# # # # # # #
# # # # # #
# # # # # # # # # # #
# # # # #
# # # # # # # # # # # # # #
# # # # # # # # #
Table C.3: Fibonacci polynomials over F2, where “#” encodes a coefficient that equals
one in the polynomial, and a space encodes a zero. The rightmost coefficient is the
highest, the rows indicate the index j of the Fibonacci polynomial Fj(x), starting with
1 and ending with 70.
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Table C.4: Characteristic polynomials of matrices over F2 with ones in the upper
left half and zeros otherwise (A in Equation (4.13) is set to zero). “#” encodes a
coefficient that equals one in the polynomial, whereas a space encodes a zero. The
leftmost coefficient is the highest, the rows indicate the dimension m of the matrix B,
starting with 1 and ending with 70.
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Table C.5: Pascal’s triangle over F2, where “#” encodes a binomial coefficient that
equals one and a space encodes a zero. For a binomial coefficient
(
n
k
)
with n, k ∈ N
and k ≤ n, the columns indicate different values of k, where the ordering is symmetric
and the rows indicate the values for n, starting with 0 and ending with 70.
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